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In a Divorce or Dissolution Who
Gets the Pension Rights: Domestic
Relations Law and Retirement Plans
HENRY ALAN PATTIZ*
INTRODUCTION
When a marriage begins, it is made in heaven and will last
"forever."1 However, when a marriage is legally over there is the
rough sundering of dreams and hopes for the future and the
need to sort out amongst the former life companions what is
legally the property of each. This article will explore the evolv-
* B.S. University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School of Finance and
Commerce, 1963; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1967. Certified Tax Specialist,
California Board of Legal Specialization. Member, State Bar of California, Bar
Association of Beverly Hills, Los Angeles County Bar Association, and Ameri-
can Bar Association.
The author has lectured and written extensively on employee benefit plans
and estate planning topics and has also lectured in the Graduate School of
Taxation for Golden Gate University. He has undertaken a course in Employee
Benefit Plans for the University of West Los Angeles, as well as presenting
courses for the California CPA Foundation. He is Chairman of the Employee
Benefits Committee for the Beverly Hills Bar Association.
1. See generally 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 1(1948), 32 CAL. JUR. 2d, Marriage § 2
(1956), BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1123 (4th rev. 1968). The legal definition of
marriage is stated to include the intention of husband and wife to agree to live
together forever as long as they both shall live.
ing legal process2 which divides the property rights acquired
during marriage in a retirement plan which was, intended to act
as a shield against deprivation of the marriage partners in their
mutually shared old age.
2. The state of the law as to the existence of "marital property" in retire-
ment plans has been evolving rapidly. This is especially true in community
property states. See French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235, Annot., 123
A.L.R. 366 (1941); and In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126
Cal. Rptr. 553 (1976). See also the list of cases in Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d
422, 423 (Tex. 1977) wherein a series of cases on the same subject has been
developed by the Texas courts. In Taggart, supra, it is noted that the Texas
courts have admonished counsel and trial judges to bear in raind the community
property aspects of retirements plans. This particular approach of admonish-
ment has been going on by the courts since Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex.
1970).
California courts have been less lenient to the legal profession in insisting that
attorneys remain up to date with the evolving state of the law. In Smith v. Lewis,
13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975), the Supreme Court of
California (over a strong dissent by Justice Clark) upheld a malpractice verdict
of $100,000 against a divorce attorney who had failed in 1967-68 to assert com-
munity property interests in a military pension plan pursuant to a divorce
proceeding where the attorney was representing the wife. The case illustrates
lack of "due diligence" by the attorney, but also illustrates a very rapid prog-
ression in the change in the law in this area. and by hind-sight amply shows what
the attorney might have been able to guess, but failed to do. See especially id. at
355, 530 P.2d at 562-63, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 624-25 (1975).
The court states further:
[W]e believe an attorney assumes an obligation to his client to undertake
reasonable research in an effort to ascertain relevant legal principles
and to make an informed decision as to a course of conduct based on
intelligent assessment of the problem. Id. at 359, 530 P.2d at 595, 118 Cal.
Rptr. at 627.
The court also states that the attorney failed to undertake research. "Even as to
doubtful matters, an attorney is expected to perform sufficient research to
enable him to make an informed and intelligent judgment on behalf of his
client." Id. at 360, 530 P.2d at 596, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 628. See especially strong
dissent, id. at 369-70, 530 P.2d 102-03, 118 Cal. Rptr. 634-35, illustrating a very
uncertain state of the law in 1967-68. In dissent, Justice Clark is willing to
concede possible negligence, but does not grant that there was any adequate
showing of $100,000 damages.
Subsequent cases illustrate more clearly that California attorneys must be
exceptionally careful to avoid malpractice in this area.
The first, Bucquet v. Livingston, 57 Cal. App. 3d 914, 219 Cal. Rptr. 514
(1976) (illustrates that a California attorney will be held responsible for the
tax implication of whatever advice is given where such tax matters may
have a major impact on the value of the services rendered to the client. See Part
V, infra, dealing with the difficulty in valuing an interest of a retirement plan
where tax implication may be involved. See also In re Marriage of Fonstein, 17
Cal. 3d 739, 552 P.2d 1169, 131 Cal. Rptr. 973 (1971), citing Weinberg v. Weinberg,
67 Cal. 2d 557,432 P.2d 709, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967), for the principle that normally
tax implications will only be considered where a tax can be expected as of the
time of the court deliberation. Bucquet, supra, involved an attorney doing estate
planning work and the preparation of a trust on behalf of a decedent. The cause
of action arose in favor of intended beneficiaries of the decedent. The second
California case, Cline v. Watkins, 66 Cal. App. 3d 174, 135 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1977)
refused to allow the dismissal of a malpractice action against a first attorney in
a divorce action who had failed to note the probable community property status
of a military pension plan. The first attorney had undertaken to continue the
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To begin, the reader must first understand the purpose of
marriage and the purpose of the retirement plan. Society, for its
own continuation, for the "procreation of the race," has en-
dowed the union of men and women with special status and has
encouraged the man and the woman to join together for their
own pleasure and security. The overriding purpose is the har-
monious continuation of society. Society, by legal rules, insures
the privacy of the parties and aims to give them economic secu-
rity. To each party there has been the promise of recognition
and encouragement. Society asks, in turn, that the partners in
the marriage give their legal assurances 3 that society will not be
burdened by the financial expense of providing for each of
them and for raising their children. Society thereby gets its
continuation, unencumbered by their debts.4
In short, society grants recognition and the chance of shared
financial security. In exchange society receives a new genera-
representation. The second attorney had also been negligent in failing to 6 ite the
community property status of the pension and had allowed the matter to
continue to final judgment thereby establishing res judicata against the wife for
any interests she may have had in such pension. Again, a vigorous dissent
argued against holding the first attorney liable for malpractice.
[I]n summary, we have the following situation: attorney Watkins pro-
tected the issue in the complaint he filed before he was substituted out;
he had no say in the selection of and was not in privity with the subse-
quent attorney; he was a complete stranger to and had no control over
participation in the OSC in the trial which culminated in the Interlocut-
ory Decree of Divorce.
By reason of the above, I conclude that attorney Watkins could not
reasonably foresee the failure, if any, of the subsequent attorney (attor-
ney Scott) to protect the community interest of Wife in Husband's feder-
al military retirement pension. Id. at 180, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
In short, California courts have been prone to hold attorneys liable for mal-
practice in failing to anticipate (a) changes in court decisions; and (b) the failure
of subsequent counsel to continue to protect the interests of a client. In addition,
tax implications seem to have been placed at a high priority level in representing
a client's interests in this particular area.
3. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11350 (West Supp. 1977). The State takes
a keen interest in seeing that the responsibility for support and maintenance of
close family relatives (in California, the spouse, children and parents, when in
need) so that the welfare burden for other members of society is minimized.
See Los Angeles Times, Jan. 20, 1978, § 1, at 13. The article briefly illustrates
an effort, in fiscal 1977 (ended September 30th) to assist the states in collecting
child support from runaway parents (a total of $258 million spent). The depart-
ment of HEW collected $818 million in the fiscal year 1977. See also 42 U.S.C. §
659 (1977).
4. Wisconsin, in a recent attempt to protect the State Treasury against
responsibility for the welfare of unsupported children, passed a statute which
tion, bred and raised at the primary expense of the parents.
For the worker, a pension is the promised reward for the long
years of heavy toil-the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow-
the shield against deprivation and want when his personal
labors no longer yield a full measure of the needed daily bread.5
The employer receives better work because the morale of the
employee is improved. The employer also feels better as a hu-
man being (paternalistic) in that he can be assured that the
employee will not be cast out on the slag heap when his days of
productive labor are ended.
Society offers incentives for both-mainly in the form of tax
advantages 6-for the establishment and maintenance of the
pension program. Again, society gets the best of the bargain, for
it obtains cheaply a strong partnership of employer and employ-
ee in production without having to bear the financial burden of
the employee's retirement. Marriage provides a safe place for
raising the young; retirement plans, a safe place for the aged
and infirm.
There is generally no conflict between the purposes of mar-
-riage and of retirement plans-except when the marriage rela-
tionship ends. Then, the property rights in the retirement plan
must be divided or passed on to others. Here, the emphasis shall
be on the end of marriage by divorce (dissolution), although
some reference will also be made to marriage termination by
death of husband or wife.
Who are the players on this stage? Who must be considered
when discussing family law and pension plans? To begin, there
is, of course, husband and wife-one or both of whom will also
forbade the issuance of a marriage license to a father who could not prove that
children of prior marriages were being supported in such a manner as not to
become public charges. The U.S. Supreme Court in Zablocki v. Redhall, No. 76-
879 (decided Jan. 18, 1978), held such a statute invaded the individual's right to
privacy. See Los Angeles Times, Jan. 19, 1978, § 1, at 11.
5. See R. NADER, K. BLACKWELL, You AND YOUR PENSION (1973); ALAN,
MELONE AND ROSENBLOOM, PENSION PLANNING (3d ed. 1976); D.M. McGILL, FUN-
DAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS (1975).
6. See I.R.C. §§ 401, 501. Generally, (a) Employer contributions will be
deductible when made; (b) Neither Employer nor Employee will be subject to
tax on earnings of fund; and (c) Employee may receive favorable tax treatment
upon receipt of distribution from retirement plan. See BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 7,
1977, 104, "Pensions Land in Divorce Court." Increasingly, the intermediaries
who merely hold the money on behalf of the plan find themselves facing an
impossible choice between protecting the interests of the plan participant as
required by federal law and following the obligations imposed by state court in
accounting for some or all of the benefits to a divorcing spouse.
7. See note 2, supra. The issue of malpractice for professionals is espe-
cially important in the State of California.
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have the status of employee and of participant/member in a
retirement plan. There will also be the employer and the trus-
tees and other fiduciaries managing the pension plan. Then
there are the advisors, including attorneys, accountants, ac-
tuaries, and others, for all of the above. Aside from the husband
and wife, the other actors merely wish a clear set of ground
rules so they may continue to carry out their functions. The
emphasis here will be on providing those ground rules for these
others.7 For the financial intermediary and for the advisors,8 a
logical and consistent set of rules is necessary. Without such
guidelines making retirement plan administration predictable,
qualified fiduciaries and advisors will be increasingly reluctant
to provide their services and retirement plans can beexpected
to disappear.'
The emphasis throughout this article will be on purpose and
predictability. To that end, the essential definitions of marriage
(Part I), of retirement plans (Part II), and of property rights
(Part III) begin this article. Some of the more important clauses
found in retirement plans (those which limit alienability of ben-
efits and which provide a basis for payment of benefits) and the
statutory and other legal bases for retirement plans are dis-
cussed in Part IV. Because the United States consists of a num-
ber of different jurisdictions, each of which has its own legal
8. With the best of intent, Congress passed the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1975) (hereinafter referred to as
ERISA). Section 2 of ERISA sets forth Congress' intention of fostering the
continued healthy development of employee benefit programs, and most specif-
ically, retirement plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1975).
However, in a study requested by Congress, the Internal Revenue Service
revealed that approximately thirty percent (30%) of the pension plans in exist-
ence when ERISA was enacted could be expected to terminate because of the
added costs incident to complying with the new law. [Jul. 25, 1977] 147 PENSION
REPORTER (BNA) A-10; [Aug. 19,19771125 PENSION PLAN GUIDE (CCH) § 25 at 176.
9. In the United States, and its possessions, there are nine (9) community
property jurisdictions. Of these, Louisiana has adopted the Napoleonic code
approach to community property, while Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada,
New Mexico, Puerto Rico, Texas and Washington have adopted the Spanish and
Mexican approach. Of the above, Idaho and Washington have adopted a specif-
ically statutory system. Hawaii, because of the mixture of its sources of law,
combines elements of the common law and of community property and of East
Asian and of Polynesian principles. For somewhat similar reasons, Alaska has
certain specialized concepts of property law. The remaining States and the
District of Columbia, apply one form or another of the English common law
concept as to determination of rights and property.
system,1" there has been a continuing dispute over whether or
not federal law preempts and supersedes local law as it relates
to retirement plans. This issue is presented in Part V.
Assuming for the moment that local jurisdiction may reach
property interests in retirement plans incident to divorce (dis-
solution) proceedings, how such interests are to be valued (Part
VI), division made (Part VII), and such orders of division en-
forced (Part VIII) will then be discussed.
Remember, the objective is to harmonize as much as possible
the various diverse purposes of the spouses, the employer, the
fiduciaries and society. This reconciliation is carried out in
practice by the actual valuation, division and pay-out of plan
benefits. If the spouses move to different jurisdictions (state-to-
state, or from the United States to a foreign country, or vice
,versa) their legal relationships and their interest in the retire-
ment plan may change markedly. The real and potential
conflicts that arise from such peregrinations are explored in
Part IX. Part X will illustrate by example some of the more
horrendous difficulties that can (and do!) occur.
There have been social changes amounting to a revolution in
society in the last several decades. The advent of artificial birth
control, coupled with markedly increased life expectancy, has
undercut the traditional purposes of marriage 1 and of retire-
ment plans and has also led to a substantial increase in the
number of women in the work force. In addition, people are far
more mobile and therefore tend to come under more legal juris-
dictions than before. This social revolution is not easily as-
similated into our legal system. For this author, all of these
changes must be reflected in any solution to the conflict of
purposes for marriage and for retirement plans. The conclusion
to this article is an attempt to integrate these changes in arriving
at a solution. It is believed that marriage is becoming a more
consensual and less societal contract and that the traditional
"retirement plan" is being broadened to provide a source of
funds for needed change in circumstances during the working
life of the participant. Since people live longer and are freer to
10. See generally Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 815 (1976). This case and the substantial commentaries that have occurred
because of it, are discussed below in Part I; see also Kay and Amyx, Marvin v.
Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CAL. L. REV. 937 (1977). California does not
allow common law marriages to be established under its state law. CAL. CIv.
CODE §§ 4100-01 (West 1977).
11. See 1978 Cal. Stats. ch. 851, which bans all mandatory retirement ages.
Presently, a similar statute is in Congress which would raise the Federal manda-
tory age from 65 to 70. (Effective Jan. 1, 1979).
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move, there is a longer period of time for interests in a retire-
ment plan to be subject to divergent legal jurisdictions. For
these reasons, a uniform national statute applicable to the
rights of participants in plans which will allow them, under
certain circumstances (such as divorce), to create rights in
others, is suggested. Such a statute should allow for employer
or employee registration of plan interests and should also estab-
lish clear, but flexible, guidelines for valuing and distributing
interests in retirement plans. Such a statute could also allow
individuals to contract with their employers, their spouse, state
agencies (but not normal creditors), and other specially placed
persons for any reasonable variation in the normal right to earn
and receive benefits from the plan, so long as consistent with
the purposes of the plan (to be specified in writing in the plan
document). This consensual element leaves flexibility and indi-
vidual choice.
Finally, the holder of the plan assets, the trustee, and other
plan fiduciaries must be protected. If the system leaves doubt as
to proper recipients and plan fiduciaries remain liable for mis-
taken payment of benefits,'12 there will be substantial added
administrative expense for running plans 13 and less incentive to
establish and continue them.
Briefly;
1. There should be some national uniformity to define rights in
plans.
2. Individuals should have some personal flexibility to transfer
interests in plans to others, especially in domestic relations areas
without adverse tax effect. 14
3. Always, the purposes of plans and of marriage (as changing)
should be kept uppermost in mind when problems arise.
12. ERISA requires that a plan fiduciary "shall discharge his duties with
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries. .. "
29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1975); see also Kerbow v. Kerbow, 421 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D.
Texas 1976), where the Federal District Court held that wives attempting to
collect pension benefits directly from the pension plan, which had been ordered
paid to them by a Texas divorce court, were not participants or beneficiaries
under the plan and therefore had no rights under the Federal law to maintain a
cause of action to obtain such benefits.
13. See note 8, supra. See Fox v. Smith, 531 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. 1975), where
the court allowed the trustee to pay into the court the disputed fund and to
deduct its costs from the funds to be distributed. The court treated the proceed-
ing as to the trustees as in the nature of an interpleader.
14. I.R.C. § 61 (a)(11) requires the recipient of retirement interests to treat
4. Plan fiduciaries must be allowed to administer the plan without
undue expense or liability.
PART I
MARRIAGE: What is it, where is it today and how does it end?
Marriage has been "defined" as a civil contract between a
man, a woman 15 (and the state 16) wherein they, having the legal
capacity to do so, agree to live together for life as husband and
wife. 17 Marriage is a relationship favored by the law. The public
policy is to make it a permanent and public institution and to
prevent separations.18
Society, the state, wishes to have a next generation and wishes
parents to raise their own children at their own expense. The
celebration 9 of marriage is in the nature of an open and notori-
ous announcement that one man and one woman are now joined
to each other in marriage and are hereafter out-of-bounds to all
others. In this way a man may be sure that he is the father of any
children born of the relationship and will therefore be willing to
provide support for the wife and children.
In some states, excluding California, a common law marriage
will occur when a man and a woman join together and hold
themselves out by agreement as husband and wife. Even where
such marriage would not be permissible in one state, it generally
will be recognized for persons properly so married in another
jurisdiction." California does, however, recognize a "pocket"
marriage which may be entered into without a license for per-
sons who have been living together as husband and wife. Such a
marriage need only be recorded on the books of a church, but
need not be entered otherwise in the public record by the par-
them as part of gross income. In addition, distributions on account of certain
limited circumstances give favorable tax effect to the recipient. See I.R.C. § 402.
The Internal Revenue Code needs a specific authorization to treat as untaxed
any division of marital property or similar transaction not carried out with a
primary purpose towards tax avoidance. See also Comm'r v. Wilkerson, 386
F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1966), which indicates the community property treatment of
retirement benefits under the federal tax laws; and I.R.C. §§ 402(e)(4)(G), 408(g)
which is illustrative of the provisions in the Internal Revenue Code which could
allow tax flexibility for division of marital property.
15. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4100-01 (West 1970).
16. 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 1(b), 808 n.23 (1948).
17. 32 CAL. JUR. 2d Marriage § 2, 329 (1956).
18. 55 C.J.S. Marriage § l(b), 806, 808 (1948).
19. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4104 (West 1970) requires a solemnization and certifi-
cate. In 1895, statutory authorization for common law marriage was deleted.
20. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4104 (West 1970); Tatum v. Tatum, 241 F.2d 401 (9th Cir.
1957); In re Gosnell's Estate, 63 Cal. App. 2d 38, 145 P.2d 42 (1944); 55 C.J.S.
Marriage § 6816 (1948).
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ties, although the clergymen must file notice with the county
clerk.2'
When a marriage has been established, whether by ceremo-
nial means or as a common-law marriage, no subsequent denial
of such relationship by the parties may terminate the mar-
riage,2 2 except by formal judicial state action.23 There is no such
thing as a common law divorce.
By the recent case of Marvin v. Marvin 2 4 the Supreme Court
of California has recognized changing social mores25 and al-
lowed economic relationships to be judicially recognized for
two people, man and woman, living together apparently as hus-
band and wife, though not lawfully married. In previous cases,
the courts had been jealous of the marriage relationship, had
refused to condone any such economic arrangement, and had
taken the position, generally, that such contracts must fail as
based on unlawful consideration, viz., meretricious sex.26
The Marvin court specifically rules out application of the
Family Law Act but does allow a contract claim to be heard,
and even suggests that a claim in quasi contract (implied in law)
for quantum meruit (fair value) would be appropriate.2 7 In any
21. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4213 (West Supp. 1978); see Leff, Instant Marriages,
Popular in California, May Spread in U.S., Wall Street Journal, Sept. 14,1977 at
1.
22. Estate of Winder, 98 Cal. App. 2d 78, 219 P.2d 18 (1950).
23. 32 CAL. JUR. 2d Marriage § 3, 330 n.8 (1956), citing Sharon v. Sharon, 67
Cal. 185, 7 P. 456 (1895).
24. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
25. Id. at 665 n.1, 557 P.2d at 109 n.1, 134 Cal. Rptr. 818 n.1 (1976). The court
noted:
In summary, we believe that the prevalence of nonmarital relationships
in modern society and the social acceptance of them, marks this as a
time when our courts should by no means apply the doctrine of the
unlawfulness of the so-called meretricious relationship to the instant
case. As we have explained, the nonenforceability of agreements ex-
pressly providing for meretricious conduct rested upon the fact that
such conduct, as the word suggests, pertained to and encompassed
prostitution. To equate the nonmarital relationship of today to such a
subject matter is to do violence to an accepted and wholly different
practice. Id. at 683, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
26. Id. at 669-71, 557 P.2d at 112-14, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 821-23. See also In re
Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).
27. Marvin v. Marvin, supra note 10 at 665,557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at
819.
We conclude (1) the provisions of the Family Law Act do not govern the
distribution of property acquired during a nonmarital relationship;
such a relationship remains subject solely to judicial decision. (2) The
courts should enforce express contracts between nonmarital partners
case, the form of relationship discussed in Marvin is not a mar-
riage and creates no rights in domestic relations.28
Marriage today is a legally acknowledged status which allows
a man and a woman to be properly, and lawfully labeled hus-
band and wife. The institution of marriage, while thriving,29 is
no longer as permanent as it once was.30 In California the judi-
cial procedure that terminates a marriage is the dissolution
proceeding. In other states it is a divorce.31 In California, the
economic sharing of community property ends when actual sep-
aration occurs (as to earnings and accumulations). 2 However,
except to the extent that the contract is explicitly founded on the con-
sideration of meretricious sexual services. (3) In the absence of an ex-
press contract, the courts should inquire into the conduct of the parties
to determine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied contract,
agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some other tacit under-
standing between the parties. The courts may also employ the doctrine
of quantum meruit, or equitable remedies such as constructive or result-
ing trusts, when warranted by the facts of the case.
28. Any division of assets by reason of an express contract right would not
presently be within the ambit of the main topic of this article. However, differ-
ent problems do exist here which illustrate the need for reform to allow greater
flexibility of individual choice. As an example, in the Appeal of Rebecca Smith
Randolph, Calif. Bd. of Equalization, August 16, 1977, a woman was denied the
favorable tax status as "head of household" because she was unmarried, even
though she was allowed to treat her male roommate as a dependent. [1977] CAL.
TAX, RPTR. (CCH) §§ 205-756. Federal law is generally not of like import. I.R.C. §§
2(b), 152(a)(9), 152(b)(5). However, if, as in Marvin, the woman is entitled to
payment for her "household" services such payments to her would be taxable
income, under I.R.C. § 6(1) but would not be deductible to the man. There is no
authority under federal law for unmarried individuals to split their income.
Therefore, as one must report all and pay gift taxes on amounts given to the
other, one must report all and find some business or other deductible reason for
making payments to the other, and as a result, one must pay tax on 100%, while
the other is obligated to pay on 50% (as was allegedly due in Marvin) received; or
if after a valid marriage and divorce, an arrangement for alimony can be
devised to allow income splitting. See I.R.C. § 71.
For a more extensive discussion of the implications of Marvin, see Kay and
Hill, Marvin v. Marvin, Preserving the Options, 65 CAL. L. REV. 938 (1977);
Comment, Domestic Relations-Expansion of the Property Rights of Non-
Marital Partners, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1327 (1977); Comment, The Scope of
Equity with Respect to Non-Marital Relationships, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 49
(1977).
For the possibility of enforcement of division of property, see Part VIII, infra,
especially the discussion related to constructive trusts. In Marvin, the court
made specific reference to the possibility of courts applying, when appropriate,
constructive or resulting trusts. Marvin v. Marvin, supra at 684, 557 P.2d at 123,
134 Cal. Rptr. at 831; see also Barnett, From Meretricious to Marvin, or Com-
mon Law Marriages Must Beget Common Law Divorces, Vol. 12 No. 1 FAM. L.
NEWSLETTER 12 (1977).
29. U.S. Statistical Abstract, Bureau of Census (1976) Marriages: (latest
year: 1974): California, 160,900; U.S. 2,229,700. Marriage trend between 1960-1974
(based on per 100,000 population): 1960, 8.5; 1974, 10.5.
30. Id. Divorces: California, 121,700; U.S. 977,000.
31. See generally Freed, Grounds for Divorce in the American Juris-
dictions [as of June 1, 1977], 8 FAM. L.Q. 401 (1974). See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4501,
4503, 4506-15 (West 1977).
32. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5118 (West 1971). In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d
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valuation of community property is to be determined as close
as possible to the actual date of trial.33 Alternatively, the court
may grant a dissolution and reserve for further proceedings a
division of property and/or a grant of support.34 Unless it is
made clear that rights to divide property are reserved however,
the grant of dissolution becomes res judicata as to all property
rights decided or which were decided by implication in the final
judgment.35 The law in other states is otherwise. For instance, in
New Jersey marital property ceases to accumulate only when a
petition is filed.3 6 However, in most other states which use the
standard "fair, just and equitable" distribution of marital prop-
erty, the precise date is not so important. Since California re-
quires an equal division, the date of cut-off of accumulation has
immediate and real impact.3
Marital property rights end at "divorce" which may be at
different times in different states. Because of "divisible di-
vorce" however, the property and support rights may be
583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1976) held that § 5118 governs all property
rights whenever acquired, that have not been finally adjudicated by a judgment
from which the time to appeal had lapsed. However, "separation" must be
actual and apparent. Where husband left and went to live with girlfriend, but
ate at home almost every night and otherwise was with wife (not sexually) to
"keep up appearances," the court said § 5118 would not insulate his earnings
from community property. In re Marriage of Baragry, 73 Cal. App. 3d 444, 140
Cal. Rptr. 779 (1977). The court stated "One who enjoys the benefit of a polygam-
ous lifestyle must be prepared to accept its accompanying financial burdens.
(Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal. 3d 660; 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815; CAL. Crv.
CODE § 3521)." Id. at 449, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
33. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(a) (West Supp. 1978).
34. In re Marriage of Van Sickle, 68 Cal. App. 3d 729, 137 Cal. Rptr. 568
(1977); Irwin v. Irwin, 69 Cal. App. 3d 317, 138 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1977). See also In re
Marriage of Adams, 64 Cal. App. 3d 181, 134 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1976) wherein the
court granted dissolution January 31, 1972; child support and spousal support
March 21, 1973; and only in March, 1975, did the court divide community proper-
ty in the pension.
For the federal basis of "divisible divorce" see Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354
U.S. 416 (1957). One state allowed to adjudicate divorce if either partner is
domicillary, but may not adjudicate personal property rights without personal
jurisdiction; Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
35. Irwin v. Irwin, 69 Cal. App. 3d 317, 321,138 Cal. Rptr. 9,11(1977). How-
ever, in this case the court "rescued" a wife who appeared in pro per and who
failed to note probable jurisdiction over husband's military pension; see also In
re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1976)
and note 32, supra.
36. Tucker v. Tucker, 121 N.J. Super. 539, 298 A.2d 91 (1972).
37. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1978). Only Louisiana among the
litigated at a date subsequent to the actual sundering of the
marriage relationship. Now, most states divide marital property
(see Part III, below) based on a standard of equity.3 8
PART II
RETIREMENT PLANS: What they are and how they work.
When used in the context of this article "retirement plans"
include plans established by an employer to provide deferred
benefits for employees. These benefits are primarily intended to
be paid after the employee terminates service with the employer
or after a normal retirement age has been reached. Such plans
may or may not be "qualified,"3 9 and may or may not be subject
to ERISA.40 Such plans as a group are generally referred to as
other community property states requires a substantially equal division. LA.
CIV. CODE art. 2406 (1971).
38. Foster and Freed, From a Survey of Matrimonial Laws in the United
States, Distribution of Property Upon Dissolution, 3 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 231
(1976). As of 1976, only eight states and the District of Columbia do not follow
some form of equity division: District of Columbia, Florida, Mississippi, New
York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and West Virginia.
39. See I.R.C. § 401. A plan which is established by a qualified employer for
the exclusive benefit of employees and which provides benefits on a non-dis-
criminatory basis, and otherwise meets the requirements of I.R.C. § 401 will
obtain three major tax advantages: a) employer contributions will be currently
deductible, I.R.C. § 404; b) employer contributions and all fund earnings are not
currently taxable to employee/participants, see I.R.C. §§ 501-04 and c) funds
eventually paid out to recipients may have substantial tax advantages or may
even be partially or wholly exempt from income and/or estate and gift taxes,
I.R.C. §§ 101(b), 402, 2039(c), 2517.
According to most recent Internal Revenue Service and Department of Labor
figures, there are presently over 500,000 private plans of one sort or another
which have been established as qualified plans in the United States. Probably,
because several hundred thousand have not reported in, the figure could actual-
ly exceed 700,000 corporate and Keogh (Self-employed) Plans. Initial statistics
show nearly 2,000,000 IRA's have been established. IR 1949, Jan. 31, 1978 - IRA
statistics for tax year 1975-1976.
To get an idea of the immensity of these pension plans, consider these figures:
a. As of September 30, 1977, the 106 largest local and state retirement
systems had $112.7 billion in assets. [Jan. 2, 1978] 169 PENS. RPTR.
(BNA) A-25.
b. A 1975 survey revealed that 30 million workers were covered by
retirement plans. As of the end of that year total private non-insured
pension plans had assets in excess of $145 billion; the Social Security
Bulletin, Nov. 1977.
c. If insuredplans, IRA's and other non-federal government plans are
aggregated, total funds in pension plans totals over
$400 billion.
For a graphic and easily readable (and brief) history of pensions, see Hewitt
Associates, Employee Retirement Systems: How it all Began, PENSION WORLD,
July, 1976 at 6. Amongst highlights, the first private pension plan was estab-
listed in 1875 (American Express). By 1925 only about 400 plans, total, existed.
See also D. MCGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS ch. 1 (3d ed. 1975).
40. ERISA is a comprehensive program of federal regulation of the private
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pension plans.
41
The primary distinctions between types of plans which will be
of importance for this article are the following:
1. Defined benefit vs. defined contribution plans.42
A defined benefit plan is always a pension plan and, except
where fully insured, does not have individual segregated ac-
counts.43 These plans promise a definite benefit upon "retire-
ment." Because there are no individual accounts, valuation of
an interest in the plan at any time will require the services of an
actuary.
On the other hand a defined contribution plan has only indi-
vidual accounts. At any point in time each participant's accrued
benefit is the balance in that individual's account.
2. Contributory vs. non-contributory plans.
Employee funding is always fully vested in ERISA covered
plans. Plans which require mandatory employee contributions
must therefore always have a vested interest for a participant
consisting at least of the mandatory contributions. In many
states this element of contribution with vesting is very im-
portant in determining whether or not pension interests are
pension systems in the United States. Several categories of plans are not cover-
ed, for this article the most important of which is governmental plans. See 29
U.S.C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(1). In addition to the statutory treatment, a rather
substantial majority of the cases dealing with pension benefits in divorce have
been governmental plans, and most specifically U.S. military pensions.
41. The text which follows describes some of the more important variations
in types of plans and their features which factors are important in characteriz-
ing, valuing and ultimately dividing retirement benefits amongst spouses. For
the greater assistance of the reader there is an appendix to this article which
gives in greater detail a list of the variations most often encountered.
Excellent texts for an even more thorough grounding .in pensions include
MCGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS (3d ed. 1975); ALLEN, MELONE &
ROSENBLOOM, PENSION PLANNING (3d ed 1976). Shorter expositions dealing di-
rectly with pensions and divorce in the community property setting include,
Dickerson, The Divorce Situation-Role of Retirement Plans, 10 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 644 (1975); Doyle, ERISA and the Non-Employee Spouse's
Community Interest in Retirement Pay, 4 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 3 (1977).
42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(34), 1002(35) (1975); I.R.C. §§ 414(i), 414(j).
43. But see contributory versus non-contributory infra. Some contributory
defined benefit plans, especially government plans, are hybrids. See I.R.C. §
414(k).
characterized as marital property.44 A non-contributory plan
need not have early vesting of any benefits. Such plans also
have considerably simpler accounting.
3. Government plans.
Government plans are not subject to ERISA. They are there-
fore also not subject to a uniform standard of regulation which
now seeks to insure the financial stability of all private plans. In
addition, some government plans specifically reserve to the gov-
ernment the right to unilaterally abrogate its largess. Such
plans have therefore sometimes been classed as "gratuities."4 5
4. "Widow" vs. Beneficiaries plan.
Some private, and many governmental, plans provide a
lifetime benefit to the participant, and, upon death, a separate
benefit to the then surviving spouse. Such "widow" plans allow
the participant no opportunity to leave any part of the pension
to any other beneficiary. 46 Traditionally, larger defined benefit
plans have had a forfeiture of benefits at death. ERISA discour-
ages this.47
5. Disability Assets.
Some compensation programs provide disability in addition
to, or in lieu of, similar benefits. In California some or all disa-
bility benefits may be classed as separate, non-divisible assets,
while in other states the rule may be otherwise. When a disabili-
44. Cf. In re Marriage of Ellis, 538 P.2d 1347 (Colo. App.), aff'd, 552 P.2d 506
(Colo. 1975) with In re Marriage of Pope, 544 P.2d 639 (Colo. App. 1975).
45. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934), concerning military pensions
and similar benefits. See also 38 U.S.C. § 802(i) (1977) denying any person a
vested right in National Service Life Insurance proceeds- see Rennick, Appoint-
ment of Community Property Interests in Prospective Military Retirement
Benefits Upon Divorce, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 72, 74 n.10-11 (1977) specifically defer-
ring to various military retirement codes.
See also Packer v. Board of Retirement, 35 Cal. 2d 212, 217 P.2d 660 (1950)
where the Board actually did make a change in benefits, which stripped the
widow of a previously present benefit. (Husband had election at a cost to
continue widow's benefit, but chose not to do so): ". . . [T]he wife of a public
employee does not acquire a vested interest in a pension until it becomes pay-
able to her." Id. at 217, 217 P.2d at 664.
46. See Benson v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal. 3d 355, 384 P.2d 649, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 257 (1963).
47. See 29 U.S.C. § 205 (1975); I.R.C. § 401(a)(11); requiring, in most cases, a
qualified joint and survivor annuity.
A "widow's" plan is sometimes used in smaller employers for estate and tax
planning purposes. Sometimes the results are not as planned. See M.S.D., Inc. v.
United States, 434 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
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ty benefit is electable in lieu of pension there appears to be no
justification for characterizing the disability payments as sepa-
rate, at least to the extent of any pension entitlements.
Retirement programs come in different shapes and sizes. Re-
member, however, that they were designed for someone's indi-
vidual purposes. Before a firm and meaningful rule can be
established as to a logical division of such benefits, the purpose
must be clear, and the mode in which that purpose has been
actually carried-out must be carefully examined.
PART III
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN RETIREMENT PLANS
To say that an interest in a plan is "property" is to state a
conclusion. In truth, property is whatever the courts say it is,
and nothing more. Logically, property should be defined as
something of value which is not free, but logic does not always
prevail. The reason it is necessary to determine if there exists a
property right in a retirement plan is to be able to determine
whether or not there is "marital property," in California, com-
munity property, which may be divided upon divorce or dissolu-
tion. To assist themselves in reaching the ultimate conclusion of
whether or not a pension interest is "property", courts have
developed several rules of analysis.
A survey of the current state positions on property interests in
retirement plans follows. The most striking facts from the sur-
vey are the substantial divergences that exist and the small
minority of states which have actually encountered litigation in
this area.
There are eight community property states.48 These juris-
dictions treat property acquired during marriage as the proper-
ty of husband and wife as partners.49
Of the community property states, California has seen the
most litigation in this area. California law requires an equal
48. Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and
Washington. In addition, Puerto Rico is also a community property jurisdiction.
49. See Foster & Freed, From a Survey of Matrimonial Laws in the United
States: Distribution of Property Upon Dissolution, 3 COMMUNITY PROP. J.
231, 235 (1976); see also Foster, Pensions and Marital Property, Vol. 17 No. 4
FAM. L. NEWSLETTER 6,13 (1977).
division of community assets" upon dissolution. Retirement in-
terests, whether or not "vested" or "matured," 51 are community
property and are to be divided as a part of the dissolution. This
is true for private pensions,52 military pensions53 and railroad
pensions, 54 but evidently not for Social Security OASDI.55 In
addition, governmental pensions from state or local entities are
divisible. 56 Pension interests are divisible community property
whether or not vested and whether or not matured.5 7
50. CAL. CIv. CODE § 687 (West 1954), community property defined, id. at §
5118 (earnings and accumulations after separation are separate property); id. §
4800 (community property to be equally divided, value to be determined as of
trial date).
51. "Vesting" has two meanings; one for community interest, the other, as
to pension plans. An interest is vested for community property reasons when a
property interest first occurs so that, all things being equal, no third person (the
employer as to pension plans) may unilaterally repudiate such interest. As to
pension plans, vested means the participant may not lose whatever pension
interest is vested should service with employer be interrupted. "Matured"
means that there is an unconditional right to immediate receipt for enjoyment.
In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 842, 544 P.2d 561,563, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633,
635 (1976).
52. Id. at 843, 544 P.2d at 564, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 636; see note 51, supra;
see also In re Marriage of Carl, 67 Cal. App. 3d 542, 136 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1977),
where husband successfully claimed an interest in wife's invested pension inter-
est.
53. In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 544 P.2d 561,111 Cal. Rptr. 633,
cert. denied 419 U.S. 925 (1974).
54. In re Marriage of Hisquierdo, 19 Cal. 3d 613,566 P.2d 1203,138 Cal. Rptr.
590 (1977).
55. In re Marriage of Kelley, 64 Cal. App. 3d 82,134 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1976); In
re Marriage of Nizenkoff, 65 Cal. App. 3d 136, 135 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1976), citing as
authority Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) and Flemming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603 (1960) that Social Security is in the nature of social insurance and is not
a form of deferred compensation akin to a pension. The Supreme Court had
held previously that OASDI benefits are non-contractual and do not give rise to
any vested benefits which could arise from a pension system. Weinberger v.
Salfi, supra at 2469.
To like effect in Caughey v. Employment Secur. Dept., 81 Wash. 2d 597, 503
P.2d 460, Annot., 56 A.L.R. 3d 513 (1972), wherein the receipt of social security
was held not to be compensation for services rendered, while a federal civil
service pension was to be so treated.
It is ironic that at the present time many state workers and all federal civil
service and military employees and some other industries (such as railroads, see
Hisquierdo, supra) have separate pension systems in lieu of Social Security
OASDI. Query: If Social Security is "social welfare" and such government
pensions are in lieu of Social Security is the community property distinction
logical and is it justified?
56. Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 492 P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972) (judge's
pension); Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 473 P.2d 765, 89
Cal. Rptr. 61 (1970) (state pension); Benson v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 355,
384 P.2d 649, 33 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1963) (city pension); Berry v. Board of Retirement,
23 Cal. App. 3d 757, 100 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1972) (county pension). See also In re
Marriage of Peterson, 41 Cal. App. 3d 642, 115 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1974) (federal civil
service pension).
57. In re Marriage of Brown, supra note 2 at 851 n.14, 544 P.2d at 569 n.14,
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Even though California classifies pension interests as commu-
nity property, it limits the rights of the non-participant spouse
to those received during the joint lives of the divorcing partners.
This is known as the "terminable interest rule. '58 It has been
severely criticized as an unwarranted limitation of the rights in
property of the non-participant spouse. 9 The rule is not fol-
lowed in Texas and Louisiana, also community property
states.60
126 Cal. Rptr. at 641 n.14 (1976); see also notes 53, supra, and 62, infra; Brown
retroactively (as to all cases which had not gone to final judgment of dissolution
wherein property rights had been resolved) extended community property
status to non-vested pension interests.
58. See note 56, supra; the rule which denies the spouse a right in any
survivor's benefits or the right by devise to name a beneficiary for any after-
death benefits is justified in Waite as follows:
The state's concern, then, lies in provision for the subsistence of the
employee and his spouse, not in the extension of benefits to such per-
sons or organizations the spouse may select as the object of her bounty.
Waite v. Waite, supra note 56 at 473, 492 P.2d at 21, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
59. See note 56, supra; In re Marriage of Peterson, supra note 56 at 656, 115
Cal. Rptr. at 194 the court stated:
Reading the cases discussed above, we are bound to hold that
Elizabeth's entitlement in this case is limited to Roy's pension rights
while he is living, and'that she has no "vested" interest in any amounts
payable after his death, even though these amounts are part of the
pension package purchased with community funds.
We do not believe the rule which we must follow is fair. Roy's pension
rights constitute a bundle to which Elizabeth, as a partner in the commu-
nity during the years of marriage contributed her equal share. Why
should she be deprived of her right to any single stick in the bundle?
(See Kent, 25 Stan. L. Rev., 462-463.) We must, however, follow Benson,
Phillipson and Wilson.
The apparent reason for the rule in Wilson that the wife be awarded
only a percentage of each pension payment is a wish to limit the im-
mediate burden on the husband where the primary, if not the sole,
community asset is the prospective pension. However, where, as here,
the pension package allows a survivor's pension and possibly lump-sum
death benefits, any hardship is created by the husband's paying the wife
projected pension amounts before he receives them, he need only desig-
nate the wife as survivor and beneficiary.
See also Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 535 P.2d 53 (1975), wherein Mr. Justice
Baker (dissenting) argues that the community property law is mongrelized by
the "terminable interest rule":
If the husband's military retirement pay was in fact community proper-
ty, and one half of it belonged to the wife, it would be an absolute
property right which would pass to the wife's heirs like any of the other
community property which the wife is awarded in the divorce. It cer-
tainly mongrelizes recognized property law concepts to say that upon
her death that property right terminates in order to avoid a result which
would point up the obvious inconsistencies with the congressional intent
in establishing military retirement pay. Id. at 684, 535 P.2d at 65.
60. Laffite v. Laffite, 253 So. 2d 120 (La. 1971). See Busby v. Busby, 457
S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970).
It is this author's view that the "terminable interest rule"
should be abrogated by the courts since it was grafted into law
by them. There is no statutory basis for an altered form of post-
dissolution separate property, 61 and the abolition of the rule
need not interfere with the pension contract between employer
and employee if the spouse is merely given an undivided right in
whatever may be received from a pension program, including
any specific annuity arrangement which allows the participant
to choose the beneficiary. The type of plan which allows a sur-
vivor benefit to the "widow" would not be altered because the
ex-spouse is not the "widow." However, if that type of pension
had allowed participant/husband to make a selection of a bene-
ficiary which could, by the terms of the plan, include his ex-
wife, then such a selection could be ordered to be made by the
court in dividing the interest in the dissolution proceeding. Like-
wise, there appears to be absolutely no justification not to allow
the ex-spouse to name an heir to receive whatever interest might
still be due if the spouse should die before the participant.62
A personal injury claim not reduced to judgment by time of
separation is separate property of the injured spouse.63 Like-
wise, disability pay received after separation, not in lieu of a
pension, is the injured person's separate property.64 Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, a non-contributory military disability pension,
not in lieu of a regular pension, is the separate property of the
disabled spouse. 65 The same rule applies to a contributory disa-
61. CAL. CIv. CODE § 687 (West 1954) defines community property as any
such property acquired during marriage. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800 (West Supp.
1978) requires an equal division of such community interest upon dissolution. In
re Marriage of Brown, supra, says even unvested pension interests are commu-
nity property. Brown also quotes Phillipson, to indicate the favored form of
payout is to allow the participant to retain the pension intact and transfer to the
spouse other community property to compensate, but also suggested other
modes, such as "when and as received" might also be used. 15 Cal. 3d at 848,554
P.2d at 950-951, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 639. Query: If alternative property is given to
the spouse in lieu of the pension interest, then the spouse dies, does not the logic
of the "terminable interest rule" call for a return of the other property to the
participant instead of allowing it to descend to the heirs of the spouse? See also
Waite v. Waite, supra note 56 at 473-74, 492 P.2d at 21-22, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 333-34.
62. Perhaps as was suggested by the wife in In re Marriage of Bruegal, 47
Cal. App. 3d 201, 120 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1975) the California courts could utilize a
modified community property insurance approach, however, the court in
Bruegal declined to do so. For insurance California uses a "premiums paid"
allocation between separate and community. Polk v. Polk, 228 Cal. App. 2d 763,
39 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1964).
63. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5126(a)(2) (West Supp. 1978); Washington v. Washing-
ton, 47 Cal. 2d 249, 302 P.2d 569 (1956).
64. In re Marriage of Robinson, 54 Cal. App. 3d 682,126 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1976).
65. In re Marriage of Jones, 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108
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bility plan for a policeman, even one which is an alternative to a
regular pension.66 However, the better rule seems to be that
disability payments are separate property only if (a) not direct
compensation for actual pain and suffering; and, (b) only to the
extent such payments exceed the regular pension. By this rule
part of the pension might be separate and part community.
67
Sometimes other unusual property interests, akin to deferred
compensation, are argued to be community property interests.
For instance, insurance renewals, denominated employment
termination fees, have been held to be community property.
68
Likewise, an "earned" but as yet unreceived legal contingency
fee has been held divisible. 69 However, a wife was unsuccessful
in having a value placed on her husband's legal education which
she helped finance so that it could be divided. 70 Courts are
willing to consider a professional practice to be divisible com-
munity property, however, despite the argument of the
spouse/professional that to do so is to attempt to value and
(1975); In re Marriage of Loehr, 13 Cal. 3d 465, 531 P.2d 425, 119 Cal. Rptr. 113
(1975).
66. In re Marriage of Olhausen, 48 Cal. App. 3d 190, 121 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1975).
Citing Jones and Loehr, as authority, the court ruled that the disability pension
of the husband was entirely separate property. This type of pension was elected
by the husband to fulfill the public policy of the state in aiding injured peace
officers, even though such a policy would detrimentally affect the community
interests of their ex-wives. Id. at 193, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
67. In re Marriage of Cavnar, 62 Cal. App. 3d 660, 133 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1976).
In re Marriage of Mueller, 70 Cal. App. 3d 66, 137 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1977).
Disability pensions are considered divisible in Idaho: Guy v. Guy, 98 Idaho
205, 560 P.2d 876 (1977); Texas: Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970);
Dominey v. Dominey, 481 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1029 (1972); Washington: all property, whether separate or community, is divis-
ible: Morris v. Morris, 69 Wash. 2d 506, 419 P.2d 129 (1966); Missouri, all property
divisible: In re Marriage of Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); and New
Jersey, all property divisible: Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974);
Kruger v. Kruger II, 73 N.J. 463, 375 A.2d 659 (1977).
68. In re Marriage of Skaden, 19 Cal. 3d 679, 566 P.2d 249, 139 Cal. Rptr. 615
(1977), "We think it clear from the foregoing that the termination benefits
contemplated by the subject contract were, like pension benefits, 'a form of
deferred compensation for services rendered.'" Id. at 687, 566 P.2d at 252-53,
139 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19. The court declined to guess its approach to insurance
renewals which were "unvested." Id. at 686 n.6, 688 n.7, 566 P.2d at 252 n.6, 253
n.7, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 618 n.6, 619 n.7; see also In re Marriage of Brown, note 52
supra; Texas law may be contra, Vibrock v. Vibrock, 549 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1977).
69. Waters v. Waters, 75 Cal. App. 2d 265, 170 P.2d 494 (1946).
70. Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 73 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969).
divide future earning power, an argument akin to the division of
an education.7
When community property is not divided in a dissolution pro-
ceeding, the spouses remain tenants in common and may seek
partition at a later date.72 Such a partition may occur for a
pension plan interest.73 California also has a peculiar legal
theory called "quasi-community property" which causes sepa-
rate property acquired in another jurisdiction to be treated as
community property if it would have been such had it been
acquired while the marriage had been domiciled in California.
This characterization attaches as soon as the marriage becomes
domiciled in California 74 and the inchoate community interest
becomes vested as soon as the petition for dissolution is filed.75
Moreover, quasi-community characterization could very well be
applied to pension interests in the future.76
71. In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93,113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974); In re
Marriage of Fonstein, 17 Cal. 3d 738, 552 P.2d 1169, 131 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1976).
72. Fieger v. Fieger, 28 Cal. App. 2d 736, 83 P.2d 526 (1938); Becker v.
Becker, 36 Cal. 2d 329, 223 P.2d 479 (1950). The Becker case illustrates a trap for
the unwary attorney: if the divorce decree purports to dispose of all marital
property, when the decree becomes final, the decree is non-modifiable and res
judicata as to any community interest. See Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530
P.2d 589,119 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975) and Irwin v. Irwin, 69 Cal. App. 3d 317, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 9 (1977).
73. Irwin v. Irwin, 69 Cal. App. 3d 317, 138 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1977), wherein the
court was generous in allowing wife to seek interest in pension of husband; see
also Bodle v. Bodle, No. 4 Civ. 14821 (Cal. App. Jan. 11, 1978) wherein the court
refused to allow reconsideration of a 1968 divorce decree for interest in pension
after change in law in Brown which was specifically made retroactive, but only
as to cases which had not yet gone to final judgment. See In re Marriage of
Cobb, 68 Cal. App. 3d 855, 860 n.1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 670, 674 n.1 (1977).
Since neither the pleadings nor the judgment in the dissolution action
mention Loren's pension as a community asset, the court was withoutjurisdiction to consider the matter at a modification hearing. Property
which is not mentioned in the pleadings as community property and
which is left unadjudicated by a decree of divorce or dissolution is
subject to future litigation, the parties being tenants in common mean-
while (In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 850-51 [126 Cal. Rptr. 633,
544 P.2d 561]; In re Marriage of Elkins, 28 Cal. App. 3d 899, 903 [105 Cal.
Rptr. 59]; Estate of Williams, 36 Cal. 2d 289, 292-93 [233 P.2d 248, 22
A.L.R. 2d 716]). The property rights of tenants in common cannot be
adjudicated in a motion or order to show cause, and can only be settled
in an independent action. The trial court properly dismissed the part of
the order to show cause requesting a division of Loren's pension, but its
comment about res judicata should be disregarded since the court lack-
ed jurisdiction to modify its judgment with respect to property rights.
74. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4803 (West Supp. 1978). See Thiede, The Community
Property Interest of the Non-Employee Spouse in Private Employee Retire-
ment Benefits, 9 U.S.F.L. REV. 635, 658 (1975). The article formed part of the
basis for the change in position of the California Supreme Court in In re
Marriage of Brown, supra note 2 at 847, 544 P.2d at 566, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
75. Cooper v. Cooper, 269 Cal. App. 2d 6, 74 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1969); Addison v.
Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965).
76. See Cooper v. Cooper, 269 Cal. App. 2d 6, 74 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1969),
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California courts will not take jurisdiction over separate
property in a dissolution proceeding; 77 will not allow alimony
(spousal support) to be substituted for a division of community
property;78 and have found it improper for a separate property
obligation of one spouse to be used to "fund" an otherwise
difficult community property division.79 In short, community
property must provide its own logical basis of division without
the aid of the separate property interests of the marriage part-
ners.
80
The other community property states have had considerably
less litigation in this area; however except for Nevada, which,
according to this author's research, has had no decisions on the
topic, each of the remaining six community property state
courts have had something to say-and almost invariably
concerning the specific interest in military pensions.
The one case on the subject in Arizona, Everson v. Everson,81
recited the authorities from New Mexico and Texas and ordered
the husband's pension interest valued and divided equally with
the wife to the extent earned during marriage. The court neatly
avoided any difficulties about future supervision by ordering an
accounting to wife immediately.
There are two cases in Idaho, one dealing with a military
wherein the court applied the concept to stock options a mode of deferred
compensation. That case was particularly interesting because the husband had
originally obtained options while in New York, had then changed the domicile of
the marriage to California, where a divorce was initiated, then moved back to
New York. Only after he had returned to New York did options mature. Still
California maintained jurisdiction over them as quasi-community property.
See also I.R.S., Private Letter Ruling 7742042, July 22, 1977, aknowledging no
tax cost upon division of quasi-community stock in California dissolution.
77. See Thiede, The Community Property Interest of the Non-Employee
Spouse in Private Employee Retirement Benefits, 9 U.S.F.L. REV. 635, 649
(1975). Also see In re Marriage of Hopkins, 74 Cal. App. 3d 591,141 Cal. Rptr. 597
(1977).
78. In re Marriage of Cobb, 68 Cal. App. 3d 855,137 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1977); In
re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838,848,544 P.2d 561,567, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633,639
(1976).
79. In re Marriage of Hopkins, 74 Cal. App. 3d 591,141 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1977);
In re Marriage of Tammen, 63 Cal. App. 3d 927, 134 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1st App. Dist.
80. See McNamara, Community Property Aspects of Executive Compen-
sation; presented to the U.S.C. Tax Institute, Jan. 17, 1978; to be published in the
U.S.C. Tax Institute late in 1978.
81. 24 Ariz. App. 239, 537 P.2d 624 (1975).
pension and National Service Life Insurance; the other, with
disability payments. The first, Ramsey v. Ramsey,8 2 held that
National Service Life Insurance could not be a community as-
set, following the opinion of Wissner v. Wissner,83 but that the
military pension, which was fully vested and matured, could be
divided. The Court analyzed the California cases of In re Mar-
riage of Fithian84 and In re Marriage of Milhan85 and came to
the conclusion that a characterization of the pension as commu-
nity property, so long as it did not interfere with the rights and
obligations of the United States, was unobjectionable. The Ram-
sey Court, in quoting Fithian, found no conflict between feder-
al purposes and state interests in protecting its citizens by appli-
cation of the principles of community property. 86
The more interesting issue in Ramsey was whether the mar-
riage had been domiciled in Idaho when the pension was "earn-
ed." The Court held that the portion earned while the marriage
was domiciled in Idaho would be community property. But the
husband had been in the service for three years when he mar-
ried his wife while he was stationed in Georgia. Their stops for
the next seventeen years included Georgia, Germany, Korea,
South Carolina, Utah and two years in California. The husband
argued that his domicile was outside of Idaho, but the Court
disagreed, and held that the seventeen year marriage had been
domiciled in Idaho despite the fact husband and wife had not
lived there until after the husband was released from the service
to return to Idaho and go to work for his father. The final matter
to be decided was the mode of "payout." This, under Idaho law,
was to be done immediately with the husband being required to
"buy" the wife's interest at its current actuarial values, the pay-
ments due in their entirety within a reasonable time.87
82. 96 Idaho 672, 535 P.2d 53 (1975).
83. 338 U.S. 655 (1950). This case will be more fully discussed in Part V
below, dealing with federal preemption.
84. 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974).
85. 13 Cal. 3d 129, 528 P.2d 1145, 117 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1974).
86. Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 676, 535 P.2d 53, 57 (1975); In re
Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 597, 517 P.2d 449, 451-52, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369,
371-72 (1974), where the court enunciated the basic test:
When there have been questions of property law involving a conflict
between a state decision and a valid federal statute, the United States
Supreme Court has determined that the supremacy clause requires the
state law to yield no matter how clearly the subject matter otherwise
falls within the state's acknowledged sphere of power. (Citations) Our
task, therefore, is to ascertain whether the application of California
community property law to husband's federal military retirement pay
interferes in any way with the accomplishment of the goals of Congress
in creating the current military retirement scheme.
87. For an alternative argument, akin to that of the two dissenters in Ram-
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The other Idaho case, Guy vs. Guy,88 held disability benefits
payable under an employee group policy were "acquired" dur-
ing the marriage and that they may be equitably divided. Idaho
normally follows the "inception of title" doctrine 89 which nor-
mally would have classed the proceeds as separate; however,
using a life insurance analogy, the court likened the disability
program to a term policy and then reasoned that it started anew
each year. Therefore, the community property was to be divided
on an "as received" basis.
Louisiana has very different community property rules, stem-
ming from the fact that their laws emanate from the Napoleonic
Code rather than the Spanish-Mexican tradition. Under
Louisiana law there are some substantial differences in own-
ership rights, and the legal terminology is entirely unique in the
United States. Predominant to the Louisiana system are the two
concepts of absolute inviolability of the community partnership
of husband and wife and forced heirship distribution upon
death. The latter dictates who may be an effective beneficiary of
plan benefits, the former grants literally full ownership powers
to an ex-spouse in any plan interests. However, diverging from
these principles, life insurance is treated differently. To the
extent life insurance is separate property at inception,90 the
owner need not account to the community for any premium
payments and also has complete freedom to name any benefi-
ciary.91
Upon the dissolution of the community, each spouse is enti-
tled as an owner to receive an accounting for interests in a
retirement plan.9 2 The rights of ownership include all the rights
granted by the plan including the right to elect optional settle-
ment.9 3 However, normally the marriage partners in divorce
sey, see Bowman, Lump Sum Division of Military Retired Pay: A Dissenting
View, Vol. 3, No. 3 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 135 (1976).
88. 98 Idaho 205, 560 P.2d 876 (1977).
89. This doctrine says property originally acquired as separate property
remains such and is not transmuted merely because community assets are used
to continue its up-keep, although the community may be entitled to reimburse-
ment for such expenditures. 560 P.2d at 879.
90. See note 89, supra.
91. T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834, 844 (La. 1976).
92. Id. Lafitte v. Laffite, 253 So. 2d 120 (La. 1971).
93. Id.
arrange a settlement whereby the participant will retain the
plan interest in exchange for an agreed purchase price.9 4 How-
ever, where such an agreement is not carried out and where the
divorce court makes a disposition of the plan interest, the par-
ties remain co-owners.9 5 When co-ownership occurs on the dis-
solution of the community, payout to the respective owners may
be made only when called for in the plan contract.96 If payout
from a plan should occur on account of death however, the
proceeds may be claimed by the takers in forced heirship de-
spite the contractual right in the plan for the owner to name a
beneficiary.9 7 The analogy of such death benefits to insur-
ance, which as noted above, is an exception to forced heirship, is
not acceptable short of statutory change.98
The allocation of interest in pension plans is made based on
the ratio of contributions made during any period to the total
contributions made cumulatively, 99 or alternatively based on
the actuarial values of interests. 100 Louisiana, like the other
community property states, has had the occasion to consider
military pension rights. The court in Swope v. Mitchell'0 ' up-
held the community status of such pensions and divided them
based on the formula of number of years in coverture over the
number of years in service, sometimes referred to as the
"time rule." Benefits are to be vested "when and as received.' 10 2
Another interesting feature of Swope was the issue of
domicile. 0 3 The husband argued for domicile where he had
been stationed. The court turned him down, holding domicile to
have been continuous in Louisiana for the full time of the com-
munity.104
At an early stage New Mexico considered the question of
military pensions and decided that, if vested, such deferred
compensation benefits, by whatever name they may be called,
94. T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834, 851 n.2 (La. 1976).
95. See Lynch v. Lawrence, 293 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 1974); Laffite v. Laffite,
253 So. 2d 120 (La. 1971); T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834
(La. 1976).
96. See note 95 supra.
97. T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834, 854-55 (La. 1976).
98. Id. at 834.
99. Id.
100. See Lynch v. Lawrence, 293 So. 2d 598, 600 (La. App. 1974).
101. Swope v. Mitchell, 324 So. 2d 461 (La. App. 1975).
102. Id. at 462.
103. See Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 535 P.2d 53 (1975).
104. For the reader skilled in the arcane (to the author) terminology of
Louisiana or the avid student desiring to explore this area more fully see the
Comment by Stephen Kupperman, The Relation of Community Property and
Forced Heirship to Employee Retirement Plans, 51 TUL. L. REV. 645 (1977).
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are community property."' 5 The allocation of the benefits be-
tween community and separate is to be done based on the
amount of time during which the marriage is domiciled in a
community property jurisdiction divided by the total amount of
service time. This concept is commonly referred to as the "time
rule."'10 6 Division was proper between the spouses as and when
received. 107
Texas has had a great deal of litigation in this area. At present
the standard is that all pension interests, whether or not vested
or matured, are community property subject to being divided
upon divorce. 0 8 The measure for allocation is the "time rule"-
how many months of the time in employment were also months
in coverture. 10 9 Like California, the rules for division of pen-
sions in Texas have been evolving rapidly." 0 However, Texas
applies the rule of equitable distribution for division of commu-
nity property. Its courts therefore have an easier time deciding
how to accommodate the changing law."'
At present, the "time rule" utilized measures value at time of
divorce (current rank, if military; current actuarial value other-
wise) instead of at retirement."2 Also, any ancillary benefits,
including payments for disability are considered available for
105. LeClert v. LeClert, 80 N.M. 235, 453 P.2d 755 (1969); Otto v. Otto, 80 N.M.
331, 455 P.2d 642 (1969).
106. LeClert v. LeClert, 80 N.M. 235, 236, 453 P.2d 755, 756 (1969) "That
portion of the retirement pay which was earned during coverture became prop-
erty of the community."
107. Id., 453 P.2d at 757.
108. Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976). This decision cites with
favor and quotes extensively from the opinion of In re Marriage of Brown, 15
Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
109. Id.
110. The first major case deciding vested, matured military pensions are to
be subject to division; Mora v. Mora, 429 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968); eight
years later Cearley, supra note 108, was decided.
111. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1976) "fair and just."
112. Mora v. Mora, 429 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968).
A proper valuation of the community interest in this case is, obviously
not free of complications. A proper valuation must take into account the
possibility that appellant might, despite a record of military service
which appellant conceded to be 'excellent' be dishonorably discharged,
or that he might die while in the service. In addition, there is the problem
of determining present value as against future value. This problem is
particularly troublesome where it is contemplated that the husband will
make an immediate cash settlement in payment of the wife's interest.
However, in partitioning the community estate, a trial court is vested
with a wide discretion. Perhaps the trial court may conclude that con-
division.113 This, too, is a change from prior law. The Texas
courts so far have been patient in coaxing the bar and the bench
to note the change and to recognize that community property
will apply to all pension interests, whether or not vested." 4
Unlike California where a final decree ostensibly litigating
rights to marital property is res judicata,"5 Texas courts allow
long-since final decrees to be reopened to hear claims for lost
pensions.1 1 6 These continually re-emerging cases on petition to
divide a tenancy in common in previously undivided communi-
ty property also have no statute of limitation.1 7 Further, since
Texas is a state which divides all community assets as equitable,
these proceedings will seldom be heard by a judge acquainted
with the factors justifying a previous division; which leaves the
court no choice but to evenly divide the tenancy in common
even where such a division would not have been made earlier." 8
A similar problem of reopening cases was foreseen by the
California Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Brown when it
limited the retroactive effect of the change to cases not yet
final." 9 The law in Texas is evolving by court interpretation.
siderations of fairness to both-parties compel the entry of a decree that
the husband pay the wife her portion of the retirement benefits if, as,
and when he receives them. We know of no reason why a divorce could
or would lack power to enter such a decree.
113. Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970); Dominey v. Dominey, 481
S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972). Compare California law, note 61, supra.
114. Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970); Cearley v. Cearley, 544
S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1976); Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Tex. 1977).
115. See Smith v. Lewis, 130 Cal. 349, 530 P.2d 589, 119 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975).
116. See Taggart v. Taggart, supra note 115, a case of a petition for a divorce
in 1968, suit having been brought to partition the pension in 1974.
117. Constance v. Constance, 537 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976).
118. See Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Tex. 1977). In the dissent,
Mr. Justice Yarborough objects to retroactive application of a major court-
created change in the law, stating that:
At the time of their divorce in 1968, military retirement benefits payable
in the future were assumed to be of a contingent, non-vested character,
and therefore outside the jurisdictional power of the court, and accord-
ingly not subject to division by inclusion in court approved and/or draft-
ed property settlements. Notwithstanding that assumption, which we
now recognize to have been erroneous, courts were then free to make
virtually any distribution of the remaining community and separate
property as seemed just and appropriate, in order to do equity among
the partners. We cannot know to what extent if any, the expectation of
retirement benefits influenced the various courts in dividing properties
among divorcing partners. The bounds of judicial discretion in divorce
property settlements have known little appellate limitation or review,
and what courts could not do officially, they have often done unofficial-
ly. It is more than a 'reasonable assumption' that such benefits have
been in many if not most instances, of major consideration to the court
in effecting a property settlement between partners.
119. See note 73, supra; In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838,851,544 P.2d
561,126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976). See also as an example Thibodeaux v. Thibodeaux,
546 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977), wherein a plea of res judicata for a final
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Like in California, the changes aim for greater equity, but may
well cause at least temporary "growing pains.
120
In Washington, by statute, all property, whether community
or separate, may be equitably divided in a divorce.121 Since the
standard of division of property is equitable in nature, 122 the
characterization of items as community or separate property is
not as important as in other states. Still, Washington has been
earliest in holding that unvested, unmatured pension interests
are subject to a divorce court distribution, including interests in
military retirement pensions. 123 The Washington courts seem to
have avoided the helter-skelter court-made changes of its sister-
community property states to the south without any loss to the
rights of its citizens. Equity has been the key and the legislature
has entrusted the courts, the experts in equity, with great flexi-
bility and all the "property" to see that the fullest measure of
just distribution can be accomplished.12 4
Few states, other than the community property states, have
had much litigation in this area. Of those that have, most have
opted for including pensions in assets subject to marital divi-
sion.
Arkansas, as an example, is not in the majority. Citing a
Colorado decision, 25 the Arkansas Supreme Court tersely ruled
that a military pension was not "personalty" which, by statute,
must be divided one-third to the wife in divorce. The court
criticized the community property states for allowing military
decree issued in 1972 was denied and a redetermination of rights in husband's
pension was granted wife. The court was sympathetic to the wife who had been
unrepresented by counsel in her divorce.
120. See Note, Military Retirement Benefits: Community Property as Earn-
ed During Marriage, 14 Hous. L. REV. 925 n.86 (1977).
121. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.08.110 (1961).
122. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 16.09.070 (1961).
123. Morris v. Morris, 69 Wash. 2d 506, 419 P.2d 129 (1966) (vested military
pension); DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5 Wash. App. 741, 491 P.2d 249 (1971) (the
husband's AT&T non-contributory unvested pension); Payne v. Payne, 82 Wash.
2d 573, 512 P.2d 736 (1973) (unvested military pension); Wilder v. Wilder, 85
Wash. 2d 364, 534 P.2d 1355 (1975) (with great caution, an unvested military
pension which required another tour of duty of husband before it would vest at
all).
124. See also In re Marriage of Pea, 17 Wash. App. 728, 566 P.2d 212 (1977).
125. In re Marriage of Ellis, 538 P.2d 1347 (Colo. App.) aff'd, 522 P.2d 506
(Colo. 1975).
pensions to be reached. 126
Colorado has gone both ways. Division III of the Court of
Appeals in Ellis,127 ruled a non-contributory but vested military
pension was not to be considered marital property. After re-
viewing the authorities in the community property states and
criticizing the "terminable interest rule," the court considered
the lack of assignability of the pension and held it was not
"property.' ' 28 On the other hand, Division II of the Court of
Appeals, in In re Marriage of Pope,'129 held a contributory state
pension plan, which was fully vested, to be marital property.
The rationale being that in Colorado lump-sum military retire-
ment payments are considered marital property. 30
The Court in In re Marriage of Graham'3 ' addressed the issue
of whether a husband's education, to which the wife had con-
tributed, was divisible marital property. The lower court ruled
affirmitively to the tune of $33,134.00. The Court of Appeals
reversed, citing Todd v. Todd.132
Missouri has ruled that a vested but unmatured pension plan
interest comes within the statutory authority as considered
"property acquired during marriage.' ' 33 The position taken is
quite similar to that of New Jersey, discussed below.
Michigan, after exhaustively reviewing practically every posi-
tion from all states yet heard from, determined a vested, con-
tributory government pension interest was most similar to the
facts of In re Marriage of Pope, 34 and opted for including the
pension interest in the definition of "marital property.' 135 The
court also criticized references to "vesting," which it indicated
were not included in the Michigan law. 136
126. Fenney v. Fenney, 259 Ark. 858, 537 S.W.2d 367 (1976), "In effect the
community property jurisdictions treat armed forces' retirement pay as
alimony; otherwise it is not collectible, 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1974)." On this point, a
Florida court agreed with the Arkansas Supreme Court allowing a garnishment
under 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1974) for "alimony" and "child support" in order for a wife
to collect the interest in her husband's military pension assigned to her by a
Texas court decree. Williams v. Williams, 338 So. 2d 869 (Fla. App. 1976).
127. See note 125, supra.
128. Id.
129. 544 P.2d 639 (Colo. App. 1975).
130. In re Marriage of Moore, 531 P.2d 995 (Colo. App. 1975), cited in the
dissent of Ellis, note 125, supra.
131. In re Marriage of Graham, 555 P.2d 527 (Colo. 1976).
132. See 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 73 Cal. Rptr. 131 (3d App. Dist. 1969). See also
Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975), which is discussed below.
133. In re Marriage of Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949 (1975).
134. See note 129 supra.
135. Hutchins v. Hutchins, 71 Mich. App. 361, 248 N.W.2d 272 (1977).
136. Id. at 376, 248 N.W.2d at 277, citing similarity to New Jersey statutes.
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New Jersey has, by statute and by court decision, become by
far the most active non-community property state in this area.
The courts have criticized any requirement of "vesting" when
determining whether any pension interest is property "acquired
during marriage."1 37 However, no reported case has actually
found that a non-vested pension interest is marital property. In
the case of Painter v. Painter1 38 the New Jersey Supreme Court
reiterated that the law of that state requires all property "ac-
quired during marriage" to be distributed during divorce, re-
gardless of the source of such property or its otherwise exempt
character. 139 The statute is intended to be comprehensive, and
the courts are instructed to so construe it. 140 Since New Jersey
uses a "fair and equitable" standard, similar to the Washington
statute, the inclusion of all property cannot work an injustice.
Dealing specifically with pensions, the New Jersey courts have
allowed a broad scope to the injunctions of the statute as expost-
ulated in Painter.4 '
The issue of the value of future earnings has also arisen in
New Jersey.42 The court acknowledged the difficulty of
137. Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 348, 331 A.2d 257, 262 (1975). "We take the
opportunity. . . to suggest that the concept of vesting should probably find no
significant place in the developing law of equitable distribution." See also
McGrew v. McGrew, 151 N.J. Super. 515, 516, 377 A.2d 697, 698 (1977).
138. 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974).
139. Id. at 216-18, 320 A.2d at 495.
140. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (1977), see also Painter v. Painter, supra note
67 at 494-95.
We think the Legislature used the word in a more comprehensive sense
to include not only property title to which is the direct or indirect result
of an expenditure of effort on the part of a spouse, but also, assets title to
which is received by gift or inheritance, or indeed in any other way. We
therefore hold the legislative intent to be that all property, regardless of
its source, in which a spouse acquires an interest during the marriage
shall be eligible for distribution in the event of divorce.
141. Blitt v. Blitt, 139 N.J. Super. 213, 219, 353 A.2d 144, 147 (1976).
In short, the portion of a pension plan, whether contributory or noncon-
tributory, acquired during marriage and over which an employee has
complete control, even though enjoyment may be postponed, should be
an asset subject to equitable distribution. The postponement of enjoy-
ment should be considered in determining the manner in, and the time
at which, this portion of the plan is divided.
Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 464, 471, 375 A.2d 659, 663 (1977) wherein the court
stated that the "[H]usband's military retirement payments constituted property
subject to equitable distribution in divorce action even though until the pay-
ments were received they were not assignable and were exempt from attach-
ment, levy, or seizure."
142. Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 346 n.5, 331 A.2d 257, 261 n.5 (1975).
separating the future earning power of a well-known profes-
sional (not property) from the value of his legal practice (proper-
ty), but was willing to accept the task as required in making a
fair distribution of marital property. 14
3
Wisconsin has also chosen to include pension interests when
determining marital property, 144 especially where it consists of
property which comes from the joint efforts of husband and
wife and where it is the largest available asset in the marital
estate. The courts have not required the current "realization" of
the pension plan 145 but have suggested that courts might impose
a constructive trust on the pension interest in order to ensure
future proper division when any sums are, in fact, realized.
146
With divorces rising to over 1,000,000 a year and with pension
assets over $400 billion, it will probably not be long before the
other states and the District of Columbia, which are not listed in
this survey, will be heard from. The present trend seems to be to
include all employee benefits in the property to be divided upon
dissolution. This would be consistent with the trend of no-fault
divorce and to equitable distribution of those assets which are
available.
PART IV
SELECTED RETIREMENT PLAN PROVISIONS AND
THE STATUTORY SETTING
Retirement benefits as a major source of family assets in the
property division pursuant to a marital dissolution is a-relative-
ly recent development. Moreover, since the state of the law is
still in its developmental stages, our courts are faced with a
myriad of specific issues, each of which are tainted with a spe-
cific policy consideration in effecting a just and equitable divi-
sion of this valuable asset.
The plan is the contract, the blue print, which defines all
rights, whether set forth in statute (primarily governmental
plans) or in a separate document (mostly private plans including
those which are fully insured). 147 The following issue delineation
143. Id.
144. Pinkowski v. Pinkowski, 67 Wisc. 2d 176, 226 N.W.2d 518 (1975). The
court here reviewed all prior state authorities. The pension was vested and
worth $23,551.00 in an estate with no other substantial liquid assets.
145. Id. at 179-81, 226 N.W.2d at 520.
146. Id. at 184-85, 226 N.W.2d at 522. See also Parsons v. Parsons, 68 Wisc.
2d 744, 751, 299 N.W.2d 629, 633 (1975), "[T]he value of the retirement fund must
be taken into account in making the division of the [marital] estate."
147. An excellent publication which explains the application of ERISA and
then illustrates how the law is to be applied by specimen language and With
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presents a simplified view of the plan provisions which should
be reviewed by the careful practitioner and by the court when
determining the best resolution of the disputed rights.
1. When did participation begin; how long has it lasted;
have there been any breaks or changes in the character of
participation; how is participation measured by the plan?148
The divorce courts have attempted, in many circumstances,
(especially related to military pensions which are defined bene-
fit plans) to allocate pension interests on the basis of "time" in
the plan.149 Most private pension plans today, because of the
sample or model plans (for plans subject to ERISA) is R.A. BILDERSEE, PENSION
REGULATION MANUAL (rev. ed. 1977). This "book" is supplemented monthly by
newsletters and periodically (generally, semi-annually) with revised Specimen
Plan language.
For Social Security, there are a number of publishers who print annual sum-
maries, such as 1978 Social Security Benefits-Including Medicare January 1,
1978, CCH (1978).
See also H.A. PATTIZ, PENSION PLAN LANGUAGE AFTER ERISA (1976). This
work was prepared as course material for the continuing education programs
regularly offered by the California C.P.A. Foundation.
For texts which review the history and purposes of retirement plans as well as
discuss legal requirements and illustrate some plan language, D. MCGILL, FUN-
DAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS (3d ed. 1975) and ALLEN, MELONE AND ROSENB-
LOOM, PENSION PLANNING (3d ed. 1976).
An excellent book explaining pensions from the management and accounting
viewpoint is POMERANTZ, RAMSEY AND STEINBERG, PENSIONS: AN ACCOUNTING
AND MANAGEMENT GUIDE (1976).
148. 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (1976); ERISA § 202; I.R.C. § 410. Textual references to
"ERISA" and "I.R.C." refer to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 and the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended respectively. Care must
be taken when determining "time in the plan" to consider "eligibility" aside
from "entry." On occasion, an employee will not enter a plan even though
eligible. On other occasions "entry" may be retroactive to a date earlier than
eligibility. And on other occasions, a plan may allow years of service credit for
the employee's time before plan entry.
There may be periods of time after an employee begins to participate that his
participation will be interrupted, such as a break in service or leave of absence,
or the type of participation may change, from active to inactive. When measur-
ing the period of participation, it is often important to give differing weight to
similar time periods because the character of participation has changed.
149. This is known as the "time rule." See In re marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal.
3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974); In re Marriage of Wilson, 10 Cal. 3d
851, 519 P.2d 165, 112 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1974); In re Marriage of Freiberg, 57 Cal.
App. 3d 204, 127 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1976); In re Marriage of Anderson, 64 Cal. App.
3d 36, 134 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1976). See In re Marriage of Judd, 68 Cal. App. 3d 515,
137 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1977) expounding on the "momentum theory" (earlier years
give momentum to a career and to value of pensions):
requirements of ERISA, now have extensive, technical defini-
tions of how eligibility, entry, and participation occur and
how they are to be measured. 150 ERISA requires such records to
be kept by the Plan Administrator and by the employer. 151 The
regulations issued by the Department of Labor recognize that
for years prior to ERISA (pre-1975, generally) such records may
not exist; but the regulations do call for a good-faith effort to
reconstruct them or otherwise develop a fair substitute.152
2. How are benefits (potential benefits) described; how are
they "earned" (accrued), how are they denominated and as of
when, how are accruals measured and valued by the plan; are
benefits guaranteed, either by the plan, the employer or other-
wise; has the measure of benefits changed during the period of
participation (increased or decreased); and are benefits subject
to adjustment for cost of living, plan earnings or otherwise ?153
The plan must define the mode of benefit calculation and how
such benefits are earned. 154 In addition, because of Department
Where the total number of years served by an employee-spouse is a
substantial factor in computing the amount of retirement benefits to be
received by that spouse, the community is entitled to have its share
based upon the length of service performed on behalf of the community
in proportion to the total length of service necessary to earn those
benefits. The relation between years of community service to total years
of service provides a fair gauge of that portion of retirement benefits
attributable to community effort. Id. at 522-23, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
150. 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (1975); ERISA § 202; I.R.C. § 410. See R.A. BILDERSEE,
PENSION REGULATION MANUAL ch. 2 n.1 (rev. ed. 1977). See also note 152 infra,
for the regulations which define the elements of "time" to be included in main-
taining a plan.
151. 29 U.S.C. § 1021-25 (1975); ERISA H 101-05 for plan administration; for
administrator and employer see 29 U.S.C. § 1027 (1975); ERISA § 107.
152. 29 C.F.R. Part 2530 (1976). These regulations provide for periods of
service to be calculated on "years of service". (generally, 1000 "hours of service"
during an applicable "computation period").
The determination of time in service ("years in service") must be maintained
for each employee for all years of service (with exceptions) for a) eligibility and
participation; b) accrual of benefits, and c) for vesting.
Records must be maintained (and have been maintained) so as to allow a plan
to calculate "hours of service" and "years of service." If such records have
previously not existed (pre-ERISA), the regulations allow an educated "guess."
153. 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (1975); ERISA § 204; I.R.C. § 411(b). Generally, benefits
are "earned" in defined contribution plans by funding contributions, generally
annually (or more often) and generally by employer (sometimes with employee
mandatory or voluntary contributions). For a defined benefit plan, benefits (as
projected at retirement) are "earned" over time, based on the completion of
accrual years of service (years of plan participation).
The variety of benefit formulas to be found in plans is very large. R.A. BIL-
DERSEE, PENSION REGULATION MANUAL ch. 3A (rev. ed. 1977).
154. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (1975); ERISA § 402(a) requires each plan to be in
writing. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1) (1975); ERISA § 402(b)(1) requires a funding policy
and 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(4) (1975); ERISA § 402(b)(4) requires a description of the
procedures for making payment of benefits.
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of Labor reporting requirements, the plan must be able to
periodically inform the participant of the value of benefits earn-
ed thus far.15 5 As a starting point, such information will be
useful to the disputants and to the court; but it is important to
remember that such statements of plan benefits for plan pur-
poses will not necessarily be usable without substantial adjust-
ment for divorce purposes.156
3. How are the benefits funded, whether by the employer
and/or by the employee; what contributions have been received
155. 29 U.S.C. § 1025(a) (1975); ERISA § 105(a). See also Daniel v. Int'l
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977). In the Daniel case, the
Federal District Court in Chicago held that the anti-fraud provisions of federal
securities law apply to the receipt (by a "sale") of an interest (a "security") in
non-contributory mandatory pension plan. The anti-fraud provisions provide
relief if misrepresentations are made or if all materialfacts are not stated prior
to the time the investment decision is made in the "purchase of a security." Here,
such full disclosure would have to be made prior to first employment. ERISA,
in a comprehensive list of record keeping requirements, only requires such
disclosure after employment has begun and after an individual has either be-
come a participant or, if a beneficiary, has begun to receive benefits. 29 U.S.C. §
1024(b) (1975); ERISA §§ 104(b), 105.
Whether or not securities law disclosures will be required by the Daniel
decision is still being widely discussed. Whether or not "required" by law, such
disclosures would be prudent for a plan fiduciary wishing to short-circuit any
Daniel-type subsequent dispute. Such disclosure would also be very expensive.
156. Such information for defined contribution plans will show account
balances as of the last valuation date. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(B) (1975); ERISA §
3(23)(B). For a defined benefit plan it will show the amount of an annual benefit
beginning at normal retirement date. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(A) (1975); ERISA §
3(23)(A). See also 29 U.S.C. § 1054(C)(3) (1975); ERISA § 204(C)(3) requiring any
other form of benefit to be the "actuarial equivalent" to single life and Qualified
Joint and Survivor Annuity beginning at normal retirement date.
For divorce purposes appropriate values are needed for the court as of the
divorce date. Even for defined contribution plans, appropriate discounts need
to be considered for the delay before benefits are to be paid and for the possibili-
ty that some or all benefits may never be paid at all. See In re Marriage of
Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976), "In dividing
nonvested pension rights as community property the court must take into ac-
count the possibility that death or termination of employment may destroy
those rights before they mature." Id. at 848, 544 P.2d at 567, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
So far, no court seems to have considered a premium for defined contribution
accrued benefits which will be allowed to accumulate earnings without paying
tax currently (a true "tax shelter") and because, when received, such benefits
will obtain favored tax treatment.
For defined benefit plans the rate of accrual may be substantially less than
the actual funding level for benefits. This is because the actual cost for benefits
in younger years is lower than in later years. There is a rising curve for funding
of the same amount of benefit as a participant gets older. For a brief (and
readable) explanation of actuarial valuations see POMERANTZ, RAMSEY AND
STEINBERG, PENSIONS: AN ACCOUNTING AND MANAGEMENT GUIDE (1976).
on behalf of this participant; and has the account of this partic-
ipant received funds from other sources, such as from forfei-
tures ?157
The source of funding has often been an important con-
sideration to divorce courts, especially in community property
states. 15 8 The measure of contributions to the plan also has been
a factor in allocating interests in the plan.15 9 Some plans re-
quire employee contributions generally, government and large
private plans, others permit voluntary contributions. 160
157. Defined contribution plans have accrued benefits which accumulate
from contributions and from earnings. Certain of these plans-plans other than
pension plans-may also have accrued benefits derived from forfeitures. See
I.R.C. § 401(a)(8). A defined benefit plan will not have separate accounts (gener-
ally, unless "full insured" with individual contracts). Earnings will go to reduce
employer's obligation to make future funding.
158. See Crossan v. Crossan, 35 Cal. App. 2d 39, 94 P.2d 609 (1939). Husband
had made contributions to state retirement plans, which were, at the least,
refundable. This was held to be community property. But see In re Marriage of
Olhausen, 48 Cal. App. 3d 190, 121 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1975). Husband made contribu-
tions to "retirement plan," which were returnable in all events. When husband
"elected" disability pension, court held pension to be separate property and
denied wife's request for "reimbursement of community."
Even more to the point was the distinguishing of In re Marriage of Ellis,
538 P.2d 1347 (Colo. App. 1975) by the court in In re Marriage of Pope, 544
P.2d 639 (Colo. App. 1975). In Ellis the court ruled a military pension could not
be considered property subject to division in a divorce. In Pope, the court was
impressed by the fact that the retirement benefits had been funded in part by
employee contributions and held the plan interest to be marital property.
Colorado is a common-law state.
To like-effect is Michigan, a common-law state, Hutchins v. Hutchins, 71 Mich.
App. 361, 248 N.W.2d 272 (1976); and Texas, a community-property state, Taylor
v. Taylor, 449 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969).
159. See T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976). The
court allocated shares of the plan between two claimant wives of two different
marriages and to the separate property heirs (for the time in between marriages
and before the first) based on contributions of employer made during each
period of being married or being single.
160. Generally, qualified retirement plans under I.R.C. § 401 may allow
voluntary employee contributions which may not exceed on a cumulative basis
10% of covered compensation during the total periods of active plan participa-
tion. IRS Publication 778, par. 4(h) Guides for Qualification of Pension, Profit-
Sharing and Stock Bonus Plans, Feb. 1972. Rev. Rul. 70-658, 1970-2 C.B. 86. The
IRS has previously ruled that mandatory employee contributions may not dis-
criminate (i.e.-force lower-paid employees "out,") and therefore should not ex-
ceed 6% of compensation. IRS Publication 778, par. 4(g), Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3(d)
(19-). Evidently, incorporating some of the "flavor" of this 6% limitation the
maximum funding provisions (I.R.C. § 415) count some of any employee contri-
butions, whether or not mandatory, which exceed 6% against total allowable
funding to a qualified plan. I.R.C. § 415(c)(2)(B).
See Taylor v. Taylor, 449 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969) wherein the court
emphasized the purely voluntary nature of the plan and of contributions in
deciding it was appropriate to force husband to leave plan before normal retire-
ment to pay wife for her share of community property.
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4. How are plan assets invested; may they be invested in a
loan to the participant to allow a "purchase" of the spouse's
interest; and are the plan assets available, or can they other-
wise be made available, prior to retirement, disability or death
for the aid of the divorce disputants?'
Divorce courts have generally been reluctant to force plan
participants to "realize" their interests in the plan to accommo-
date the divorce. 162 If the plan allows its assets to be made
available without otherwise causing a disruption in the employ-
ee/spouse's participation, this concern can be substantially al-
leviated.'63
161. ERISA, generally, has sharply restricted the use of any plan assets
(whether or not a tax qualified plan) which might be used to aid the personal
desires of any "party in interest" (a very broad category, defined in 29 U.S.C. §
1002(14) (1975); ERISA § 3(14) and including participants). 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1975);
ERISA § 406; I.R.C. § 4975(c).
But many plans, especially single employer plans which have been thor-
oughly restated to comply with ERISA, now allow loans to participants. ERISA
has a specific exception to the prohibited transaction rules for such loans. 29
U.S.C. § 1108(b)(1) (1975); ERISA § 408(b)(1); I.R.C. § 4975. If a plan does allow
such loans, especially if the plan sponsor is willing to cooperate, there is often a
ready source of funds to give the non-participant spouse a payment in full for
the community interest in the plan.
Thereafter, the participant may repay the loan over a period of time at appro-
priate interest. Such repayment in effect constitutes a repayment by the partici-
pant to himself.
162. But see Taylor v. Taylor, 449 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969). See In re
Marriage of Freiberg, 57 Cal. App. 3d 304, 127 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1976)
The time when the monthly retirement payments will commence and
the amount of those payments as between the husband and the wife, are
entirely within the control of the husband (gen; see Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal.
3d 461, 472; In re Marriage of Martin, 50 Cal. App. 3d 581,584; Bensing v.
Bensing, 25 Cal. App. 3d 889, 893). Id. at 311, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
163. In California, the "terminable interest rule" forces a nonparticipant
spouse to "gamble" on the life span of husband and of wife and to depend on the
options chosen by participant spouse in the plan. Berry v. Board of Retirement,
23 Cal. App. 3d 757, 100 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1972); In re Marriage of Petersen, 41 Cal.
App. 3d 396, 115 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1974); Ball v. McDonnel Douglas Corp., 30 Cal.
App. 3d 624, 106 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1973). The "cashing out" of the non-participant
spouse by a plan loan to the participant avoids these difficulties and ends the
partnership between them, which is the whole purpose of the dissolution of
marriage anyway. See Sutherland, Community Property, Nonvested Retire-
ment Benefits In re Marriage of Brown, Vol. 2 No. 1, FAM. LAW SECTION NEWS-
LETTER 19 (1976).
164. See generally, discussion in part V, below, Preemption. Normally no
direct assignment is possible in government plans (for their convenience). See
United States v. Smith, 393 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1968), and may be prohibited by
federal law (ERISA) for other plans. But see California's recent amendment to
its Civil Code to allow joinder of plans in a divorce action and a direct divorce
5. Can an interest in the plan be "assigned" or otherwise
transferred to the non-participant spouse?164
Non-alienation, spend thrift clauses are included in nearly all
plans and are required in all plans subject to ERISA.165 Whether
or not such clauses can or should operate to deprive a divorcing
spouse of a direct interest in the plan is discussed more fully in
Parts V (pre-emption) and VIII (enforcement) below.
6. Are accrued benefits "vested"; will the other benefits not
yet vested vest, and, if so, when and how; what forfeiture has or
can occur, and will such forfeitures ever be reversible; and can
or will the period of service of the employee/spouse generate
vested benefits in the future?166
"Vesting" for purposes of pension plans is concerned with the
issue of whether a participant will lose benefits accrued if the
participant ceases employment or dies prior to receipt of such
court order against the plan. Cal. Stats. ch. 860 p. 2523 (1977), amending CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 4351, 4363 and adding §§ 4363.1, 4363.2 and 4363.3.
165. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1975); ERISA § 206(d)(1); I.R.C. § 401(a)(13). There
is an exception to the non-alienation provision to allow a lien in favor of the plan
for loans to participants. See note 163 supra.
166. The matter was not extensively discussed in the Committee Reports by
Congress when ERISA was passed. The purpose of non-alienation provisions,
aside from serving the convenience of the plan sponsor, is to prevent funds
accumulated for one purpose to be diverted to another. See P. McGILL, FUNDA-
MENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 125 n.1 (3d ed. 1975).
Many courts have previously held that benefits which have not "vested"
(become certain to be paid) are not to be divided at the time of divorce. The
rationale was that such non-vested interests were not "property" (See Part III,
supra) or were too difficult to value. The argument in favor of this position is
well presented In re Marriage of Ellis, 538 P.2d 1347 (Colo. App. 1975). See also
French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941) (overruled on this point in In
re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
Prior to ERISA, it was not unusual for plans to not allow vesting except after
many years or even not until retirement. See Grayck, Compensation and Fringe
Benefits, J. CORP. TAX. 158 (1978). Since ERISA, for all covered plans, at least
50% vesting by 10 years, with 100% by at least 15 years, is now the rule. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1053 (1975); ERISA § 203; I.R.C. § 411.
Even assuming there is some "vesting," benefits may still be forfeitable be-
cause of death prior to retirement (or thereafter), see Ball v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 30 Cal. App. 3d 624, 106 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1973); 29 U.S.C. § 1043(a)(3)(A)
(1975); ERISA § 203(a)(3)(A); I.R.C. § 411(a)(3)(A).
In government plans, post retirement misconduct may cause a loss of benefits.
Ables v. Ables, 540 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976). This is no longer true for
plans covered by ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1975); ERISA § 411; I.R.C. § 411.
See also Merrill Lynch v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973) wherein a pre-ERISA "forfei-
ture for cause" provision was ruled ineffective under California law as an
unreasonable forfeiture of wages (then CAL. LAnOR CODE § 229 (West 1971) and
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1964)).
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benefits. 167 Vested benefits are those which are non-forfeitable.
Moreover, vesting has been a major factor in those jurisdictions
which have evaluated whether pension interests are "property"
subject to distribution upon divorce. In other states however,
specifically California, Texas and Washington, vesting has been
rejected as a primary standard for evaluating whether own-
ership interests exist.168
7. On what occasions are benefits normally payable by the
plan; are there optional forms of pay-out available to the par-
ticipant; does the plan recognize the possibility of claims ad-
verse to the participant; would a division of benefit payments
unduly burden the plan administration; is a Qualified Joint
and Survivor Annuity provided;1 69 who are the persons who
may be designated beneficiaries under the plan; and are there
any ancillary benefits, such as annuities for "widows."170
Retirement plans, consistent with their purposes, are intended
to accumulate benefit credits to be paid after many years of
167. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 842, 544 P.2d 561, 563, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 633, 635 (1976).
168. Id. Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976); De Revere v. De
Revere, 5 Wash. App. 741, 491 P.2d 249 (1971); and Payne v. Payne, 82 Wash. 2d
573, 512 P.2d 736 (1973). See also McGrew v. McGrew, 151 N.J. Super. 515, 377
A.2d 697 (1977). "The concept of 'vesting,' as developed within the law of future
interest, has little meaning in the equitable distribution of a marital estate...
Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 348-349 (1975)." Id. at 517, 377 A.2d at 698.
169. See discussion below I.R.C. § 401(a)(11); ERISA § 205.
170. The occasion upon which benefits may be payable is an important
factor in valuing a plan interest. For instance, if benefits are not payable until
normal retirement at age 65 and are subject to alteration in amount until then or
even to forfeiture on account of death in the interim, and if the participant is
now 35, the valuation will be difficult. However, if death does not work a
forfeiture and if some benefits are payable on account of disability or for early
retirement, or, as in thrift plans, merely because funds have been accumulated
for several years, the valuation of benefits is less speculative.
If the plan pays benefits for "disability" prior to retirement, how is "disabili-
ty" defined? Is it total and permanent, or is it some lesser loss of ability?
If the plan allows retirement "after 15 years of service," is that term defined to
include service for other employers?
Some plans allow the choice of -beneficiaries for the payment of a death
benefit; others do not. Where there is a choice (other than in California which
applies the "terminable interest rule") the designation as beneficiary of the
spouse may alleviate many difficulties. But see Budee v. Pierce, 375 A.2d 984
(Vt. 1977), where the court allowed the second wife to elect against the husband's
will which by a prior divorce decree was required to leave property to his
service, generally only on account of death, disability or retire-
ment. For these reasons plans seldom have allowed pay-out to
be made for other reasons, such as a division between spouses
incident to a divorce. Also, especially for larger private plans
and for government plans, a life-time annuity for the partici-
pant is the normal form of benefit, with all plan interests being
forfeited upon the death of the participant. In lieu of allowing
the participant to name a beneficiary for any value of benefits
not paid prior to death, such plans often include an ancillary
annuity for the "widow" of the participant.171 A similar provi-
sion has been engrafted on other plans by ERISA which now
requires a Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity for most, if not
all, retirement programs. 172 The court in a dissolution proceed-
ing must understand the available options allowed by the plan,
but should not attempt to override the contract between the
employer and the employee. 173
children of the first marriage. Compare In re Marriage of Peterson, 41 Cal. App.
3d 642, 115 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1974).
171. Benson v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 355, 384 P.2d 649, 33 Cal. Rptr.
257 (1963); Berry v. Board of Retirement, 23 Cal. App. 3d 757, 100 Cal. Rptr. 549
(1972).
172. The Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity (QJ&SA) was added as a
requirement by ERISA in order to protect the "spouse" who was dependent on
the participant for support from being cut-off entirely upon the participant's
untimely demise. H.R. REP. No. 93-533 93rd Cong., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 4639, 4732. There are some very complicated rules (too
complicated?) which govern this retirement option. IRS Regulations published
42 FED. REG. 1463, 26 C.F.R. Part 1 (1977).
Briefly, a plan which provides any form of annuity (whether or not optional to
the plan) must provide at normal retirement a QJ&SA, and all defined benefit
plans (and some others) which allow early retirement may have to offer a
QJ&SA earlier. The QJ&SA value must be not less than equal to the actuarial
value of a straight life annuity for the participant (an annuity for the partici-
pant's life with no guaranteed pay out) and must provide a survivor's benefit for
the life of the spouse, (the regulations are not clear whether it need be to the
spouse) of not more than 100% nor less than 50% of the benefit paid during the
life of the participant. The participant must have the option to say no to the
QJ&SA unless it is the only form of payout.
The QJ&SA appear to be a "widow's" plan-that is, if elected, or if required as
the only mode of payout, the beneficiary must evidently be the person who is
the spouse as of the time of death, (and perhaps as of the time benefits begin)
according to Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a) 11(d)(3), and not the "ex-wife."
Query: Does the QJ&SA express a Congressional purpose to override com-
munity property rules, or does the QJ&SA merely demonstrate a lack of
Congressional foresight that the provision might complicate the rights of for-
mer spouses?
Second query: So long as the plan does not have the QJ&SA as the only form
of payout, may not the divorce courts order the participant to elect another
form of benefit? See Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 48, 473
P.2d 765, 775-76, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61, 71-72 (1970).
173. See In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838-39, 544 P.2d 561, 567-68, 126
Cal. Rptr. 633, 639-40 (1976). But see Taylor v. Taylor, supra notes 160 and 162.
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8. Are there any other plan provisions or employee benefits
ancillary to the plan which substantially affect the property
interests in the plan?
On occasion an employer may tie retirement plan benefits to
other employee benefits, such as stock options, life insurance,
and the like. Also plans may be integrated with Social Security
so that the actual benefits receivable from the plan may be
reduced if Social Security benefits increase. 174 These relation-
ships, if any, should be researched on behalf of the divorcing
husband and wife so that the court may have such information
before it when it attempts to value and properly divide those
property interests which actually exist.
A retirement program may be likened to an office building
which is constructed to house diverse businesses over a long
period of time. Just as the building can be expected to last for an
indefinite period, so too, the program is expected to persist. Just
as the desires and goals of diverse businesses may be accom-
modated in the office building, so too, numerous individual
participants may enter into and depart from the retirement
program. In each case, the purpose of the building and of the
plan allows for such diversity. However, no rational owner of an
office building would think to maintain the structure and ac-
commodate the interests of the tenants without a good set of
blueprints so that the sections of the building can be graphically
seen and maintained. So too, the plan document of the retire-
ment program is the blueprint of its existence and the prac-
titioner must be thoroughly conversant with the terms of the
document to be sure that its utility for all its participants is not
altered or destroyed to accommodate the immediate needs of
one participant. The divorce court must be thoroughly conver-
sant with the terms of the plan and with its purposes so that, in
174. See Rev. Rul. 71-446, 1971-41; I.R.C. 401(a)(15) does not allow changes in
the Social Security base occuring after termination of employment or after
benefits begin to affect pension benefits.
For defined benefit plans (but not for Social Security integrated defined
contribution plans, because they work differently) if final benefits are "offset"(reduced) in one way or another by the amount of Social Security benefits to be
received, as Social Security entitlement rises, pension plan entitlement falls.
Since Social Security interests are not considered divisible property in a di-
vorce, the rise in Social Security reduces divisible marital property. In re Mar-
riage of Kelley, 63 Cal. App. 3d 82, 134 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1976).
ministering to the needs of the parties to the dissolution the
court will not inflict harm upon the other "tenants" (partici-
pants) in the "office building" (retirement plan).
PART V
PRE-EMPTION
The question of whether federal law pre-empts state law on
pension interests has been carried to the United States Supreme
Court for resolution, 175 but the ultimate answer has yet to be
determined. Perhaps this is because the question is really sever-
al different questions which can only be answered separately!
1. The states have primary concern for marital interests, 176 and, in
that regard, for the proper division of property rights upon the dissol-
ution of the marital union. Does federal law preempt state law when
determining, as between the marriage partners, whether there are
property interests in retirement plans and, if so, how those interests
are to be shared?
2. Does federal law pre-empt the manner in which the state may
direct the plan in recognizing any state acknowledged rights in retire-
ment plans?
3. Does federal law pre-empt state law as to federally created retire-
175. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950); see also Free v. Bland, 369 U.S.
663 (1962) and Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964), wherein the Court ruled
Treasury regulations concerning United States bonds overrode state communi-
ty property rules to like effect.
The issue of pre-emption by federal securities rules of California labor and
pension law also reached the Supreme Court. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973). In that case, the Court upheld local regula-
tion, saying
In contrast with Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963),
we are not confronted here with conflicting federal regulatory schemes.
The present controversy concerns the interrelationship between stat-
utes adopted, respectively, by the Federal Government and a State. The
analytical framework of Silver is instructive, nonetheless. There the
Court reviewed carefully the securities exchange regulatory scheme
that Congress had adopted in order to identify the character and pur-poses to the Act and the extent to which instances of exchange self-
regulations were necessary to the furtherance of congressional aims
and objectives. 373 U.S. at 349-361, 83 S. Ct. at 1252. It was mindful, also,
of the purposes behind the conflicting statutes which, in that case, were
the antitrust laws. So here, we may not overlook the body of law relating
to the sensitive interrelationship between statutes adopted by the sepa-
rate, yet coordinate, federal and state sovereignities. Our analysis is also
to be tempered by the conviction that the proper approach is to recon-
cile the operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather
than holding one completely ousted.
176. Id. at 389-90. In re Marriage of Pardee, 409 F. Supp. 666, 669 (D.C. Cal.
1976). The Court stated in In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 594 (1890) that:
The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife.
belong to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.And the Ninth Circuit has declared that, "domestic relations is a field
peculiarly suited to state regulation and control, and peculiarly unsuited
to control by federal courts." Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 373 (9th
Cir. 1968). See also State of Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Angler, 280 U.S. 379,50 S. Ct. 154, 74 L. Ed. 489 (1930); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582,
16 L. Ed. 226 (1858).
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ment rights, including interests in military and civil service plans, as
they may be divided between the marriage partners?
4. Does federal law pre-empt state direction to federally created
retirement plans to acknowledge such rights of the husband and
wife?
5. To what extent has federal law established standards for organi-
zation and management of retirement plans which will preclude state
regulations?
6. Finally, recognizing the increased mobility of our society and the
changing social mores, what limits has federal law placed on state law
enforcement of marital property and support rights against pension
plan interests?
A. The Argument for Preemption
All retirement plans, whether federally created or otherwise,
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 7 7 With re-
spect to plans subject to ERISA (generally, all non-government
and non-church retirement plans),1 78 Congress has specifically
and clearly pre-empted all state law, except in the fields of
insurance, banking and securities laws of general application. 79
The language used by Congress is clear and unambiguous and
is buttressed by the legislative history represented by the
speeches of Senators Javits and Williams, and Representatives
Dent and Erlenbour, who were the majority and minority lead-
ers in the Conference Committee which drafted the precise
language on pre-emption in the statute. 80
Further, ERISA is an extremely comprehensive statute in-
tended to regulate the entire field of employee benefits, includ-
ing retirement plans.1 81 Congress has affirmatively decided to
brook no state regulation or law, however well-intentioned such
state action may be, because Congress is aiming at national
uniformity and attempting to encourage the spread of employ-
ee benefit programs. 82 This goal may only be achieved if plan
See also Paoli, Pension Rights and Community Property: From French to
Brown, 4 WEST. STATE U.L. REV. 91, 102 (1976).
177. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1975); ERISA § 2.
178. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1975); ERISA § 4(b).
179. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1975); ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A). Also, criminal laws
of general application are not preempted. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4) (1975); ERISA §
514(b)(4).
180. Such legislative history is extensively quoted in Hewlett-Packard v.
Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1298-99 (N.D. Cal. 1977). See also Azzaro v. Harnett,
414 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd without opinion, 553 F.2d 93 (2d Cir.) cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 71 (1977).
181. Hewlett-Packard v. Barnes, Id. See also Standard Oil of California v.
Agsalud, No. C-76-2740-CBR (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 21, 1977).
182. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1975); ERISA § 2; Hewlett-Packard v. Barnes, Id.
participants and plan sponsors can be assured that the benefits
provided in the contract of the plan document will not vary
merely because the employee/participant should move from one
state to another.
183
As to federally created governmental retirement rights, there
is substantial and unrebutted authority that such pension inter-
ests are the personal entitlement of the employee, 184 and that the
granting of such rights were deemed necessary to insure the
morale and loyalty of government workers and to ensure a
continuing stream of willing applicants for such positions. 185
Because the federal government has facilities across the
183. For instance, should a plan participant take up residence in a common-
law marriage state (see discussion in part II, supra), which state did not have
community property, then move to California, which has by statute quasi com-
munity property, CAL. CIV. CODE § 4803 (West Supp. 1978) which has been held to
allow a retroactive effect in reaching separate property acquired elsewhere,
(see the discussion of Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 97 (1965) in In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 129
Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976)).
The application of the quasi community property legislation to property
acquired before its effective date clearly impaired the husband's vested
property rights; prior to the enactment to the legislation he had been the
sole owner of certain property and afterwards the property belonged to
the community. Nonetheless, we deemed the retroactive application of
the legislation a proper exercise of the police power. The state's
paramount interest in the equitable distribution of marital property
upon dissolution of the marriage, we concluded, justified the impair-
ment of the husband's vested property rights. (See generally Williams v.
North Carolina (1942) 317 U.S. 287, 298 [87 L.Ed. 279, 285. 286, 63 S.Ct.
207, 143 A.L.R. 1273]). Id. at 593, 546 P.2d at 1377, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
Any plan in which such a participant had an interest, even though such interest
was unvested at the time the participant was in California, could find itself
contesting the claim of a person who claimed to be an ex-spouse because of a
California dissolution. This would be so even though the participant could show
the plan fiduciaries that no marriage recognized in California had occurred,
that no interest in the plan had vested or matured while there, and that the
participant had never been properly made a party to an alleged dissolution
proceeding in California by the "ex-spouse" because the participant had never
been served in California and had had no continuing contract before or since.
In short, the plan could be faced with numerous "sophisticated" legal issues
which had naught to do with the plan's primary function of providing benefits to
employees of the plan sponsor.
See Tatum v. Tatum, 241 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1957) (California recognizes
common-law marriages from other jurisdictions even though it has no such
relationship allowed under its law); and Cooper v. Cooper, 269 Cal. App. 2d 6,74
Cal. Rptr. 439 (1969) (California quasi community property reaches stock op-
tions granted while husband in New York and matured after husband left
California to return to New York).
184. S. REP. No. 1480, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3294, 3300. See also Note, Military Retirement Bene-
fits-Prior to Accrual, Military Retirement Pension Earned During Coverture is
Community Property Subject to Division at Time of Divorce, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J.
136, 142 (1977). See also Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 683, 535 P.2d 53, 64
(dissent 1975).
185. Id. Cf. Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 492 P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972).
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country and around the world which must be manned continu-
ously and which have a steady turnover of personnel, the impo-
sition of differing state laws on government employees would
severely interfere with the federal government's need to posi-
tion persons where their services would be most needed. For
example, if the preemption doctrine was not available to pro-
tect the government-granted rights of an employee, to request a
resident of New York 186 to relocate to California for a few years
would allow the employee's spouse to file for a dissolution of
marriage and thereby obtain a vested right in the employee's
government pension which had been earned entirely outside of
California.187
The Internal Revenue Service and the Congress have become
concerned that retirement plans in existence when ERISA was
passed have begun to terminate, or just disappear, in large
numbers. 188 Part, if not most, of the problem has been the in-
creased administrative cost of amending the plan to bring it into
compliance with ERISA as well as to prepare reports for filing
with the IRS, Department of Labor (DOL), the Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corporation (PBGC),'189 and making full disclosure
to participants and beneficiaries. 90 If another layer of regula-
tion is to be applied to the already burdened retirement plan
industry because of each state having different determinations
of the rights of non-employee spouses in such plans, there will
186. New York is a "title state." All property in divorce remains owned by
the person who holds title. Foster and Freed, From a Survey of Matrimonial
Laws in the United States: Distribution of Property Upon Dissolution, 3 COM-
MUNITY PROP. J. 231, 232 (1976).
187. See Cooper v. Cooper, 269 Cal. App. 2d 5, 74 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1969).
188. [1977] 147 PENS. RPTR. (BNA) A-10. The IRS has reported that, based on
a preliminary survey about 30% of the plans in existence before ERISA have
now or will soon terminate. The cost of converting such "old" plans to ERISA
requirements had been stated to be a major cause of such terminations.
189. IRS is the Internal Revenue Service; DOL is the Department of Labor;
PBGC is the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation. All three agencies have
substantial delegated responsibility under ERISA for regulation of covered
plans.
190. ERISA originally called for full disclosure by plans to the DOL and to
participants by early in 1975. Numerous delays occurred because the forms
were in a steady state of being issued-criticized-withdrawn-amended-delayed-
issued-criticized-withdrawn, etc. The plan description, EBS-1, as originally is-
sued was a "monster," calling for extensive essay-type answers. It was re-
drafted so that information to be submitted can be given by checking boxes or
by simple fill-ins. That took over a year.
be an accelerating loss in the number of plans. This result is
directly contrary to the intent of Congress.'9 '
For the reasons stated above, federal plans never could be
subject to state control and ERISA has pre-empted any further
direct state regulation or interference with employee plan
rights.192 However, assuming arguendo that states may have the
right as between the marriage partners to determine rights in
the property interest of the plan, except to the extent of making
available reports which are already required by ERISA to be
prepared for the proper administration of the plan, the plan and
its advisors cannot, because of preemption, be required in any
way to reflect the rights of the non-employee spouse other than
as specifically provided in the plan document. 193 The plan trus-
tee is obligated 94 in state and federal court to account to the
plan participants and beneficiaries' named by plan partici-
pants or by the terms of the plan. It must be noted that a former
or soon-to-be former spouse is neither a participant nor a bene-
ficiary. 196
The annual reports (form 5500 series) was originally proposed in different
format for IRS and DOL and in fact, was required for initial years to be
submitted separately to each. The forms themselves have been revised at least
annually and are projected to be used for filing all information for IRS, DOL
and PBGC in one form at one date for later years.
The Summary Plan Description (SPD) is intended to be the primary source of
plan information for plan participants. It was to have been available in 1975, or
at least 1976. Final regulations provided for delivery November 16, 1977, or,
later, if "good cause" could be shown.
Federal regulation has been evolving so that plans now begin to understand
how to respond. If state rules are to be overlayed on the federal structure, plan
administration will remain in chaos forever.
191. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1975); ERISA § 2. See also 29 U.S.C. §§ 1222, 1231 and
1302 (1975); ERISA §§ 3022, 3031, 4002.
192. If it is argued that any preemption must only be prospective and that
any retroactive effect would be a taking of property without due process of law
and in interference with the right of contract, ERISA by its terms applies
preemption only as of January 1, 1975. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1975); ERISA § 514(a).
However, there is an exception to the due process requirements where a
"change" in vested rights is necessary to carry-out a strong public policy is
accord with the police power. See Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d
897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965) and In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583,546 P.2d
1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976).
193. ERISA does recognize divorce in limited situations. I.R.C. §§
402(e)(4)(G); 408(g); ERISA §§ 2002(b), 2005. Congress knew divorces could be a
problem and specifically considered the matter. Congress does not wish to go
any further. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1975); ERISA § 514 is comprehensive.
194. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1975); ERISA § 502.
195. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (1975); ERISA § 502 allows only "participants and
beneficiaries" to bring actions (other than governmental agencies) to enforce
plan provisions and insure rights. Ex-spouses are not participants or ben-
eficiaries. Kerbow v. Kerbow, 421 F. Supp. 1253, 1260 (N.D. Tex. 1976), "It was
not the purpose of Congress to embroil either the employers or the federal court
system in state divorce proceedings."
196. Id. at 1259.
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To the extent the Congress wishes, it may provide a remedy
for the enforcement of rights arising out of family law against
plan interests. 197 Where Congress has pre-empted the field, how-
ever, as it has here, if Congress does not create such a right, the
states may not fill the void "in the interest of justice." Arguably,
if the states can ensure that the integrity of the plan will be
maintained and that there will be no increased costs, the state
courts could be allowed a proceeding in the nature of an inter-
pleader to resolve conflicting rights.19 8 However, the arguments
in favor of such a proceeding are faulty because they do not
recognize the right of the plan to deal only with the participant.
Additionally such a court proceeding would also interfere with
some of the optional modes of pay-out present in nearly all
plans, which options are normally made by the plan
fiduciaries. 199 Also, if such an interpleader were to be underta-
ken, the plan participant would lose the tax advantages which
are available for certain forms of pay-out from plans,20 a result
which would impair the incentives for such plans clearly and
concisely created by Congress.2"'
Congress has spoken, not once, but several times, to encour-
age retirement plans for employees. Congress has seen state
interference disrupt the even-handed administration of such
plans and has therefore chosen after many years of deliberation
197. Congress has seen fit to do so for enforcement of "support" obligations
by garnishing federally-held funds. 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1977). This law, effective
January 1, 1975, goes no further than to allow state law to reach fufids in the
hands of the United States. It does not encourage or abet such proceedings by
providing a forum, and the scope of the new provision is limited to assist only
for support. See Morrison v. Morrison, 408 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
198. E.g., Fox v. Smith, 531 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975), and T.L. Jones &
Co., Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976).
199. The plan fiduciaries owe a duty of total loyalty to the plan participants
and beneficiaries and may be held personally liable if they did not so proceed.
29 U.S.C. §§ 1004 and 1132 (1975); ERISA §§ 404 and 502.
200. [1977] 149 PENS. RPTR. (BNA) J-4. A plan participant who received pay-
ment from court which would have come from plan but for discrimination by
employer could not rollover such amounts (I.R.C. § 402(a)(5) because not re-
ceived from the plan). If amounts are received from court proceeding, especially
if "interpleader" action holds funds for an extended period of time, query
whether funds retain attributes as distribution from plan?
201. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 101(b) ($5000 excluded from income tax for death
benefit) I.R.C. § 402 (capital gains; 10-year forward averaging; preferred income
tax on lump sum payouts) I.R.C. § 408 (rollovers); I.R.C. § 2039(c) (estate tax
exclusions).
to enact a comprehensive statute to regulate all employee bene-
fit programs which is intended to usurp the field and exclude
all other regulation. For these reasons, pre-emption will apply
(a) as to rights between a participant and a spouse; (b) as be-
tween the non-employee spouse and the plan; (c) as to all feder-
ally created employee benefits; (d) as to enforcement against the
plan of any state created marital rights, except those specifical-
ly authorized by Congress; and (e) as to any state court proceed-
ing which would have the plan or its fiduciaries made subject to
state court jurisdiction, including the supplying of plan infor-
mation to any person other than the participant and including
paying any sums into court or otherwise making pay-out other
than as selected by the plan fiduciary strictly in accord with the
terms of the plan and payable to the participant and/or his
beneficiaries.
B. The Argument Against Preemption
The federal government has the power and the right2 2 to
exclude state regulation from any field such as employee bene-
fits which is within the United States Constitutional grant of
power to the federal government. However, the federal govern-
ment is an authority of delegated responsibility and the states as
sovereign entities retain all jurisdiction over matters not specif-
ically and clearly undertaken by the federal government,20 3 so
long as state regulation is not in conflict with a legitimate feder-
al purpose.2 4
The Supreme Court has previously considered federal pre-
emption 20 5 in the employee benefits area, and has specifically
left open the extent to which state regulation of individual rights
202. U.S. CONST. art. 6, § 2.
203. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
204. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973);
Carlson v. Carlson, 11 Cal. 3d 474, 521 P.2d 1114, 113 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1974) in
distinguishing Wissner (National Service Life Insurance) from federal group
life insurance, "Congress has not spoken with force and clarity," to override the
strong state policy in favor of community property. Id. at 476-77, 521 P.2d at
1115, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
205. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973); Dominey v. Dominey, 481 S.W.2d 473 (Tex.
App.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1028 (1972) (Military disability pension held to
be community property subject to division in divorce); In re Marriage of Fithian,
10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825,
rehearing denied, 419 U.S. 1060 (1974) (Military pension held to be community
property, divided in marriage dissolution).
See also Daniel v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th
Cir. 1977).
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may be subject to state regulation.0 6 As a matter of fact, the
Court has been crystal clear in not eliminating state court juris-
diction over pension interests where a legitimate and strong
state concern is at stake.0 7
Marriage and divorce are matters peculiarly within the areas
of greatest concern to the states and this has been recognized by
the federal courts. 20 8 Only the clearest of congressional state-
ments can be allowed to preempt the policies of the states.
209
The state does not delve into the private affairs of the mem-
bers of the family;2 10 it only concerns itself with the legitimacy
of the marital relationship 21 1 and that, on its dissolution, the
legitimate claims for marital property and for support of the
family members are met and properly enforced by the state
courts.
2 12
With respect to federal pension rights, Congress has long been
aware of the argument made by the states that division of such
interests would occur under state law when the marriage had
been dissolved.213 What was Congress' response? Did it spring to
the fore to "cut 'em off at the pass," before those dastardly
206. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. at 659-60 supra note 205.
207. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. at 130-31 supra
note 204.
208. Gersten v. C.I.R., 267 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1959); Lee v. C.I.R., 550 F.2d 1201
(9th Cir. 1977); C.I.R. v. Wilkerson, 44 T.C. 718 (1965), aff'd, 368 F.2d 552 (8th Cir.
1966).
209. In re Marriage of Karlin, 24 Cal. App. 3d 25, 101 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1972).
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973); In re Mar-
riage of Jones, 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975):
Congress, of course, may determine the community or separate
character of a federally created benefit and such determination binds
the states. (Free v. Bland (1962) 369 U.S. 633,668 [8 L.Ed. 2d 180, 184, 82
S.Ct. 1089]; Wissner v. Wissner (1950) 338 U.S. 655, 660-661 [94 L.Ed. 424,
429-430, 70 S.Ct. 398].) (lb) We find nothing in the statutes providing
military disability pay, however, or in the history of the enactment and
administration of those statutes, to suggest that Congress intended itself
to determine whether the right of a married veteran, resident in a com-
munity property state, to disability pay is a community asset. We may,
therefore define the nature of the treatment to be accorded this benefit
according to principles of California community property law so long as
the result does not frustrate the objectives of the federal legislation. (In
re Marriage of Fithian, supra,_10 Cal. 3d 592, 597 & fn.4). Id. at 461, 531
P. at 423, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
210. Zablocki v. Redhall, 46 U.S.L.W. 4093 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1978).
211. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815
(1976).
212. See Tatum v. Tatum, 241 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1957). See also 42 U.S.C. § 659
(1977).
213. See In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 596, 517 P.2d 449, 451, 111
Cal. Rptr. 369, 371 (1974) and cases cited therein.
spouses made off with the loot? No. Congress specifically recog-
nized marital rights in federal pensions by waiving federal im-
munity to garnishment of such interests on account of state
claims for support. 214
The proponents of pre-emption argue that Congress has spo-
ken and spoken clearly. We agree. Congress has said, "yes," to
marital claims against federally created rights and thereby ac-
knowledged the superior interests of the states to ensure the
legitimate family expectations to equitable rights in property,
including pensions, and to state created rights of support.
Congress did however pre-empt direct state regulation of the
administration, organization and structure of plans.215 Even
there, though, Congress has acknowledged and continued state
regulation in banking, insurance and securities areas. 16 Clearly
a state may no longer require reports on retirement systems,
except to aid in its taxing authority.27 Nor may it require licens-
ing of employee benefit plans;218 but how has Congress clearly
and consciously spoken to eliminate marital claims? Such a
sweeping pre-emption of long established state interests must
be much more specific than Congress was in ERISA. 219 Besides,
pre-emption, as included in ERISA, was created in the Confer-
ence Committee and the broad sweep was not intended to advo-
cate the banning of legitimate state interests in maintaining the
family. No expression of such an intent was mentioned on the
floor of either the House or Senate nor reflected in the Confer-
ence Committee Report.220
Those in favor of preemption cite legislative history consist-
ing of the floor sponsors from the House and Senate. However,
none of these gentlemen represent community property
214. 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1977). See also Conference Committee Report, as to
ERISA § 206, "For purposes of this rule [non-alienation], a garnishment or levy
is not to be considered a voluntary assignment." Prepared by U.S. Senate Sub-
committee on Labor & Public Welfare, Vol. 3, pp. 4319, 4320 (April 1976).
215. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1975); ERISA § 514.
216. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1975); ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A).
217. But see National Carriers Conference Committee v. Heffernan, No. N-
77-191 (Conn., filed Sept. 29, 1977.) Reported in [Oct. 31, 1977] 161 PENS. RPTR.
(BNA) A-11, D-2. Federal District Court refused to rule out suit seeking to enjoin
Connecticut from taxing pension benefits. Court upholds right of private plain-
tiff's to sue to enforce federal preemption.
218. Hewlett-Packard v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Standard
Oil of California v. Agsalud, No. C-76-2740 CBR (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 21, 1977).
219. In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369
(1974); In re Marriage of Karlin, 24 Cal. App. 3d 25, 101 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1972).
220. See Hewlett-Packard v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), for a
discussion of the legislative history.
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states,22' or, for that matter, any of the common law states which
have taken the most active interest in insuring marital property
rights in retirement plans.222
It would be an idle exercise to grant the state courts the au-
thority to divide marital property, including rights in a pension,
and then refuse the courts the authority, where appropriate, to
enforce the claims of the non-participant spouse against the
plan.223 Further, the courts must have the opportunity to get an
expert opinion of the plan terms, the available options, and the
valuation of interests under each optional form of pay-out.
224
Since the plan is already required by ERISA to maintain
records of this information,225 and since the plan fiduciaries are
intimately acquainted with the plan as it is administered, it
would be an unnecessary expense to the marriage partners and
society to have outside "experts," who could not be as disinter-
ested as the plan fiduciaries, retained by the husband and wife
to prepare such information for the court. In addition, the
states, following the lead of the federal government, have estab-
lished fair procedures which impinge as little as possible on the
plan.226 To the extent any increase in costs may occur, they will
221. The floor sponsors were Senators Javitts (New York) and Williams
(Delaware), and Representatives Erlenborn (Illinois) and Dent (Pennsylvania).
The community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washington.
222. The common-law states which have been most active in this area are
New Jersey, Wisconsin and, to some extent, Colorado.
223. See the effect of providing limited enforcement which finally led the
court to break new ground in finding a remedy. In re Marriage of Fithian, 10
Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974). See Collida v. Collida, 546
S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977) (Court allowed direct action against public
pension board because no other means was available to provide wife with
benefit since husband had become a total reprobate). See In re Marriage of
Milhan, 13 Cal. 3d 129, 528 P.2d 1145, 117 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1974):
Wissner does not forbid the states from applying their community prop-
erty laws to achieve an equitable division of marital property, so long as
the operation of those laws does not frustrate congressional intent. Id. at
132, 528 P.2d 1147, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
224. See Parts VI, VII and VIII, below, for Valuation, Division and Enforce-
ment of court orders concerning pension interests in divorce.
225. See Part IV above, and, especially, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-27-(1975); ERISA §§
101-07.
226. 1977 Cal. Stats. ch. 860 p. 2522 amending CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4351 and
4363 and adding 4363.1, 4363.2, and 4363.3. This amendment setting forth some
basic guidelines for joinder of plans to a dissolution action arose out of the
somewhat ad hoc joinders which had occurred under the CAL. R. CT. 1250, 1252
and 1254 (Rev. July 1, 1977) and the case of In re Marriage of Sommers, 53 Cal.
App. 3d 509, 126 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1975), upholding such joinders.
be minimal.227 The figures which show previously existing plans
being terminated after ERISA 228 may reflect the recognition of
employers of alternative employee benefits, such as IRA's, 229 or
may reflect the increased rigor of federal regulation in general.
There is absolutely no evidence, however, that plans have ter-
minated because of the conferring of marital property rights on
non-employee spouses.23
0
The states are the guardians of the family, which is the bas-
tion of our society and the strength of our future. Congress has
clearly recognized this role and has equally clearly confirmed to
the states their policies of protecting family interests. Only the
most hard-hearted would rob the spouse and children of the
protection afforded by a retirement plan, which may well be the
largest single asset of the family,231 created by the sweat and
tears of many years of communal effort. Certainly Congress has
not done so.
3. Summary
Putting all the arguments together, the state has historically
defended the institution of marriage and each state has seen
that the parties to the marriage are protected as to any marital
property. To overthrow the role guardian of the family for ad-
ministrative convenience and to further the relatively recent
institution of the retirement plan will require a full and open
discussion, which has yet to occur.
Congress has moved to encourage pensions. The states in
protecting the family should be careful not to undercut these
incentives unless unusual circumstances make an extreme posi-
The giving of direction to a plan to protect the interests of a spouse originated
in Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 473 P.2d 765, 89 Cal. Rptr.
61 (1970) because the husband had left the state and was therefore not amenable
to the court's control. See also Collida v. Collida, 545 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Ct. App.
1977).
Where the plan has no costs, an interpleader cannot be objectionable. Fox v.
Smith, 531 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975). However, the present joinder proce-
dure does not remove the burden of legal and other expenses from the plan.
227. There are presently over 70 million persons covered by one form or
another of retirement plan. For 1977 it is estimated that over 1,000,000 divorces
occurred and the number is not expected to decrease.
228. See note 188 supra.
229. ERISA added I.R.C. §§ 219, 408 and 409 to the Code to allow for the first
time employees not covered under a qualified plan to put funds away in their
own plan. The deduction limits and certain other rules were amended by the
Tax Reform Act of 1976 so that now non-working spouses may also participate.
230. See Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977) (court upholds
regulation by state of coverage to be provided in all group medical insurance
policies. Court indicates no adverse effect on plans by state's regulation).
231. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 847, 544 P.2d 561, 566, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 633, 638 (1976).
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tion necessary. The state court should recognize marital rights
in pensions because those interests are "earned" by the family
unit and because otherwise, society may be burdened with the
expense of the non-participant spouse and perhaps of children.
Why should "society" bear the brunt of other people's mistakes,
at least when they, the husband and wife, have assets available
to pick up the tab?
The state court should not routinely make an order against a
plan. The plan has information the court needs and which the
plan can supply at little or no additional cost. If the plan is
forced to respond as a party to a legal action however, or if a
direct court order is to be issued against the trustee or other
plan fiduciaries, then administrative expenses will increase
markedly, probably to the detriment of the continued growth of
plans.
Although these extra expenses are worth the cost, they are
avoidable. However, where the participant will not cooperate
and the regular administration of the court can be expected to
be burdened because of continuing enforcement proceedings,
then, after a proper finding of unusual lack of cooperation by
the participant, the court could order the interest in the plan to
be brought before the court so that the court could directly
order a proper division. If this happened, tax benefits and per-
sonal financial flexibility for the participant could have been
lost, but only because the participant chose to be intransigent.
PART VI
VALUATION
ERISA requires all plans subject to its provisions to provide,
at least annually, upon request of a participant, a statement
showing the participant's current "accrued interest""2 2 in the
plan and telling what amount of the accrued benefits is vested,
if any, or when vesting will occur. s3 In addition the participant
must have ready access to all plan documents including the plan
and trust, any collective bargaining agreement, the plan de-
scription (Form EBS-1), the latest summary plan description,
232. "Accrued benefits" are defined differently for defined contribution
and for defined benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(23), 1205(b) (1975); ERISA § 3(23).
233. 29 U.S.C. § 1025(a) (1975); ERISA § 105(b).
the annual report (Form 5500) and other documents by which
the organization and operation of the plan is controlled. 234
Whenever a plan is submitted for a determination as to its qual-
ified status under the Internal Revenue Code, an application
form is prepared (5300 series of forms) and must be made avail-
able to "interested persons", who, generally, are the present
employees of the sponsoring employer, any other person with
an interest in the plan and all plan participants.2 5 Notice to
"interested persons" must be delivered before application may
properly be received by the IRS.236
Each plan participant or beneficiary is entitled to receive a
summary plan description (the plan booklet) which is supposed
to briefly but thoroughly explain in layman's language precisely
what the plan provides, how and by whom it is run and the
procedures for obtaining benefits.3 7
After having gathered the information from plan documents
and disclosure and having determined the "accrued benefit"238
of the participant, one must then determine how much, if any, of
the accrued benefit is not "property"239 under the law of the
jurisdiction hearing the divorce. Next, for the part that is prop-
erty one must determine under local law when marital property
ceased to be added,240 and, if different, the date as of which a
234. 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b) (1975); ERISA § 104(b)(2).
235. I.R.C. § 7476(b)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.7476.1, Treas. Reg. § 1.7476-2 (19).
236. Treas. Reg. § 1.7476-2; Treas. Reg. § 601.201-3(0).
237. The Summary Planning Description Regulations were first issued in 42
FED. REG. 14,266 (1977) in interim and "final" form. They were then reissued in
final form (with some minor changes) in 42 FED. REG. 37,178 (1977). These last
regulations provide for delivery of the SPD to all plan participants by Novem-
ber 16, 1977, or for "good cause" within 60 days thereafter (January 15, 1978). In
addition for certain plans seeking determination letters from the IRS, the SPD's
may be delayed for from 90 days to 6 months (depending on type of plan) after a
determination letter is received. 28 C.F.R. 2520 (1978).
Incidentally, the regulations call for a "Plain English" booklet (SPD), but take
over 20 pages, double column, small print, to say, somewhat imprecisely, exactly
how that is to be done!
238. See notes 232, 233, supra. The "accrued benefit" of a participant will be
the basic information conveyed to a participant by the plan.
239. See Part III, supra. "Property" may require "vesting" (Louisiana,
perhaps; Wisconsin, Missouri, Idaho, New Mexico); or "matured benefits" (Ar-
kansas, and perhaps, Colorado as to non-contributory plans); or some other
feature. For instance, in California disability benefits, not in lieu of retirement
payments, are separate property (In re Marriage of Jones, 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531
P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975)); but in Texas such benefits are community
property. (Dominey v. Dominey, 481 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1028 (1972)).
240. In California, after separation, all added property is "separate." CAL.
CIv. CODE § 5118 (West Supp. 1978). In New Jersey, accretions continue to be
marital property until the petition for divorce is filed. Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340,
331 A.2d 257 (1975).
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valuation is to be made.241 In some cases, especially for military
pensions2 42 or for defined benefit pension plans, no current
valuation will be needed because the court will choose to merely
allocate pension interests between separate and community and
allow the non-employee spouse a share "when, as and if" paid.
243
More on this mode of division and payout will be discussed
later. First, the following questions must be examined: What
kind of plan are we valuing? Are there any unusual features,
such as "tandem" arrangements with other plans244 which re-
quire inclusion of those plans in making a determination of
value? Do pay-out options materially differ from normal plans?
Are there any guarantees of payment to heirs or beneficiaries
that must be valued?245
A defined contribution plan, a plan with all assets allocated to
individual participant accounts which accounts are valued at
least annually at fair market value,2 46 will be valued at the most
recent accrued benefit value for the participant, less an appro-
priate discount, if any, because the participant may forfeit the
accrued benefit. 247 Thereafter, an appropriate discount may al-
241. In California valuation is to be done as close to trial date as possible.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1978). See In re Marriage of Imperato, 45 Cal.
App. 3d 432, 119 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1975).
242. Ables v. Ables, 540 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976).
243. This mode of division of benefits is especially useful where non-vested
pension interests are being divided. This is so because the value of such interests
is highly speculative, since it depends on the continuing work of the employ-
ee/spouse with the employer sponsoring the plan. See In re Marriage of Brown,
15 Cal. 3d 838, 848, 544 P.2d 561, 567, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 639 (1976).
244. See M.S.D. Inc. v.. United States, 434 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
Employee was entitled to a non-qualified deferred compensation payment if he
lived. If he died it was forfeited. However, if he died there was a widow's
payment of approximately the same value as the life-time payments.
245. In California the "terminable interest rule" (see discussion in Part III,
supra) limits the continuing interest of the non-participant spouse to the joint
lives of the participant and spouse. Benson v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 355,
384 P.2d 649, 33 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1963). There is therefore no interest to be inher-
ited through the spouse. The law is to the contrary in Texas: Taggart v. Taggart,
552 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977); Idaho: Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 535
P.2d 53 (1975); Arizona: Everson v. Everson, 24 Ariz. App. 239, 537 P.2d 624
(1974); Louisiana: Laffite v. Laffite, 253 So. 2d 120 (La. 1971), and perhaps other
jurisdictions.
246. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(23), (34), 1023(b)(3)(A), 1025(a) (1975); ERISA §§ 3(23),
(24), 103(b)(3)(A), 105(a), Rev. Rul. 70-125, 1970-1 C.B. 87; see also IR-1631, allow-
ing "suspense" accounts for defined contribution plans to comply with I.R.C. §
415 limitations. See also, Rev. Rul. 74-340, 1974-28 C.B. 26.
247. Mora v. Mora, 429 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968), Blitt v. Blitt, 139 N.J.
so be taken to reflect the present value versus future value of
the benefit.248
In a defined benefit plan, a plan guaranteeing a future benefit
based on years of service and average compensation, but with-
out individual accounts and without allocation of assets (except
upon separation from the plan) to individual participants, it is
necessary to obtain the services of a qualified actuary well-
acquainted with retirement plans who may calculate the level of
benefit "accrued" (earned) to date, its future value as of pro-
jected retirement date and its present value.249 Such calculation
may take into consideration actuarial assumptions such as (a)
discount for future value, generally, approximating an interest
return on long investments; (b) mortality expectations, if rele-
vant and (c) other factors reflecting on probability of forfei-
tures.250 Also, if benefits finally payable are to use final average
pay or some similar formula, the actuary may include an as-
sumption about increasing compensation to normal retirement
age. 251 In some jurisdictions a further discount may be in order
Super. 213, 218-19, 353 A.2d 144,147 (1976). In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d at
848, 544 P.2d at 567, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
248. No case so far noted seems to have considered a premium in evaluating
an interest in the plan. Such a premium may be justified because earnings will
accumulate without current tax, plan interests will be free from the liens of
creditors, and interests when received will receive substantial tax benefits. To
be balanced against these very real advantages will be the detriment that the
funds will not be available until a later date.
249. For an excellent article on the valuation of benefits, see Presentation of
Commissioner Herbert Ross, Valuing and Dividing Pension Benefits Upon
Dissolution of Marriage, 1976 FAM. LAW Symp. 213 (L.A. Co. B.A. 1976 and Supp.
1977). A substantially similar article by the same author appears in Ross, Han-
dling Retirement Plans in Marriage Dissolution, Practical Law Course, Appen-
dix A-2 (1977). A well-reasoned article on actuarial valuations appears in Projec-
tor, Valuation of Retirement Benefits in Marriage Dissolutions, Practice Law
Course, Appendix A-1 originally published in 50 L.A.B. BULL. 229 (1975). See
also in the same publication Firestone, Valuation of the Community Interest of
Retirement Benefits Upon Dissolution of Marriage, 50 L.A.B. BULL. 229 (1975).
For a straight forward presentation of the available choices in actuarial
methods to value interests in a plan see POMERANZ, RAMSEY & STEINBERG, PEN-
SIONS: AN ACCOUNTING AND MANAGEMENT GUIDE ch. 2 (1976).
Recently the Interprofessional Pension Actuarial Advisory Group released its
report Exposure Draft on Standardizing Actuarial Terms [Oct. 21, 1977] PEN-
SION AND PROFIT SHARING RPTR. (P-H) §§ 135, 346. This somewhat more techni-
cal document explains the various terms in common usage and attempts to
unify the underlying concepts into a logical system which may be commonly
understood by all involved in the field.
250. See Firestone, supra, in particular; and the Practical Law Course,
supra in general.
251. Compare Schappell v. Schappell, 544 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977)
(Spouse to share in benefit based on rank of officer as of divorce), with Judd v.
Judd, 68 Cal. App. 3d 515, 137 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1977) (the "Momentum Theory"-
each month of effort to earn a pension builds the momentum to reach the final
level-no period is worth more than any other).
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to reflect the income tax cost to the participant as if the partici-
pant were to incur the tax and then make a net, nontaxable
distribution to the spouse.2 52
There are a number of special circumstances that will need to
be considered when making a valuation. These include optional
pay-outs, possible early retirement, "non-property" ancillary
benefits available "in lieu" of regular pensions, 253 possible alter-
native claims on the plan benefits, 254 prior marital divisions, if
any, obligations of spousal or child support which may subse-
quently be allowed against plan benefits 255 and other peculiar
features of which the parties to the divorce may be aware.
Perhaps as important as any other factor in determining the
proper mode of valuation of the pension interest is a knowledge
of the expected mode of division to be exercised by the court.
As an example, in Idaho it is the normal rule of the court to
require immediate, or as close to it as possible, division of com-
munity property interests. 256 Accordingly, the appraiser-ac-
tuary, will have to establish a current value so that the court
may give judgment for the community property share of the
spouse in an amount equal to the proper division.
257
On the contrary, the normal procedure in Louisiana is to
confirm to each spouse their continuing share interest in the
252. Troutenko v. Troutenko, 503 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974) cf. Kruger
v. Kruger, 139 N.J. Super. 413, 354 A.2d 340 (1976) (consider tax cost when
valuing marital interest) with Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 464, 375 A.2d 659 (1977)
and Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 339, 331 A.2d 256 (1975) (the valuation does not
consider tax cost of distribution).
253. In re Marriage of Olhausen, 48 Cal. App. 3d 190, 121 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1975)
(disability benefits elected by participant in lieu of retirement pension is sepa-
rate property). But see In re Marriage of Mueller, 70 Cal. App. 3d 66, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 129 (1977) (only disability payment in excess of normal pension is separate
property).
254. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1975); ERISA § 206(d); I.R.C. § 401(a)(13), which
allow a lien in favor of the plan for loans to participants.
255. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 690.18 (West Supp. 1977) exempts plan
interests from attachment or garnishment except for support obligations. See
also Conference Committee Report, 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (1975), wherein a garnish-
ment is distinguished as an involuntary alienation and therefore not within the
ban of 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1975).
256. Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 679, 535 P.2d 53, 60 (1975).
257. Id. The court in Ramsey, entered a judgment against husband (the
participant) for the wife's share in the pension, to bear 6% to 8% interest until
paid, and to be paid "within a reasonable time."
pension as joint owners.258 In one case the court allocated inter-
ests between conflicting claimants based on contributions made
at each period during the time the pension was maintained as
compared to all contributions which had been made.259 In
another case, the court determined the wife's relative share
based on discounted present and future values. 2 In both cases
an immediate division of interests was neither expected nor,
evidently, allowable.
In California, prior to In re Marriage of Brown,261 only "vest-
ed" pension interests were treated as property.2 2 Under those
circumstances the preferred method of division was to value
currently the pension interest and then to allocate other com-
munity property to the non-employee spouse instead of having
the parties retain a continuing partnership relationship in the
property.263 However, since Brown, non-vested interests in
plans may be included. This makes current valuation exception-
ally difficult because it will necessarily involve an estimation of
the probability of the participant spouse staying on the job.264
Under such circumstances, the California courts have utilized
the "time rule" to allocate community property interests in the
total pension, but thereby avoid "valuation" until the time pen-
258. T.L. James & Co. Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So.2d 834 (La. 1976).
259. Id. at 852-53. In effect, when the plan interest vests, it is distributed
retroactively to all persons having an interest.
260. Lynch v. Lawrence, 293 So.2d 598 (La. App. 1974).
261. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
262. French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235, Annot., 134 A.L.R. 366
(1941), overruled, In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 235, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 633 (1976).
263. Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 473 P.2d 765, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 61 (1970).
264. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d at 848 n.10, 544 P.2d at 567 n.10, 126
Cal. Rptr. at 689 n.10:
(3) In dividing nonvested pension rights as community property the
court must take account of the possibility that death or termination of
employment may destroy those rights before they mature. In some cases
the trial court may be able to evaluate this risk in determining the
present value of those rights. (citations omitted). But if the court
concludes that because of uncertainties affecting the vesting or matura-
tion of the pension that it should not attempt to divide the present value
of pension rights, it can instead award each spouse an appropriate
portion of each pension payment as it is paid. 10 This method of dividing
the community interest in the pension renders it unnecessary for the
court to compute the present value of the pension rights, and divides
equally the risk that the pension will fail to vest.
10. Our suggestion in Phillipson v. Board of Administration, supra, 3
Cal. 3d 32, 46, that when feasible the trial court should award the em-
ployee all pension rights and compensate his spouse with other property
of equal value was not intended to tie the hands of the trial court. That
court retains the discretion to divide the community assets in any fash-
ion which complies with provisions of Civil Code Section 4800.
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sion benefits are actually paid. 265
The "time rule" allocates as community assets that part of the
pension "earned" during coverture (marriage) as compared to
the total period spent in earning the pension.266 As an example,
if a participant now 55, expected to retire at 65, had 15 years in
the plan, but had been married longer than that, at retirement
15/25 of the plan would have been earned during the marriage
and one-half of that, or 30%, would be spouses community inter-
est.267 In California, the courts consider time to be equal in value
and therefore will allow the non-employee spouse to share in
increased pension benefits because of future salary or rank
promotions. 26 8 In essence, the courts leave inviolate the right of
the participant to choose a retirement date but, in exchange,
265. Judd v. Judd, supra note 251; In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d
93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974), for an alternative means of allocating between
community and separate property. See also, In re Marriage of Bruyl, 47 Cal.
App. 3d 201, 120 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1975) rejecting the "insurance premium" alloca-
tion between community and separate property set forth in Polk v. Polk, 228
Cal. App. 2d 763, 39 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1964).
266. In re Marriage of Anderson, 64 Cal. App. 3d 36,134 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1976);
In re Marriage of Adams, 64 Cal. App. 3d 181,134 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1976); Matter of
Marriage of Gongwer, 554 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).
267. California requires as nearly an equal division as possible. CAL. CIv.
CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1978). The "time method" of allocation implies equal
value for all years of service. In other words, it implies pension benefits are a
reward for seniority, rather than compensation for any particular period or
periods of employment. Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 97 S. Ct. 2002, 2009 (1977).
Other aspects of pension plans like the one established by petitioner
18
suggest that the "true" nature of the pension payment is a reward for
length of service.
18. Petitioner's plan is a "defined benefit" plan, under which the
benefits to be received by employees are fixed and the employer's con-
tribution is adjusted to whatever level is necessary to provide those
benefits. The other basic type of pension is a "defined contribution"
plan under which the employer's contribution is fixed and the employee
receives whatever level of benefits the amount contributed on his behalf
will provide. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34)(35); Note, Fiduciary Standards and
the Prudent Man Rule Under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 960, 961-63 (1975). We intimate no views on
whether defined contribution plans are to be treated differently from
defined benefit plans under the Military Service Act. Id. at 2009 n.18.
See also Judd v. Judd, supra note 251, (The Momentum Theory) and Schappell
v. Schappell, 544 S.W.2d at 809.
Since all of the military retirement benefits are being earned throughout
the twenty years' service, and the last day of the last year is no more
important than the first day of the first year, those benefits should be
recognized as a valuable property right, and should be considered as
vested when the service begins and earned when the twenty years are
completed.
268. Judd v. Judd, supra note 251; In re Marriage of Freiberg, 57 Cal. App.
exact continuing participation for the spouse.2 69 In Texas, the
"time rule" is also used, but the spouse does not share in promo-
tions.270 In those states which favor immediate pay-out, a cur-
rent valuation will fix forever the rights between the parties and
terminate their partnership. This, after all, is what a divorce is
about.271
In California, there is a further complicating factor: if no
immediate pay-out of the spouse is made, then the interest of the
non-employee spouse terminates upon the death of either hus-
band or wife (known as the "terminable interest rule").272 This
court-created theory arose out of the ancillary benefit of a
"widow's" pension under the government plans which were
first considered by the courts. It has been severely criticized
since 27 13 and the rule has no general application in any other
jurisdiction.2 7 4
Before valuing a pension interest, the court, counsel and par-
ties must know what it is and must know it is "property" under
state law. This requires careful gathering of information,
2 7 5
most of which can be obtained from the information required to
be retained by the plan. Of the various methods available for
valuation and of the factors to be considered in making that
determination, the appraiser should start with a view to the
expected mode of division. This requires research of prior
3d 304, 127 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1976).
269. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d at 849,544 P.2d at 568,126 Cal. Rptr.
at 690; In re Marriage of Freiberg, 57 Cal. App. 3d at 311, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 797,
citing Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 492 P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972). But see
In re Marriage of Martin, 50 Cal. App. 3d 581,123 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1975), where the
court noted husband's control and therefore ordered him to begin immediate
payments to wife akin to what she would have received if he had chosen to
retire.
270. Schappell v. Schappell, supra note 251; Rennick, Apportionment of
Community Property Interests in Prospective Retirement Benefits Upon Di-
vorce, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 72, 76 (1977).
271. J. Sutherland, Community Property: Non-vested Retirement Benefits-
"In re Marriage of Brown (1976), 15 Cal. 3d 838, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633," Vol. 2, No. 1
FAM. L. NEWSLETTER 19, 20 (Spring 1976).
272. Waite v. Waite, supra note 269; Benson v. City of Los Angeles, supra
note 245. Cf. In re Marriage of Bruyl with Polk v. Polk, supra note 265. The
"insurance premium" rule set forth in Polk, but rejected in Bruyl, allocates
death benefits from insurance based on the source of funds to pay insurance
premiums.
273. In re Marriage of Peterson, 41 Cal. App. 3d 642, 656, 165 Cal. Rptr. 184,
194 (1974); Ramsey v. Ramsey, supra note 245, 535 P.2d at 65 (dissent). See also,
commentary above in Part III of this article.
274. The "terminable interest rule" was recognized at one time in New
Jersey. See, Kruger v. Kruger, 139 N.J. Super. 413,354 A.2d 340 (1976), overruled
on this issue 73 N.J. 464, 375 A.2d 659 (1977).
275. See, Firestone, supra note 249 and Part IV above. The careful gathering
of answers requires a more than passing acquaintance with the questions.
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cases or a knowledge of current court practice. In any case, a
valuation should serve the purpose of facilitating the property
division. Now that property rights include intangible and un-
measurable elements such as unvested pensions and numerous
optional modes and dates of pay-out, the courts seem to be more
inclined to leave the parties in partnership as to the pension in
lieu of making an arbitrary division which can almost be as-
sured of punishing one or the other of husband or wife.
PART VII
DIVISION OF PENSION INTERESTS
Once a court has determined that an interest in a pension is
marital or community property and has valued it, or has chosen
to delay such evaluation, it must decide an appropriate form of
division. In some states, the court will order an immediate divi-
sion to be funded by other property.2 6 This step is effective
provided there is other property and provided also that the
evaluation was "fair." For instance, if a court should decide to
order the participant spouse to pay the non-participant one-half
the current value of a profit sharing interest, and then the par-
ticipant should lose such an interest because of a break in em-
ployment, the participant has not been fairly treated. To the
contrary, if a deep discount is taken because of the unexpected
future vesting of the interest, if the interest does vest, the non-
participant may be unfairly treated.277 An immediate division
works best close to retirement where contingencies are few and
especially where the participant has the option of realizing the
benefit or not.27 8 Alternatively, if a current valuation can be
reached and if the pension interest is "matured" 279 so that the
participant may choose to receive benefits immediately, or
276. Arizona: Everson v. Everson, 24 Ariz. App. 239, 537 P.2d 624 (1975);
Idaho: Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 535 P.2d 53 (1975); Wisconsin: Parsons
v. Parsons, 68 Wis. 2d 744, 229 N.W.2d 629 (1975). See also, Phillipson v. Board of
Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 473 P.2d 765, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1970).
277. Sutherland, Community Property: Nonvested Retirement Benefits-
"In re Marriage of Brown (1976) 15 Cal. 3d 838, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633," Vol. 2, No. 1
FAM. L. NEWSLETTER (Spring 1976).
278. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Ramsey, supra note 276.
279. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1976). "[A] vested pension right must be distinguished from a 'matured' or
unconditional right to immediate payment." Id. at 842, 544 P.2d at 563, 126 Cal.
Rptr. at 635.
choose not to do so, the court may order the participant to either
retire and begin payments to the spouse or, pay to the spouse
what benefits otherwise would have been payable if retirement
had begun currently.280 The rule may be too harsh for some
courts if it would force the participant to leave the plan.281 For
these courts "current pay-out" may be made by counting the
pension value in making division of other available property.
282
In'other states such "property" as a pension may also be con-
sidered in making awards for support,283 but in California, a
decision whether or not to award support may not be based on a
division of property.28 When a pension is too difficult to value
or when there are no other assets to allocate in exchange for an
assignment to the participant of the entire plan interest,281 the
courts have been increasingly prone to favor a "when, as and if"
division calling for pay-out to the non-employee spouse only
280. In re Marriage of Martin, 50 Cal. App. 3d 581, 123 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1975).
Cf. In re Marriage of Freiberg, 57 Cal. App. 3d 304, 312, 127 Cal. Rptr. 792, 798
(1976) where the court stated:
As a general rule, in selecting a method to effect distribution of the
community interest in retirement rights the court acts in the exercise of
judicial discretion and its determination respecting such will not be
interfered with on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is shown. The
criterion governing judicial action is reasonableness under the circum-
stances. The method adopted may vary with the facts in each case.
See In re Marriage of Wilson, 10 Cal. 3d 851, 519 P.2d 165, 112 Cal. Rptr. 405
(1974) where the court denied a "discount" to reflect future versus present value
of-pension interest when "realization" was within husband's control; see also
Taylor v. Taylor, 449 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Ct. App. 1970).
281. See Taylor, supra note 280, wherein the court recognized appellant's
argument that withdrawal from the plan constituted a "penalty" but neverthe-
less, the husband was forced out of the plan in order to pay his wife her interest
in the plan. Cf. Pinkowski v. Pinkowski, 67 Wis. 176, 226 N.W.2d 518, 520 (1975)
wherein the court noted:
The trial court in its directions for findings of fact and conclusions of
law said, 'It is clear that Mr. Pinkowski should not be required to termi-
nate his employment so that the proceeds of his retirement program
would be available for division.' We agree. However, the present value of
the fund as determined by the trial court must be included in the assets
to be divided between the parties.
282. Pinkowski v. Pinkowski, supra note 281, and Parsons v. Parsons, 68
Wis. 2d 744, 229 N.W.2d 629 (1975) where the court used the "legal rate" of 5% to
determine the current plan value.
283. Colorado: In re Marriage of Ellis, 538 P.2d 1347 (Colo. App. 1975) (mili-
tary non-contributory pension not "property"); In re Marriage of Pope, 544 P.2d
639 (Colo. App. 1975) (Government contributory pension is "property"); Mis-
souri: In re Marriage of Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949 (Mo. App. 1975) (unmatured
pension is "property" to be divided and/or considered when setting support);
Michigan: Hutchins v. Hutchins, 71 Mich. App. 361, 248 N.W.2d 272 (1977) (con-
tributory government pension, refundable, is "property").
284. In re Marriage of Brown, supra note 279, 15 Cal. 3d at 848, 544 P.2d at
567, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 639; In re Marriage of Cobb, 68 Cal. App. 3d 855, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 670 (1977).
285. See In re Marriage of Milhan, 13 Cal. 3d 129,528 P.2d 1145,117 Cal. Rptr.
809 (1974), cert. denied 421 U.S. 976 (1974) where the court divided other commu-
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when the participant chooses to retire.286 When a division is to be
made and under what terms is relatively straight forward.
Once a proper valuation and definition of the property rights is
available to the court it may decide in the best interest of the
community and in accord with state law how such a division is
to occur. However, what if the property is ignored or, by mis-
take, excluded from the divorce consideration? In community
property states, the property is held in a tenancy in common,
subject to a subsequent action of division.287 Upon the partition
of such tenancy there will be an equal division.2 8 Recognizing
nity property after valuing a National Service life insurance policy and assign-
ing as a part of his share to husband-an indirect equalization.
286. In re Marriage of Freiberg, 57 Cal. App. 3d 304, 127 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1976)
(husband and wife as partners, sharing profits and losses); Mora v. Mora, 429
S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968); and see Rennick, Apportionment of Communi-
ty Property Interests in Prospective Military Retirement Benefits Upon Di-
vorce, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 72, 77 n.27 (1977). Blitt v. Blitt, 139 N.J. Super. 213,
353 A.2d 144 (1976) (wife to share profits and losses of combined defined contri-
bution plans); Laffite v. Laffite, 253 So.2d 120 (La. App. 1971) (total partnership
between husband and wife in profit sharing plan); Lynch v. Lawrence, 293 So.2d
598 (La. App. 1974) (same as Laffite, except court specifically orders valuation
as of retirement by present values at that date); Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d
661 (Tex. 1976) (nonvested military pension to be shown when, as and if pay-
ments received). See Rennick, supra at 76. Query: whether base for dividing
pension is at divorce or at retirement. But see Schappell v. Schappell, 544
S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977) (division as of base at divorce); and In re
Marriage of Pea, 17 Wash. App. 728, 566 P.2d 212 (1977) (division as of divorce
date).
287. In re Marriage of Cobb, supra note 284; In re Marriage of Brown, supra
note 284; Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1977) ("time rule" for military
pensions); Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970) (military disability pen-
sion); Constance v. Constance, 537 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976) (there is no
statute of limitations for a partition of a tenancy in common in a pension
because the right is a continuing right). See also, T.L. James & Co., Inc. v.
Montgomery, 332 So.2d 834, 851 n.2 (La. 1975).
Although at the time of dissolution of the community, the right to share
in the funds' proceeds may be a mere expectancy without marketable
order or redeemable cash value, the wage earner and his spouse may at
that time agree upon its value and partition it, along with the other
assets of the community. In practice, usually this is done after a separa-
tion or divorce, by the wage earner paying his spouse for the discounted
value of her half of the community asset, either by cash or by the spouse
receiving in exchange an agreed-upon equivalent share of other commu-
nity assets. See Comment, 25 La. L. Rev. 108, 140-141 (1964).
In the present case, however, the husband did not settle with his first
wife for her interest in the contractual right to receive these proceeds
eventually, and therefore, to the extent of the value of the contribution
of the first community in these funds, the first community's interest
remains an unpartitioned assets of that community. See Lanlinais v.
David, 289 So.2d 343 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
288. See Taggart v. Taggart, supra note 287 at 424-25 (dissenting opinion).
this possibility, the Supreme Court of California in Brown,289
limited the retroactive effect of the ruling so as not to open up
long-since final dissolution decrees.
A court may order a judgment or other accounting by one
spouse to another to properly distribute marital property, in
Idaho, 29 0 but may not in California. 291 The California courts
reason such a division unfairly allows community assets to one
spouse by substituting the less valuable personal note of the
other spouse. In difficult cases, courts make unusual decisions.
When husband ran off with all but wife, the California court on
behalf of wife, and because husband was out-of-reach, ordered
the state pension plan to make payment to wife.2 9 2 Since hus-
band had, by his conduct, dissipated all other community prop-
erty, the court awarded his entire pension interest to wife and
further took upon itself the opportunity to allow such court
supervision of participant elections to protect the community. 293
In short, the court, of necessity, directed a pension plan to pay to
wife even though the plan had a contract giving husband the
election only. When limited to its facts, i.e., an errant and uncon-
scionable husband, it is clear that the court had little choice.
Unfortunately, this difficult case has been cited for authority in
subsequent cases on the point when the subsequent cases have
no similar facts dictating judicial activism. It was this difficult
case which is so often quoted to favor as the preferred mode of
distribution, the assignment to participant of the plan interest,
At the time of their divorce in 1968, military retirement benefits payable
in the future were assumed to be of a contingent, non-vested character,
and therefore outside the jurisdictional power of the court, and accord-ingly not subject to division by inclusion in court approved and/or draft-
ed property settlements. Notwithstanding that assumption, which we
now recognize to have been erroneous, courts were then free to make
virtually any distribution of the remaining community and separate
property as seemed just and appropriate, in order to do equity among
the partners. We cannot know to what extent if any, the expectation of
retirement benefits influenced the various courts in dividing properties
among divorcing partners. The bounds of judicial discretion in divorce
property settlements have known little appellate limitation or review,
and what courts could not do officially, they have often done unofficial-
ly. It is more than a 'reasonable assumption' that such benefits have
been, in many if not most instances, of major consideration to the court
in effecting a property settlement between partners.
289. Supra note 279 at 851, 544 P.2d at 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 641: "Our
decision will apply retroactively, however, to any case in which the property
rights arising from the marriage have not yet been adjudicated to such rights if
such adjudication is still subject to appellate review, or if in such adjudication
the trial court has expressly reserved jurisdiction to divide pension rights."
290. Ramsey v. Ramsey, supra note 276 at 679, 535 P.2d at 60.
291. In re Marriage of Tammen, 63 Cal. App. 3d 927, 134 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1976);
In re Marriage of Hopkins, 74 Cal. App. 3d 591, 141 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1977).
292. Phillipson v. Board of Administration, supra note 276.
293. Id. at 48, 473 P.2d at 775, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
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with a compensating grant of other community assets to
spouse.294 As noted above, such a mode of distribution becomes
a "gamble" for each spouse when unvested benefits are in-
volved.
One final word should be noted about terminable interests to
the non-participant spouse. In establishing "equal value" for
divisions of community property, as required by statute, how
many California courts have actually evaluted the increased
value of the participant's spouse "inheritance" upon the partici-
pant's or the non-participant's death? Equality requires such a
calculation. If actually applied the result would be a large,
perhaps a much larger, share of each pension payment being
made to the non-participant so long as both spouses survived.
PART VIII
ENFORCEMENT
Once the court has determined there is an interest in the
pension plan and has determined its value and made an order as
between the parties to the divorce concerning the future respec-
tive rights in the pension the question then arises, how may the
court's order be enforced? 295 Additionally, if the parties have
discussed the matter and come to an agreement, can they ask
the court to make a determination binding on the plan itself?
Even if they do not agree, can the court make such an order?
In California, and probably in other jurisdictions, court rules
allow the joinder296 of persons who claim any interest in the
property or whose presence before the court would be indis-
pensable for a determination or necessary to the enforcement of
court orders.297 However, can a court order a plan to account to
a person other than a participant or beneficiary? Afterall, plans
subject to ERISA are required to have language which would
prohibit any assignment or alienation of any interest in the
294. Id. at 46, 473 P.2d at 764, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 70. See In re Marriage of
Brown, supra note 280 at 848 n.10, 544 P.2d at 565 n.10, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 639 n.10.
295. Most of Part VIII will focus on California enforcement procedures.
There is a large variation between individual states on how court orders are
made and enforced. In the area of family law, this tendency is even more
pronounced because of the different backgrounds of the various states in defin-
ing the marriage relationship. See Part II, supra.
296. CAL. R. CT. 1250-55 (Rev. July 1, 1977).
297. Id. at 1254.
plan?298 Not only is such a clause mandatory,299 but ERISA also
contains language that purports to preempt the court from
making any such ruling. 300 California and other state courts
have ruled that the ERISA prohibition does not apply to com-
munity property interests because a spouse claims as an owner
and not as a creditor.30 1 Additionally any pre-emption provision
which Congress might wish to institute would need to be clearer
and more specific than the one presently in ERISA.
302
The court may join the plan and/or trust as a necessary par-
ty.30 3 What if the court order conflicts with the plan or what if
the court decides to be nice to the non-employee spouse by
ordering an early pay-out? At one time that was a problem, but
California has changed the law. Now, a plan has the right to
have been served and formally joined and then may raise as a
defense against any such order, among other defenses, that the
court order would expand the rights of the participant or spouse
or both.304 In other words, the plan must be formally joined and
the court will only make an order which will not expand the
obligations of the plan.
The plan is still to operate under the federal law, solely and
298. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1975); ERISA § 206(d); I.R.C. § 401.
299. ERISA covers nearly all plans, whether or not "tax qualified" excepting
for the most part only government plans and some church plans. 29 U.S.C. §
1003(b) (1975); ERISA § 4(b).
300. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1975); ERISA § 514. See discussion in Part V, supra.
301. This is a legal fiction, utilized by the court to deftly avoid a confronta-
tion with the clear language of ERISA. In re Marriage of Fithian, 74 Cal. App. 3d
397, 403, 141 Cal. Rptr. 506, 512 (1977). "A spouse with a community property
interest in the other spouse's retirement pay 'claims not as a creditor, but as an
owner with a present, existing and equal interest,' (citations omitted)."
302. Or, at least, that is the opinion of the California courts. See, In re
Marriage of Milhan, 13 Cal. 3d 129, 132, 528 P.2d 1145, 1147, 117 Cal. Rptr. 809,
811, cert. denied 421 U.S. 976 (1974), "Clearly, given the express congressional
intent" the state courts would have to bow to the supremacy of the federal
jurisdiction. See also Carlson v. Carlson, 11 Cal-3d 474, 521 P.2d i114, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 722, cert. denied 419 U.S. 1105 (1974).
303. In re Marriage of Sommers, 53 Cal. App. 3d 509,126 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1975)
applying CAL. R. CT. 1250, 1252, and 1254 [Rev. July 1, 1977]. The court accepts
joinder as proper because, "The trust holds community assets." However, this is
not so. In fact the community asset is the interest in the plan and is akin to a
share of stock in a corporation (for these purposes, the analogy may work. For
Daniel v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, supra, the interest in a plan is not the
kind of "security" intended to be subjected to the watchful eye of the SEC). Just
as a couple which owns, say, a share of General Motors stock cannot join that
corporation to their divorce (dissolution) action, so should the trust holding the
plan assets be free from joinder. The effect of allowing joinder is to materially
increase the legal and other costs for the plan which now must become a party to
a marital dispute which truly does not concern it. To date, the courts do not
agree with this analysis.
304. 1977 Cal. Stats. ch. 860 amending CAL. CIV. CODE 88 4351, 4363 (West
1970) and adding CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4363.1, 4363.2, 4363.3 (West Supp. 1978).
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exclusively in the interest of the participants and their be-
neficiaries. 30 5 A federal district court in Texas has held that
spouses of participants are neither participants nor be-
neficiaries. 3 6 How can the plan fulfill its obligation to the court
and still follow federal law? The answer is that federal law is not
pre-eminent in divorce matters.0 7 The states have jurisdiction
in that area and, having such jurisdiction, impliedly have the
right and power to enforce their own orders. A federal district
court in California has twice ruled in favor of state authority to
determine spousal rights in pension plans incident to a
divorce.308
The issue of whether a pension plan may be joined in a state
court dissolution proceeding has, at least temporarily, been re-
solved in favor of state jurisdiction.0 9 If the court issues its
order directly to the plan, then compliance can be assured.
However, if the plan is not amenable to service or otherwise has
not been joined, what then? The order of the court for a division
of property was originally thought not to be enforceable by
contempt3 10 because enforcement by imprisonment would vio-
late the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for
305. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1975); ERISA § 404(a)(1).
306. Kerbow v. Kerbow, 421 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
307. In re Marriage of Pardee, 408 F. Supp. 666 (C.D. Cal. 1966). See Paoli,
Pension Rights and Community Property: From French to Brown, 4 WEST. ST.
U.L. REV. 91, 102 (1976) discussing Pardee. In So. Cal. IBEW v. Superior Court,
No. CV 76-1768-F (C.D. Cal. filed July 16, 1976). Judge Ferguson again ruled
ERISA was not intended to preempt state law in the domestic relations proceed-
ings. This opinion does not appear in the official reports (Federal Supplement),
but was reported in [Sept. 27, 1976] 105 PENS. RPTR. (BNA) D-18.
308. Id. at 669 n.5, 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a) (1975): "[ERISA § 205] provides that
annuity plans must provide for payment of benefits in a form having the effect
of a qualified joint and survivor annuity. The trust divines an intention from this
section (which appears merely to attempt to provide protection for surviving
spouses) to invalidate community property laws. If that was the intention
Congress surely selected an indirect and cryptic method of expressing its views.
Even more remote is the assertion that the community property laws operate as
prohibited assignments in derogation of 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d). See Phillipson v.
Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 473 P.2d 765, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1970). Of
course, if Congress intended to regulate this area, it has the power to do so. Cf.
Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950); Hoffman v. United States, 391 F.2d 195
(9th Cir. 1968).
309. See the forms for joinder in the Practical Law Course, supra note 249,
discussed in Part VII.
310. Presentation of Herbert Ross, Contempts, 1976 FAM. LAW SYMP. 251, 256
(L.A. Co. B.A. 1976 and Supp. 1977) citing In re Fontana, 24 Cal. App. 3d 1008,
101 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1972).
debt.3 ' However, contempt was often used to enforce payment
of child or spousal support, which were treated as fulfillment of
a legal obligation and not as payment of a debt.3 12 Prior to recent
statutory amendment, pension interests were exempt from at-
tachment and could not be reached for support payments.31 3
Contempt can now be used to enforce a court ordered division
of a pension. Recently, California has joined the other states
that recognize that the participant is a constructive trustee on
behalf of the spouse and that any failure to account is a breach
of a fiduciary duty which is punishable by contempt. 31 4 How-
ever, contempt requires personal service and a present ability to
do what is requested. What if the interest to be reached, such as
a military pension, is exempt from legal process? If the partici-
pant can get the military to acknowledge the claim of the
spouse, then contempt may still be used.31 5 Often however, the
311. CAL. CONST. art. I § 16. Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 509, 310
P.2d 634 (1957).
312. In re Fontana, supra at 1010, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 466; Ross, Contempts,
supra, note 310. See Tilghman v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. App. 3d 599, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 195 (1974), wherein the court ruled an order for support, even though a
part of an integrated property settlement, is always enforceable by contempt.
313. Ogle v. Heim, 69 Cal. 2d 7, 9-10, 442 P.2d 659, 660-61, 69 Cal. Rptr. 579,
580-81 (1968) wherein the court held pension assets themselves were exempt, but
stated the husband could be held in contempt for a failure to provide support.
Miller v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. 2d 14, 442 P.2d 663, 69 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1968). CAL.
CODE CIV. PROC. § 690.18 was amended in 1975 and 1976 to allow all pensions
(including HR-10 Keogh plans) to be reached for support obligations. California,
along with the other states in the United States, has enacted the Uniform Recip-
rocal Enforcement Support Act. Presentation of Commissioner Richard Den-
ner, Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law, 1976 FAM. LAW SYMP.
299 (L.A. Co. B.A. 1976 and Supp. 1977). This uniform law has been interpreted
in California to give rise to an independent and always modifiable right to
support, even in derogation of a sister state's previous judgment. Elkind v. Byck,
68 Cal. 2d 453, 459, 439 P.2d 316, 320, 67 Cal. Rptr. 404, 408 (1967). There it was
argued that California must give "full faith and credit" to the Georgia judgment
of nonmodifiable child support. (U.S. CONST. art. IV § 1, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1975)).
The court stated:
The purpose of the full faith and credit clause is to establish throughout
the federal system the salutory principle of the common law that a
litigation once pursued to judgment shall be as conclusive of the rights
of the parties in every other court as in that where the judgment was
rendered .... (Citation). But ... the federal system now espouses the
principle that no state may freeze the obligations flowing from the
continuing relationship of parent and child.
314. In re Marriage of Fithian, 74 Cal. App. 3d 397, 141 Cal. Rptr. 506 (1977).
Other states have previously utilized the concept of constructive trust and al-
lowed contempt proceedings to enforce marital property divisions: Wisconsin:
Pinkowski v. Pinkowski, 67 Wis. 2d 176, 183-85, 226 N.W.2d 518, 522 (1975); New
Jersey: Callahan v. Callahan, 142 N.J. Super. 325,328-30,361 A.2d 561,563 (1976);
Texas: Marshall v. Marshall, 511 S.W.2d 72, 75 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974). Those cases
which have actually enforced a contempt action for failure to divide a marital
interest in a pension are few, but do include: Ex Parte Sutherland, 526 S.W.2d
536 (Tex. 1975) and Ex Parte Anderson, 541 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976).
315. See Ross, Contempts, supra note 310 at 252.
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military cooperation is not present.3 16 Although the Social Secu-
rity law was amended effective January 1, 1975, to waive United
States immunity to service of process for garnishment for any
amount due from the United States for any claim for alimony or
child support,317 such provision may not apply to a division
which is not a support claim. However, when suit was brought
in Texas 318 and in Florida,319 for "support" to divide retirement
benefits, the courts held that a division of marital property
served the same function as alimony and therefore allowed the
garnishment. 3
20
Even assuming that garnishment will be appropriate, the lim-
its on what can be reached are defined by state law, which may
deny recovery entirely.321 In such cases, the federal courts have
gone both ways; sometimes "reaching" to allow a pension divi-
sion as within the Social Security amendments and sometimes
not. The federal government is willing to prevent deadbeats
from leaving the states with a welfare burden or abandoning
their family, but it also wants to avoid unnecessary investiga-
tion of claims and alleged "assignments. '322 Either the federal
316. See Brown v. Brown, 21 N.C. App. 435, 438, 204 S.E.2d 534, 536 (1974)
wherein North Carolina was requested, and did agree, to enforce a Texas prop-
erty division in husband's military pension. The court, in explaining the need for
the action by North Carolina, noted the refusal to cooperate by the Army in the
division. See also, Marshall v. Marshall, supra, 511 S.W.2d at 74 wherein the Air
Force declined to cooperate in the division, necessitating an imposition of a
constructive trust by the court.
317. Social Security Act § 459; 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1975). The courts have inter-
preted this new provision as not providing an independent basis for federal
court jurisdiction. Wilhelm v. United States Department of Air Force, 418 F.
Supp. 162 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Morrison v. Morrison, 408 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Tex.
1976). However, where appropriate, and only after certification of need by the
Secretary of HEW, Congress has allowed the federal courts to enforce support
obligations. 42 U.S.C. § 660 (1975). See Bolling v. Howland, 398 F. Supp. 1313
(M.D. Tenn. 1975).
318. United States v. Stelter, 553 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).
319. Williams v. Williams, 338 So.2d 869 (Fla. App. 1976).
320. See Popple v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 1227 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) wherein
the husband attempted to enjoin Georgia enforcement of a garnishment against
his military pension (under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 459 (1975) supra) but the
federal court, though sympathetic, again reiterated that there was no independ-
ent federal jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 459 (1975) to enjoin its improper
application by the states. The federal courts have rejected the theory that a
property division of military pensions is akin to "alimony" under 42 U.S.C. § 459
(1975). Marin v. Hatfield, 546 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1977).
321. See Samples v. Samples, 414 F. Supp. 773 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
322. United States v. Smith, 393 F.2d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 1968), "The purpose of
[The Anti-Assignment Act, 31 U.S.C. § 203] is 'to prevent possible multiple
payment of claims, to make unnecessary the investigation of alleged assign-
ments, and to enable the Government to deal only with the original claimant,'
government might help or the plan could have joined. However,
what if it is a state government plan, not subject to ERISA, but
containing similar non-alienation provisions? Perhaps the title
to the interest in the plan could be tried.323 The court has juris-
diction to try title to all property which is claimed in a dissolu-
tion, including being able to sell the property to the highest
bidder. This is in the interest of avoiding a multiplicity of ac-
tions.324
If that type of joinder is not enough, the court may choose to
treat a particular case as sufficiently unusual so that it will issue
its order directly to the retirement board. 25 At the very least, if
the plan is amenable, perhaps it will consent to an action akin to
an interpleader. This has been done before and the courts have
granted the plan its costs out of the funds to be distributed.3 26
Certainly, the court, if it can find other property, can award
the difficult-to-reach assets to the participant while making
available to the non-participant spouse any assets which can be
found.3 27 This approach has been taken where an equitable dis-
tribution of assets is all that is necessary,3 28 but it can be utilized
in California, too, since the law requires equality by total value
and not as to each individual asset.3 29 In some jurisdictions,
excluding California, 3 0 it would be permissible to order
alimony for the spouse, if needed.33' The difficulty with that
approach is that the recipient has "traded" away a permanent
United States v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., (1949), 338 U.S. 366,373, 70 S. Ct.
207, 211, 94 L. Ed. 171."
323. See In re Marriage of Davis, 68 Cal. App. 3d 294, 303,137 Cal. Rptr. 265,
279 (1977), ". . . either party to the divorce action may bring in third parties
claiming an interest in property alleged to be community and adjudicate the
claims of such party in the divorce action." See In re Marriage of Sommers,
supra, note 303.
324. Id. at 302, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 273, citing Elms v. Elms, 4 Cal. 2d 681, 52 P.2d
223, Annot., 102 A.L.R. 811 (1935).
325. Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 35,473 P.2d 765,769,
89 Cal. Rptr. 61, 64-5 (1970), there is no "assignment" since the spouse claims as
"owner." See note 301, supra. For a case of similar import in Texas, see Collida
v. Collida, 546 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).
326. Fox v. Smith, 531 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975). T.L. James & Co., Inc.
v. Montgomery, 332 So.2d 834 (La. 1976). In re Marriage of Milhan, supra note
302. See also, Phillipson v. Board of Administration, supra note 325; and Waite
v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 492 P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972).
327. See, e.g., Pinkowski v. Pinkowski, supra note 314.
328. Waite v. Waite, supra note 269; Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3
Cal. 3d at 47, 473 P.2d at 775, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 71, ". . . it has never been supposed
that each asset must be cleaved in twain, without regard to the wishes of the
parties or the justice of the matter."
329. In re Marriage of Cobb, 68 Cal. App. 3d 855, 137 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1977).
330. Subject, in California, to the "terminable interest rule," discussed in
Part III and elsewhere in this article.
331. See, e.g., Colorado: In re Marriage of Ellis, 538 P.2d 1347 (Colo. App.
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property right" 2 for a temporary support payment. If either
party died, alimony would stop, but a property right might
continue.
A final point of caution should be considered. If the court's
enforcement order allows the participant to make an election
and the participant chooses (putting aside the intentionally nas-
ty selection)333 the wrong option, the non-participant spouse has
no recourse against the employer . 3 4 Likewise, if the participant
is allowed to deal with the plan without any monitor of the
communication, some affirmative statement to the plan that the
participant must account to another, and the plan pays off the
participant, there can be no recovery against the employer.335
Enforcement 336 must be very carefully pursued to be sure that
interests of the parties, especially the non-participant spouse,
are protected. Any slip along the way and the participant could
flee with the boodle, leaving the practitioner red-faced and,
perhaps, considerably poorer. Court orders against federal
plans now allow garnishment, at least in some state courts. In
any case, a constructive trust will be held to exist as to the
participant for any sums received. The constructive trustee will
be held accountable by contempt if necessary. In some, if not all,
jurisdictions the court will allow, and perhaps encourage, the
joinder of the plan in deciding the division of plan interests. If a
court order goes directly to the plan, with the court retaining
jurisdiction to supervise compliance, the interests of the spouse
1975), and In re Marriage of Pope, 544 P.2d 639 (Colo. App. 1975). But, in Califor-
nia, for a contrary reference to Cobb see Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d at 474,492 P.2d
at 21-2, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 333-34.
332. See, e.g., Phillipson v. Board of Administration, supra note 325.
333. Ball v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 30 Cal. App. 3d 624, 106 Cal. Rptr. 662
(1973).
334. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5106 (West Supp. 1978); Schneider v. Standard Oil Co.
of California, 55 Cal. App. 3d 1018, 128 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1976). Query whether a
"loan to a participant" made before a benefit payout was otherwise due, which
loan created a lien in favor of the plan against the participants interest, could be
"utilized" to covertly allow the participant to receive benefits without having to
account to the spouse?
335. For a more elaborate and thorough discussion of the numerous (and
complicated) possibilities of enforcement of marital court orders see Presenta-
tion of Commissioner Norman Pittluck, Enforcement of Orders or Judgments
for the Payment of Support Money-Other than by Contempt, 1976 FAM. LAW
SyMp. 263 (L.A. Co. B.A. 1976 and Supp. 1977).
336. Review again the earlier discussion of malpractice and especially note
the $100,000 judgment against counsel in Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349,530 P.2d
589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975). See note 2, supra.
will be protected. Where the plan may not be joined and if the
participant is not amenable to personal service to be brought
before the court, perhaps the court will allow the plan interest to
be brought before the court to determine title to that property.
There are numerous available tools of enforcement. Whichever
ones are to be utilized, the practitioner must continue to be
vigilant lest the money in the plan be disbursed and thereby the
plan be released from further liability.
PART IX
MULTIPLE JURISDICTIONS
The cases cited and the matters discussed heretofore have
focused on the resolution of the pension interest in a divorce in
one jurisdiction. In this section the focus will be on some of the
difficulties which have arisen when more than one jurisdiction
is involved.
For a state to grant an effective divorce one of the marriage
partners must be domiciled within its jurisdiction.337 However,
without further contacts with the other partner, the order of the
state may not make a determination of support and property
rights.338 The Supreme Court has stated that a determination of
the support obligations and of property interests requires that
that state perfect in personam jurisdiction over the parties to be
bound.339 However, the divorce decree determining the status of
337. Williams v. North Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Annot., 143 A.L.R. 1273
(1943); Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226 (1944); Annot., 157 A.L.R. 1366
(1945).
338. Hudson v. Hudson, 52 Cal. 2d 735, 344 P.2d 295 (1959). Carmichael v.
Carmichael, 216 Cal. App. 2d 674, 31 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1963) when the domicile in
another state is fraudulent (nonexistent) then even the decree of divorce need
not be given "full faith and credit." See also Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 492
P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972), and In re Marriage of Van Sickle, 68 Cal. App. 3d
728, 137 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1977) giving effect to a Nevada divorce (in rem), but
denying effect to support and property determinations made in Nevada without
in personam jurisdiction as to the California spouse.
339. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957). See also, Storer v. Storer,
346 So.2d 994 (Fla. 1977) wherein the court noted:
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam
is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence
his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequi-
site to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him. Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733, 24 L. Ed. 565, 572. But now that the capias ad
respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other
form of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.'" Id. at 995, citing Pinebrook v. Pine-
brook, 329 So.2d 343, 347 (Fla. 1976).
The Court pointed out that the minimum contact held sufficient to satisfy due
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a person domiciled within a state's borders must be given full
faith and credit.340 This leads to the concept of the "divisible
divorce, '341 meaning that the status of the parties may be deter-
mined without prejudicing the future opportunity of the parties
to have their property and support rights determined.342
In order for a state to establish in personam jurisdiction, the
state must see that either (a) the person to be bound is personal-
ly served within the state or (b) the person consents to the
court's jurisdiction, either in person or by counsel or (c) there is
established sufficient contact related to the subject matter for
the individual within the forum state to satisfy the fundamental
standard of fairness and to make constructive service sufficient
to appraise the individual of the proceeding. The nature of such
"service" must be in accord with a "long-term statute" of the
forum state.343 It has been argued that long-arm statutes were
limited to commercial dealings, but the courts have ruled that
the reach of the statutes is particularly useful in divorce matters
because of the relatively ambulatory nature of some persons at
the time of divorce.
344
Sometimes more than one state will have sufficient contact
with the marriage or the parties to allow both or more states to
process has consisted of as simple an act as maintenance of the last marital
domicile within the forum state, coupled with one spouse's continued residence
in the forum state.
340. Waite v. Waite, supra, note 338; Mizner v. Mizner, 84 Nev. 268, 439 P.2d
679, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 972, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 972 (1968). Pierrakos v.
Pierrakos, 148 N.J. Super. 574, 372 A.2d 1331 (1977).
341. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, supra, note 339. For an example of divis-
ible divorce" see In re Marriage of Adams, 64 Cal. App. 3d 181,134 Cal. Rptr. 298
(1976) where the dissolution was granted January 31, 1972, support was set
March 21, 1973, and benefit plan division was heard March, 1975.
342. Hudson v. Hudson, supra note 338, at 742, 743, 344 P.2d at 299:
In a divorce action in a foreign state upon constructive service the court
there has authority to adjudicate status (in rem) of a person residing in
that state but has not jurisdiction to adjudicate away (in personam) any
of the then vested property rights of the absent spouse who does not
reside in such state, who is not personally served with process in that
state and who does not appear in the action. The personal rights of the
spouses in property not within the jurisdiction of the acting court re-
main subject to litigation in the proper forum. It seems to me that the
right of a wife, or in a proper case, the husband, to support from the
other spouse as of the date of the order is a property right which can be
adjudicated only by a court having jurisdiction in personam. (Schauer,
J. concurring in De Young v. De Young, 27 Cal. 2d 521, 527 [165 P.2d
457].)
343. Mizner v. Mizner, supra note 340, 439 P.2d at 680.
344. Id. at 681. Wright v. Wright, 114 N.J. Super. 439, 276 A.2d 878 (1971).
undertake divorce actions.141 It then becomes a race to judg-
ment,3 46 or one state may recognize the others predominant
interest i.e., comity.347 The test for whether one state shall honor
the actions of another is to see if the judgment presented ap-
pears to be in proper order, and, if so, then to require the an-
tagonist to the judgment to establish its invalidity.3 48 For exam-
ple, if Arizona had sufficient contacts, even though Texas, the
forum state, may have had more, and good constructive service
had been made, then an Arizona judgment will not be set
aside.349
In matters related to the determination of pension rights one
case will illustrate the setting. In Brown v. Brown,350 the North
Carolina court was asked to assist in the enforcement of a Texas
divorce decree which divided the interest in a military pension
between the husband and the wife. In 1973, after obtaining a
Texas divorce decree, both parties moved to North Carolina.
The wife sought payment directly from the army, but the army
refused to make payment to anyone other than the retired offic-
er. The wife sued to enforce her claim "in the nature of
alimony." The husband countered that Texas, the state with
original jurisdiction, does not allow permanent alimony, so the
wife's claim must fail. The North Carolina court, having re-
searched Texas law, determined the division of pension inter-
ests was probably a division of community property and was
therefore not invalid under Texas law and would be enforced.
The court of one state issued its divorce decree which appeared
proper on its face. It was challenged in another state as to the
application of the law of the initial jurisdiction. The court of the
enforcing state sought, and in this case was able to find, a basis
for sustaining the sister state's decree and then consented to
enforce it.3
51
345. In Scott v. Scott, 554 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977), the Texas court
refused to give full faith and credit to a California determination of
domicile/residence because it had not become final. The case demonstrates the
"race to judgment" needed in such matters.
346. Id. at 278. The court emphasizes that the full faith and credit clause
requires a judgment before there is an obligation of one state to abide by the
decision of another.
347. Id. The court noted:
The general rule on comity is: 'While . . the pendancy of a prior suit
involving the same parties and subject matter strongly urges the court
of the local forum to stay the proceedings, pending determination of the
prior suit, yet the rule is not mandatory upon the court nor is it a matter
of right to the litigant. It is after all, a matter resting within the sound
discretion of the court.' Mills v. Howard, 228 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1950, no writ).
348. Mitchim v. Mitchim, 518 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1975).
349. Id.
350. 21 N.C. App. 435, 204 S.E.2d 534 (1974).
351. Social Security Act § 459, 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1975) effective January 1, 1975.
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Minimum contact as to the subject matter sufficient to satisfy
the concept of fairness352 is always needed if out-of-state service
is to be enforced. Contact such as prior domicile in the state of
decree will nearly always be enough if coupled with the barest
extra additional contact.
In Wright v. Wright,353 the husband departed from New
Jersey, the last domicile of the marriage, to move to New York.
His only continuing contact with New Jersey was a weekly
column he wrote which he sent from New York to New Jersey.
Such contact was deemed sufficient by the New Jersey court
which held him liable under the state long-arm statute to make
him account for the support of his "abandoned wife and child."
In Mitchim v. Mitchim,354 the wife sued in an Arizona court
for divorce, alimony and child support, serving her husband in
Texas. The couple had lived in Arizona for five years, but had
decided to move to Texas (or the husband had at any rate). The
wife never really settled in Texas, returning after only three
days to Arizona. She obtained judgment against him in Arizona
and proceeded to sue to enforce the judgment in Texas. Among
the minor contacts the husband continued to have with Arizona,
was his sending child support checks and mortgage pay-
ments through the mail. The Texas court enforced the Arizona
order, deeming such contact sufficient to warrant jurisdiction.
Perhaps the most persuasive element in establishing
minimum contact was the fact that the state of decree was, in
each case, the last real domicile of the marriage. The implica-
tion is that it was in that state that the final break-up of the
marriage occurred. Again, in Fox v. Fox, 355 where New Jersey
had been the last domicile of the marriage, a long-arm service
was upheld in an action for arrearages for support. To like
effect a California decree against a husband who had moved to
Utah, served by mail, as to the sale of Florida property was
See also discussion in Part VIII, above, concerning the controversy over en-
forcement of "support" orders when in fact the decree is for division of marital
property.
352. See Storer v. Storer, supra note 339 at 995, citing International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
353. 114 N.J. Super. 439, 276 A.2d 878 (1971).
354. See note 347, supra.
355. 526 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).
upheld since California had been the last domicile of the mar-
riage and since wife continued to live there.356
In re Marriage of De Lotel 5" confronted another issue when
a husband moved to Oregon and his wife sought to execute
against his pension for unpaid support. The husband argued
Oregon law, which exempted his pension from execution, ought
to apply. The California court held that California law would
apply because comity is not to be given to procedural and reme-
dial provisions of another state. Besides, California had issued
the original support order which was now in default and would
not hear an argument to evade its judgments.358 Logic would
indicate California would be most reluctant in allowing the law
of another jurisdiction to permit exemption for California or-
dered support.
California has a peculiar institution called "quasi-community
property." By statute in 1961, 359 California retroactively 360
created an inchoate property right akin to community property
"for any property which would have been community if it had
been acquired while the marriage was domiciled in California.
The inchoate. property right "vests" upon the filing of the peti-
tion for dissolution or, as in 1969, at the time of the interlocutory
decree.36 1 In a peculiar case involving stock options, the hus-
band received options as compensation while in New York,
then came to California. The wife filed for divorce and thereaf-
ter the husband's options "matured." The wife obtained an in-
terlocutory decree in which the court held the options were
quasi-community and were therefore divisible with the wife.
Whether California has a legitimate interest in reaching such
property is debatable. At any rate, this is the kind of decision
that will certainly discourage the itinerant executive from tak-
ing up residence.
356. Pinebrook v. Pinebrook, 329 So.2d 343 (Fla. D.C. App. 1976). See also
Storer, supra note 339 which recites the full catalogue of cases. Storer involved
a Wyoming marriage and divorce with long-arm service being made in Florida.
357. In re Marriage of DeLotel, 73 Cal. App. 3d 21, 140 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1977).
358. Id.
359. Former CAL. CIV. CODE § 140.5, repealed by 1969 Cal. Stats. ch. 1608 § 3,
now CAL. CIv. CODE § 4803 (West Supp. 1978) added by 1970 Cal. Stats. ch. 312 § 3.
360. Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal.2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965),
Annot., 14 A.L.R. 3d 391 (1967). See The more honest acknowledgment of retro-
active application of Addison in In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal.3d 583, 593,
546 P.2d 1371, 1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 432 (1976). Bouquet itself involved the
retroactive application of a statute (CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118) which interfered with
previously "vested" rights.
361. Cooper v. Cooper, 269 Cal. App. 2d 6,11,74 Cal. Rptr. 439,443 (1969). See
also IRS Private Letter Ruling, No. 7742052 issued July 22, 1977, discussing tax
effects of quasi community property division on account of a dissolution.
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In an easier case 62 to understand, the Florida state court
stretched the law a bit so that a wife's allocated community
property interest in her husband's military pension plan coula
be garnished. 36 3 Florida was willing to assist in the enforcement
of the Texas decree but was limited in the remedies available
since the asset to be reached was an entitlement from the United
States. The court stated: "Like the well-known rose by another
name, these post-marital benefits of the Texas decree are tan-
tamount to alimony for the purposes of statutes of the United
States securing the enforcement of state alimony awards."
As if the combination of diverse purposes of pension and
family law were not enough, when matters become entangled
with more than one jurisdiction which may have markedly dif-
ferent legal developments, the permutations and combinations
become like an advanced jig-saw puzzle: fitting the pieces to-
gether to even resemble a reasonable result may be beyond the
limits of the system.
PART X
PROBLEMS
The fact situations below are offered to illustrate problems.
Sometimes an answer may be apparent, but most -often, no
satisfactory solution is possible given the current state of the
law.
1. A doctor, age 45, making very good money and newly incor-
porated, establishes a defined benefit pension plan. The
plan provides for a $50,000 per year benefit for the doctor at
normal retirement age of 65, but also provides an early
retirement option at full pension at age 55 with 10 years of
service. There are also six other employees, none of whom is
over thirty, but all of whom may receive pensions based on
salary of $10,000 per year at age 65, or at age 55 if they are
living. As expected, turnover is very high. The plan accrues
benefits at 3% of final projected benefits, but accruals are
100% at normal or early retirement if an employee has twen-
ty years service. Vesting is 50% after five years, reach-
362. Williams v. Williams, 338 So.2d 869, 870 (Fla. App. 1976).
363. Social Security Act § 459; 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1975) allows garnishment
against the United States only for "support" obligations.
ing 100% at ten years. In the past, in fifteen years of practice
none of the doctor's staff has stayed five years.
Using aggressive funding assumptions, the plan receives
contributions of $80,000 per year for the doctor plus $45,000
for the other employees. Actually minimum funding is much
less. For the doctor it would be approximately $30,000, and
for staff, perhaps $10,000. Funding is level each year, but the
value of accrued, earned but not yet vested, benefits is
minimal. Accrued benefits for the doctor in the first year, 3%
of final pension of $50,000 or $1,500 per year at age 65 at
current value, is worth less than $10,000. If an employee
leaves early, and all have in the past, all benefits are for-
feited. Annual funding is $125,000 (actual, very aggressive),
$40,000 (minimum level, assuming high turnover); and ac-
crued benefits for the doctor in the first year is $10,000 (or
less).
If the doctor gets divorced, what is the value of his wife's
community interest? Is it one-half of the accrued benefit of
the doctor? Is it one-half of minimum funding for the doc-
tor? Is it one-half of maximum funding for the doctor? In
truth, the doctor is socking away $125,000 per year. 36 4 The
wife may be entitled to as little as $5,000!
2. Louisiana, Texas and California are all community property
states. However, the community property rights differ some-
what. Louisiana follows the Napoleonic Code. Each spouse,
upon break-up of marriage, obtains full and complete own-
ership of one-half of the community. This includes the right
to select options available under pension plans. Louisiana
uses the concept of "vesting" to determine whether commu-
nity property exists, but applies attribution retroactively as
soon as vesting does occur, even if that should happen after
the divorce. Marital interest in pensions are inheritable from
the non-participant spouse.365
Texas allows the participant spouse to maintain all plan
options, as a constructive trustee, but does endow the non-
participant spouse with all other ownership rights, such as
the right to have the interest passed on to his or her heirs.
Texas does not require "vesting" to create a property right
for the community. Unlike Louisiana and California, Texas
364. In re Marriage of Imperato, 45 Cal. App. 3d 432, 119 Cal. Rptr. 590
(1975). Normally, the owner of a corporation will not be heard to question its
existence. May the spouse do so where the corporation is being utilized to
accumulate funds for long term retirement such as this problem?
365. T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So.2d 834 (La. 1976).
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does not require equal division of community property; in-
stead it follows the "equitable distribution" rule.366
California considers unvested pension interests as com-
munity property. Generally, participant options are left with
the participant and do not pass to the non-participant
spouse. California also has the "terminable interest rule"
which prevents heirs of the spouse from inheriting any plan
benefit. California has quasi-community property, unlike
Texas and Louisiana, which would create a "vested" right in
the spouse as soon as a petition in divorce was filed 367 as to
any other property which would have been community, if
acquired in California during marriage.368 Assume that hus-
band and wife marry in Louisiana. On the same day hus-
band enters the regular army. After seven years, they move
the marital domicile to Texas and, after seven more years,
they move the marital domicile to California. After seven
years in California, the husband retires and gets a divorce.
Does the wife have community property interest as to one-
half under California rules or as to one-sixth each for
Louisiana, Texas and California? Are the wife's interests
which arose in Texas and Louisiana inheritable? Do Califor-
nia's quasi-community laws alter the nature of Texas and
Louisiana community interests?
3. Texas has common law marriage, California does not. Hus-
band and wife believe California does and believe they are
married at common law. They have lived together for five
years. The wife has a pension interest from Sears where she
works. Does the husband have any rights in the pension,
either under Marvin or otherwise?
Husband and wife move to Texas for five years. Under
Texas law they are now married. Does this alter the answer
as to the husband's rights in the wife's Sears pension? Sup-
pose husband and wife first lived in Texas, then came to
California. A different result?
366. Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976).
367. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4803 (West Supp. 1978), Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d
558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1965).
368. See In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr.
633 (1976); Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 492 P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972); In re
Marriage of Freiberg, 57 Cal. App. 3d 304, 127 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1976).
4. Husband and wife met at college and dated for a while in
Louisiana. Husband moves to Iowa, a common law state, in
order to join the army and take graduate courses in ag-
ronomy. Wife comes from Louisiana and they marry in Io-
wa. Both still treat Louisiana as "home" in the sense that it is
where family is. Nineteen years pass. Husband is very suc-
cessful and is promoted to colonel as special consultant to
other countries on the rapid development of agricultural
technology. He is constantly on the move around the world.
The wife comes along wherever there is housing for herself
and the two boys, now age 12 and 7. Husband is assigned to
Denver to work on the desalination projects along the
Colorado River. Before his wife joins him from New Mexico,
he meets Tania. Wife moves into military housing with the
boys, but husband is almost never there, being "busy" with
important work. Wife finds out. They talk. He finds Tania,
"the woman he always wanted." Wife heads back to Louisia-
na for the first time in twenty-one years. Husband stays on
with Tania.
Wife sues husband for divorce in Louisiana, obtaining
jurisdiction by the long-arm statute. She contends the mar-
riage has been domiciled in Louisiana since it began, never
having had any other permanent location.369 On this basis,
serving husband by certified mail, return receipt requested,
she is awarded custody, alimony of $700 per month, child
support of $300 per month, plus one-half of the pension
earned during coverture (21 years). Husband does not ap-
pear and wife obtains default. She then seeks to garnish
wages and his pension under Louisiana law.370
Husband has in the interim sued for a Colorado divorce
and has affected service on wife in Louisiana by Colorado's
long-arm statute. He argues a six-month domicile in
Colorado with wife and boys, which was last domicile of
marriage before break-up. 17' He also alleges in his petition
that the marriage had originally been domiciled in Iowa and
that it had never been domiciled in Louisiana.37 2 Wife does
not appear. Husband obtains default, leaving wife custody,
no alimony (she deserted) and $200 per month child support.
369. Swope v. Mitchell, 324 So.2d 461 (La. App. 1975); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96
Idaho 672, 535 P.2d 53 (1975).
370. Social Security Act § 459; 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1975) effective January 1, 1975.
371. Williams v. Williams, 338 So.2d 869 (Fla. App. 1976); United States v.
Stelter, 553 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).
372. Scott v. Scott, 554 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. et. App. 1977).
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Colorado confirmed to him his military pension as his sepa-
rate property.3
73
He now quits the army, having received a lucrative offer
from the Shah to develop some agriculture and technology
at Abadan. He instructs the military retirement office to
send checks directly to him and encloses a copy of the
Colorado order confirming his sole right in the pension.
Promptly each month he sends $200 child support. Wife re-
fuses to cash or accept them and each month the letter is
sent to Abadan or to the dead letter office.
3 74
Does wife have a claim for support? Does husband have a
valid support order which he may honor? Does Colorado
and/or Louisiana have sufficient minimal contact to allow
the matter to be decided in its courts? What does the United
States answer in response to wife? Where is Tania? Does she
have a sister?
PART XI
A SOLUTION
Marriage is changing as an institution. People are living to-
gether without benefit of clergy and without children, generally
by choice. Yet, marriage is thriving. Now, those who marry
choose to do so. Retirement plans are changing the face of
America. They are not big, they are huge. They also are no
longer just retirement plans. In truth they have become the one
source of financial security for the family to fall back on in case
of severe need. Commerce between the states, of goods and of
people, is more active than ever. People move about more and
more. There is a choice and more Americans are choosing to
live in the sun. However this mobility and migration bring dif-
ferent values from around the country into confrontation. Na-
tional policy favors uniformity. However, a person is still free
and encouraged to choose local alternatives. So too, pension
plans must be uniform in installation and in operation, but not
necessarily in the diversity of individual rights which they ef-
373. In re Marriage of Ellis, 538 P.2d 1347 (Colo. App. 1975).
374. United States v. Smith, 393 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1968).
fect. Retirement plans would not be harmed if their funds were
to be assignable because of divorce to a spouse or as a trust to
support children; nor would an option to divert some of the
funds to a child's education be detrimental to the plans or to the
need to strengthen the family. Marriage creates the family in
our society, but the family can only continue to thrive as an
institution if we can afford it. The traditions and historically
diverse backgrounds of the states has not crippled their growth
or that of this country. Diversity does cause problems, however,
it gives a choice.
Pensions can be made subject to state court order on distribu-
tion of assets in divorce. This, however, should be done by
Congressional action, if there is to be uniformity; otherwise we
will continue to have the anomalies of two or more different
states ruling on the same marital rights in a pension plan.
The states protect the family, the federal government controls
and protects the retirement system. Let there be an understand-
ing by both of the purposes of the other. Then they may work
together.
To impliment this understanding we need:
1. A national policy, in law, to allow "pension" plans to be the securi-
ty source from major family crises, such as divorce, illness or
college for children.
2. A national policy, in law, to advise state courts how to protect the
interest of the family without conflicting with the interests of the
plans.
3. As much personal choice as possible since from diversity comes
progress.
4. A type of voluntary national register of rights in pension plans
which would allow for interests in plans for very specific purposes
to pass without tax or penalty from one person to another.
5. A broad discussion of purposes, i.e., what are we doing this for?
The law is conservative. The bar and bench respond to
change. That is their nature. If the changes recommended here-
in make sense and are needed, it rests with the legislature and
the executive to initiate the move. We need diversity; we need
personal choice; we also need family because it insures continu-
ation. We can have it all.
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APPENDIX
PRINCIPAL TYPES OF PLANS AND THEIR MAJOR DIFFERENCES
This appendix is intended to give the reader most of the major
differences between various types of qualified retirement plans.
The appendix is presented in three separate parts: first, a list of
factors of analysis; second, a list of the major types of plans
with a brief description of each; and third, a detailed presenta-
tion of the differences between the various types of plans. It is
hoped that this cross-reference procedure will prove most use-
ful in allowing the reader to distinguish a plan by the language
presented in the document.
PART I
FACTORS OF ANALYSIS
1. Purposes
2. Definitions
3. Administration
4. Eligibility
5. Funding
A. Allowable (maximum)
B. Required (minimum)
C. Deductible
6. Accrued Benefits and Allocations
7. Vesting
8. Allowable Investments
9. Benefits
10. Termination and Amendment
PART II
TYPES OF PLANS
1. Money Purchase Pension Plan. A retirement income plan
intended to replace a portion of normal earned compensa-
tion after separation from service which is funded by a
specific percentage of compensation for covered employ-
ees each year. The benefits paid are the benefits that can be
purchased with the balance standing to the account of the
participant at the time of benefit pay-out.
2. Defined Benefit Pension Plan. A retirement income plan
intended to replace a portion of normal earned compensa-
tion after separation from service, where benefits are cal-
culated based on average compensation over a period of
time, and the benefit level is determined by a formula set
forth in the document. Funding is generally carried out by
the employer, and investment results do not increase or
decrease the available benefit to participants. In effect, the
employer "guarantees" the benefit payable to the partici-
pants at the time the benefits are paid.
3. Target Benefit Plan. A retirement income plan intended
to replace a portion of normal earned compensation after
separation from service. This plan is a hybrid of the Money
Purchase and Defined Benefit Pension Plan in that a pro-
jected final benefit is calculated, based on actuarial as-
sumptions established at plan set up, and level annual con-
tributions are calculated based on the final benefit. How-
ever, the benefit payable is based on the balance in the
account of a participant at the time of benefit pay-out, and
the investment results are not guaranteed in any way by the
employer. For plan limitation purposes, a Target Benefit
Plan is considered a Defined Contribution Plan.
4. Profit Sharing Plan. A plan intended to allow partici-
pants to share in the profits, either current or accumulated,
of the employer, which has a definite formula for the allo-
cation of contributions amongst participants. Normal bene-
fits are payable at an established retirement date, but they
may be payable after a specified period of time on account
of a predetermined event prior to the normal retirement
date, and without the requirement of separation from serv-
ice with the employer.
5. Stock Bonus Plan. A plan similar to a Profit Sharing
Plan, except that contributions need not be calculated on
the basis of available profits, and distribution from the
plan must be made in the form of employer stock.
6. Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP or ESOT). An
employee benefit plan (not necessarily a retirement income
plan) which includes at least a Stock Bonus Plan, and may
include also a Stock Bonus and Money Purchase Pension
Plan. The difference between an ESOP and a Stock Bonus
Plan in general is that the ESOP is exempted from the
prohibited transaction rules in terms of borrowing funds to
acquire assets, and that it is designed principally to invest
in qualified employer securities.
7. HR-IO or Keogh Plan. A retirement plan, either Profit
Sharing, Money Purchase, or Defined Benefit type, which
provides benefits in part for self-employed individuals and
their common law employees. Please note that a Keogh
Plan may be of a Profit Sharing or Pension type, with
corresponding characteristics. The main variation in
Keogh Plans is the limitation on funding for self-employed
individuals.
8. Subchapter S Corporations. A corporation which qual-
ifies as an electing small business corporation under Sub-
chapter S of the Internal Revenue Code (Sections 137.-
1379), and which elects a retirement plan, is limited in the
amount of deductible contributions which may be made on
behalf of stockholder employees (more than five percent
owner of outstanding stock of corporations) and some
other minor provisions, but is in general considered to be a
qualified corporate retirement plan.
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9. Tax Sheltered Annuity. A 501(c)(3) organization may,
pursuant to Section 403(b) of the Internal Revenue Code,
provide by purchase of annuity or similar funding mecha-
nisms, retirement benefits on a selective basis for its
employees. In effect, the individual employee chooses to
purchase a non-transferrable annuity for his retirement,
but only those employees who choose to participate obtain
any benefits. All benefits are non-forfeitable.
10. Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA). An individual
who is not an active participant for a calendar year in any
other qualified plan, may elect to deposit in cash for the
year, a certain percentage of his income earned for the
performance of personal services in a bank, savings and
loan, or annuity contract or retirement bond. The funding
is purely discretionary with the individual involved, and all
amounts deposited are non-forfeitable.
PART III
ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF PLANS
1. PURPOSES
A. Pension Plans, all types
Replacement of income, payable generally as an annui-
ty at time of retirement.
B. Profit Sharing Plans
When profits exist, to allow employees to share in gains
of the employer and to provide a fund to ease employ-
ees' financial burden upon retirement.
C. Stock Bonus Plans
To provide employees with a closer identity with em-
ployer by giving employees stock of the employer. This
type of plan must distribute only stock of the employer.
D. Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP)
Similar to a Stock Bonus Plan, but also allows borrow-
ing to acquire employer stock. Generally, employer's
motives may also include a) providing a source of corpo-
rate financing; b) providing a market for closely held
stock; and/or c) having a vehicle which will facilitate
transfer of control to key management or owner's rela-
tives at the time of withdrawal by the largest share
holders.
E. HR-10 or Keogh Plans
These plans may be of pension or profit sharing format.
Their purpose is to provide benefits for the self-em-
ployed individual and all common law employees of
such individual.
F. Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA)
To allow individuals who are not active participants in
any other retirement program to put away funds for
retirement and have contributions tax deductible.
G. Tax Sheltered Annuities
To allow employees of § 501(c)(3) organizations (general-
ly schools, hospitals and charities) to put away funds for
their retirement and have contributions tax deductible.
All tax qualified retirement plans must have as their main
motive the providing of benefits to employees of employer. All
funding must be for the exclusive benefit of participants and
their beneficiaries (and to pay reasonable expenses of adminis-
tration). The plan must specifically prohibit diversion of the
funds for any other purpose and must clearly prohibit any use
which would constitute a reversion of funds to employer (with
some exceptions).
2. DEFINITIONS
A. Accrued Benefits:
Defined Benefit Pension Plans v. Defined Contribution
Plans: Accrued benefits for individual account plans
(defined contribution plans) are the balances in the ac-
counts. For defined benefit plans, accrued benefits are
expressed as a part of the final projected benefit at
normal retirement, which part has been "earned" to
date.
B. Compensation:
Target Benefit and Defined Benefit Pension Plans: For
most plans, compensation is the actual remuneration
for the current Plan Year. For Target Benefit and De-
fined Benefit Pension Plans, compensation is generally
defined as an average of compensation over a period of
years. This variation is used in order to "smooth out"
any sharp swings in compensation which may occur
from year to year.
C. Employees:
i. HR-10 or Keogh Plans:
Added categories of employees: Owner-Employees:
persons owning more than 10% of profits or capital;
Partner-Employees: partners owning 10% or less of
capital and profits; Self-Employed: all owners of a
capital or profit interest.
ii. Subchapter S. Plans:
Added category of employees: Stockholder-Employee:
individuals owning more than 5% of the stock of em-
ployer.
D. Retirement Dates:
HR-10 or Keogh Plans and IRA:
Normally pay-out may not occur until a participant has
reached 59 1/2 and must begin when a participant has
reached 70 1/2. These restrictions in Keogh Plans need
only apply to owner-employees, but are sometimes ap-
plied to all participants in the plan.
These are a substantial number of variations in definitions
and there are a number of terms which are defined in one plan
or another. The above list is not exhaustive by any means, but
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does indicate the key variations in definitions which will distin-
guish one plan from another.
3. ADMINISTRATION
A. Defined Benefit Pension Plans
i. Must make reports and pay premiums to the Pen-
sion Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) to "in-
sure" participants against loss of promised bene-
fits.
ii. ivMust ie actuarial reports ksignea oy rnrouiea t-c-
tuary) with IRS and perhaps with DOL.
iii. Generally, the plan assets are kept in an unseg-
regated fund and individual allocation of assets to
participants is not made. No allocations of gains
and losses is made to participants: investment re-
sults are reflected in contributions made or to be
made by employer.
B. Pension Plans, all types
Minimum Funding Accounts are kept to be sure re-
quired employer funding is made.
Plans (regardless of type) must generally be maintained with
a trust. As an alternative, a plan may be fully insured; in which
case a trust is not required, although it still may be utilized (in
which case the trustee would hold the insurance contracts).
4. ELIGIBILITY
A. HR-10 or Keogh Plans:
Maximum service to participate is three years (and all
accrued benefits are 100% vested immediately).
B. IRA:
May not be an active participant in any other qualified
retirement plan at any time during individual's tax year
(generally, calendar year).
C. Tax Sheltered Annuity (TSA):
Must be an employee in a § 501(c)(3) organization. For
certain educational institutions, minimum age may be
set at 30, instead of 25, for all retirement plans main-
tained by the employer.
5. FUNDING
A. Allowable (Maximum) Funding
i. Defined Benefit Plans
Funding sufficient to fund for a benefit not exceed-
ing 100% of compensation (over three highest
consecutive years) or $75,000 (this figure is adjusted
annually to reflect cost of living; for 1978 it is
$90,150), whichever is less (there are adjustments
made to the above limits for differing situations).
ii. Defined Contribution Plans (including Target Ben-
efit Pension Plans):
Annual Additions (basically employer funding and
forfeitures, plus some larger employee contribu-
tions) for each participant may not exceed 25% of
compensation or $25,000 (the figure is adjusted an-
nually to reflect cost of living; for 1978 it is $30,050)
whichever is less.
iii. Tax Sheltered Annuity:
Generally, 20% of aggregate covered compensation,
not exceeding 100% of current year eligible earn-
ings; but also limited as set forth in IRC § 415(c)(4).
iv. HR-10 or Keogh:
For owner-employees, 15% of earned income or
$7500, whichever is less (exceptions: when the regu-
lations are issued, HR-10 Defined Benefit Pension
Plans may allow larger funding).
v. IRA:
15% of earned income or $1500, whichever is less.
15%/$1750 for spouses IRA.
vi. Employee Contributions:
a. For most plans, mandatory contributions may
not be onerous, which has been interpreted to mean
not more than 6%.
b. For most plans, voluntary contributions are al-
lowed equal to not more than 10% of total covered
compensation during all years of plan participa-
tion; subject, however, to the restriction that part of
such contributions (whether mandatory or volun-
tary) will be counted against the Annual Additions
limitation in (ii) above.
c. For HR-10 or Keogh Plans, voluntary employee
contributions for owner-employees may only be
made if there is at least one other plan participant
not an owner-employee who could have made a
voluntary contribution, and are further limited to
10% of earned income or $2500, whichever is less.
Generally, over-funding may disqualify a plan for tax bene-
fits, but for HR-10 Plans and IRA, any over-funding will lead to
a 6% excise tax (per year) on the excess funding until it is paid
back or otherwise reduced to zero.
Any plan investing in employer securities will generally pro-
hibit investment of employee contributions (including rollovers)
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in such securities (this is to avoid certain securities law prob-
lems). For ESOP's and Stock Bonus Plans, it is common to
prohibit all employee contributions because of the above
problem.
B. Minimum Funding
i. Pension Plans:
All current year costs plus a ratable portion of past
service liability (generally, amortized over 30 or 40
years). For Target Benefit or Money Purchase Pen-
sion Plans, current cost is the required employer
contribution set forth in the plan.
ii. HR-10 or Keogh Profit Sharing Plan:
For qualification such plans must give a definite
formula for contributions (10% of profits, etc.).
C. Deductible Funding
i. Employee contributions are not deductible.
ii. Defined Benefit Pension Plan:
The current year's cost plus past service liability
and interest amortized over 10 years or minimum
funding, if larger.
iii. Target Benefit and Money Purchase Pension
Plans:
So long as the plan's contribution formula does
not exceed maximum funding limits above, the
formula contribution is deductible.
iv. Combined Pension Plan with a Stock Bonus or
Profit Sharing Plan, including ESOP:
25% of covered compensation.
v. Stock Bonus or Profit Sharing Plans:
15% of covered compensation for current year
contribution; up to 25% of covered compensation
for current year plus prior year's missed contribu-
tions.
vi. HR-10 or Keogh Plans:
For each self-employed individual (whether or not
an owner-employee) 15% of earned income or
$7500, whichever is less; for all common law em-
ployees deductions are the same as the type of
plan as noted above as if it were maintained by a
corporate employer.
vii. Subchapter S Plan:
For stockholder-employee, 15% of compensation
or $7500, whichever is less; normal limits apply for
all other employees.
viii. IRA:
An above-the-line deduction is available to each
individual having earned income (i.e. both spouses
if working may each establish an IRA) equal to
15% of earned income up to $1500 (or $1750
spouses IRA). All contributions must be made in
cash.
ix. TSA:
Generally, 20% of earnings, cumulative for all
years in eligible employment, subject to the limita-
tions on maximum funding of IRC § 415.
Generally, funding for each year may be made up to the time
for filing a tax return, except for an IRA which must be funded
(in cash) by February 14 of the following year. This allowed
delayed funding applies for minimum and deductible funding.
Maximum funding is determined for each Limitation Year
which will be the calendar year (Rev. Rul. 75-481) unless the
plan sponsor affirmatively elects otherwise. Normally the plan
will fix the Limitation Year as the Plan Year.
6. ACCRUED BENEFITS AND ALLOCATIONS
A. Individual Account Plans (Defined Contribution Plans):
Generally, all funding must be allocated to participant's
individual accounts and no substantial assets may re-
main unallocated. Accrued benefits for each participant
will be the individual account balance.
B. Defined Benefit Plans:
Accrued benefits must be determined by one of three
formulas (3%, ratable, or 133 1/3%, see IRC § 411) and the
accrued benefit for each participant is generally ex-
pressed as a percentage of final projected benefits in the
form of an annual annuity payable at normal retire-
ment. No individual accounts are maintained. The cur-
rent value of accrued benefits for participants is the
"actuarial equivalent" at the present time of the earned
portion of final retirement benefits and must be cal-
culated using the actuarial assumptions (investment re-
turn, turnover, mortality, etc.) used for the plan.
C. Profit Sharing, Stock Bonus, and ESOP's:
Forfeitures will be allocated amongst remaining partici-
pants based either on current covered compensation or
upon prior individual account balances.
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D. Pension Plans:
Forfeitures reduce employer funding and may not be
used to increase employee benefits.
E. Subchapter S Profit Sharing Plans:
Forfeiture may not be allocated to stockholder employ-
ees.
7. VESTING
A. HR-10 or Keogh Plans:
If there is an owner-employee, all accrued benefits are
immediately fully vested.
B. IRA, TSA:
All accrued benefits are 100% vested at all times.
C. Employee and Rollover Contributions:
100% vested at all times.
Except as noted above, retirement plans will have a vesting
schedule which will provide vesting based on years of service.
The minimum vesting is set forth in IRC § 411. In addition, the
maximum required vesting for plan qualification (generally)
will be a four to eleven year graded vesting schedule, which is
discussed in the Conference Committee Report from Congress,
issued when ERISA was passed.
8. ALLOWABLE INVESTMENTS:
A. Stock Bonus and ESOP's:
These plans must primarily invest in employer securi-
ties and for the stock bonus plan may only distribute
employer stock to participants.
B. Eligible Individual Account Plans (see ERISA §
407(d)(3)):
May invest more than 10% of plan assets in qualified
employer real estate and securities. Other plans may not
do so.
C. TSA, IRA and HR-10 or Keogh Plans:
Generally, no loans to participants may be made and no
pledge of plan interests to secure a loan may be made.
Defined Contribution Plan investment returns (or losses) go
directly to the participants. There is no "guarantee" of invest-
ment performance.
Defined Benefit Plan investments are used to build the fund
to pay benefits and the employer in effect "guarantees" the
investment results and is obligated to fund for any deficiency.
Contrariwise, any superior returns will reduce required em-
ployer funding.
9. BENEFITS
A. Pension Plans:
Generally, payable only at retirement or other sever-
ance from employment.
B. Profit Sharing, Stock Bonus and ESOP's:
Benefits may be paid at retirement or may be paid on
account of hardship, or even on account of the passage
of time (at least two years for employer contributions).
Benefits will be paid to participants at the times and for
those occasions as the plan will state.
C. Stock Bonus Plans (including ESOP's, at least in part):
Benefits must be paid in employer stock (not market-
able securities).
D. Defined Benefit Pension Plan:
Benefits (within limits) are guaranteed by the PBGC
and the employer's net worth (up to 30%) is collateral for
this guarantee.
E. IRA, HR-10 or Keogh Plans:
Benefits are normally payable after age 59 1/2 and be-
fore age 70 1/2.
If there is a life contingency pay-out, it must generally be in
the form of a Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity. However,
Profit Sharing, Stock Bonus and ESOP's will normally avoid
this problem by providing for lump sum pay-out only. A pension
plan (according to the IRS) will provide a life contingency pay-
out.
10. TERMINATION AND AMENDMENT
A. Defined Benefit Plan:
i. Any termination or other change in status is re-
portable to PBGC and will have to be subject to
PBGC rules (and approval).
ii. If the plan is terminated within 10 years of estab-
lishment, the 25 highest paid employees may have a
reduction of benefits in order to prevent discrimi-
nation. See Regulations § 1.401-4(c). The same rules
will apply to Target Benefit Pension Plans.
Amendments may not be made (generally) which will reduce
accrued benefits or vested benefits. In addition, no amendment
may allow a reversion of funds to the employer.
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A termination may be ordered by the PBGC if a covered
defined benefit pension plan is "in trouble" or might be. In
addition, ERISA § 4062(e) provides for a 20% plus if plan partici-
pants are terminated. Defined benefit plans have many more
restrictions because of PBGC regulation.
Any plan which is substantially curtailed or terminated (in
whole or in part) must provide for full vesting for all affected
participants. This is required plan language.

